

**CIVIC EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA:
THE IMPACT OF ADULT AND SCHOOL PROGRAMS
ON DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES AND PARTICIPATION**

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Executive Summary

The present study was undertaken to examine the impact of civic education programs on political participation and democratic attitudes among adults and high school students in South Africa. The study represents an extension of a similar assessment of civic education programs in the Dominican Republic and Poland conducted by Management Systems International (MSI) for USAID in 1997-98 (Contract No. AEP-5468-I-00-6012-00). As in that study, questionnaires were administered by a professional survey company to samples of individuals who had been trained in several different civic education programs. The questionnaires were designed to measure individuals' participation in politics, their knowledge about the political system, and their adherence to a series of democratic norms and values such as tolerance, trust, and belief in their ability to influence the political process. The impact of civic education in South Africa was ascertained by comparing the responses of individuals who had undergone civic education training to the responses of similar individuals who had not been trained. Further amplification of the findings was provided through qualitative interviews with civic education trainers, and with focus group interviews with selected adults and students who had received civic education instruction.

The goals of the study were to determine whether civic education had effects on a variety of important democratic attitudes and behaviors, and to determine the conditions under which civic education training was most effective. We hypothesized that civic education should affect several different aspects of democratic attitudes and behavior: 1) *civic competence*, or the extent to which the individual has the knowledge and personal capabilities of influencing the political process; 2) *democratic values*, encompassing adherence to the values of political tolerance, support for the rule of law, support for democracy as a system of government, and trust in democratic political institutions; and 3) *democratic political participation*, or legal means by which individuals attempt to influence the local, provincial, or national political process. We developed survey questions based on the political science literature that were designed to measure each of these attitudes and behavior, and adapted them to the South African political context.

To explore the conditions under which civic education may be more or less successful, we focused on three general features of the individual's experience with democracy training: 1) *frequency of civic education exposure*, or the number of workshops or training sessions attended by the individual; 2) *training methodologies*, i.e., whether the methods used in the civic education training were more participatory or more passive in nature; and 3) *trainer quality*, i.e., whether individuals believe that the trainers who conducted the civic education were knowledgeable, interesting, likeable, and competent. For adults, these assessments would pertain to the people who lead civic education workshops or training sessions, while for students these assessments would pertain to their classroom instructors.

The surveys were administered during the period 10 May to 1 June with a total of 1550 respondents in 44 areas in eight of South Africa's nine provinces: 475 adults who were trained in three adult civic education programs, 475 adults who were not trained in civic education; 300 high school students who were given civic instruction by university students trained under the auspices of a national NGO; and 300 high school students who were not exposed to similar

civics training. The treatment and control groups were matched on community size, gender, race, age, and socio-economic status. Additional variables were included in the statistical analyses as controls, including household size, family income, secondary group memberships, political interest, and mass media exposure.

The results for the adult analysis showed that:

- Civic education has relatively strong effects on local level political participation. Attendance at frequent civic education workshops translates into a nearly 20% increase in the percentage of people who are highly active in politics at the local level.
- There are also moderate effects of civic education on civic skills and political efficacy, two orientations that are powerful predictors of political participation in their own right.
- Civic education has weaker effects on political knowledge and relatively weak effects on most democratic values. There are, however, significant effects on several important orientations --- political tolerance, support for regular elections, support for the rule of law, support for cultural diversity --- though these effects are smaller in magnitude than for participation and civic competence.
- Civic education has consistently positive effects on the individual's political trust and evaluation of the performance of the political system. These effects are of similar magnitude to other democratic values.

These findings suggest that civic education can influence individual behavior, perceptions of civic competence, and certain democratic values to a lesser extent. Analysis of the adult data indicated further that the effects of civic education varied dramatically, depending on the nature and frequency of the individual's experience with democracy training. Specifically, civic education is more effective:

- When individuals attend three or more workshops. Less frequent exposure to civic education often has no impact whatsoever; that is, individuals who do not attend at least three democracy training workshops are indistinguishable on many democratic orientations from the control group.
- When workshops are conducted with more participatory methodologies, such as role playing, simulations, mock elections, and the like. Lecture-based civic education has negligible impact on democratic orientations.
- When trainers are perceived to be knowledgeable, inspiring, and interesting by the participants. Trainers who do not engage the participants have little success in transmitting democratic knowledge, values, or participatory inclinations

The observation of what we call "threshold effects" of civic education, where the training must pass certain thresholds in terms of frequency, methodology, and trainer quality in order to

impact individual attitudes, is perhaps the core finding of the study. It is not enough for individuals simply to be exposed to *any* civic education for democratic orientations to be affected. What matters is the *frequency* and *quality* of the training that the individual receives. These findings received strong additional confirmation in the qualitative portions of the study.

The finding that civic education is effective only under certain conditions leads to an additional important result in the adult analysis:

- There is a large difference between the *potential* effects and the *actual* effects of civic education seen in South Africa. When individuals are trained frequently and properly, there are significant and sometimes substantial effects on individual attitudes and behaviors. But less than half of civic education recipients were trained frequently and properly, and over one-quarter of all recipients of civic education were trained in ways that we identify as completely ineffective.

We conducted further analyses to examine whether civic education had greater influence on some demographic groups than others. We found no evidence that civic education mattered more for men than women, more highly educated, more urban, or younger respondents. We did, however, find evidence that:

- Civic education has greater influence on individuals who belong to more secondary groups and associations. Individuals who are more socially isolated exhibit less change from exposure to civic education than individuals who have more extensive social networks. This finding suggests that conducting civic education workshops through existing social and neighborhood associations will have the greatest impact.

The analysis of the student data showed a similar patterns of results, with the caveat that the effects of civic education in general were somewhat weaker than those observed for adults, with one significant exception. The main findings for the students were:

- Civic education has moderate effects on students' school-based political participation. The effects are weaker, however, than were seen for adults. In percentage terms, the effects translate into about a 14% increase in school participation for students who received weekly civic education compared with the control group.
- Civic education has stronger effects on students' general political knowledge than was seen for adults. In percentage terms, the effects translate into about a 10% increase in "high" amounts of knowledge compared to the control group. There were no effects, however, on other aspects of civic competence such as political efficacy or the development of civic skills.
- Civic education in the schools has virtually no effect on democratic values. Individuals who received civic education were no more supportive of democracy as a form of government, no more tolerant of opponents' political views, no more supportive of the rule of law, and no more supportive of women's political participation. There was a slight effect of civic

education on students' perceptions of the duty of individuals to vote and get involved in political life.

- Civic education increased students' overall satisfaction with the way that democracy is working in South Africa, as well the students' expectations for the political system in the future. These results indicate that civic education is having some positive effect on students' overall assessments of the system's performance, though these effects are not overly large in magnitude.

We found similar threshold effects of civic education in the student data. Specifically, civic education is most effective:

- When students are trained on a weekly basis or more frequently. Those trained only a few times a month or less are indistinguishable from the control group on all democratic orientations and behaviors.
- When civics training is conducted with more participatory methodologies, such as role playing, simulations, mock elections, and the like. Lecture-based civic education has negligible impact on democratic orientations.
- When civics classes cover more areas related to democracy. Students exposed to only a few content areas are generally indistinguishable from the control group, while students exposed to more content areas show increases in participation and some other democratic orientations. Increases in knowledge, however, were not dependent on the number of content areas covered in civics classes.
- When teachers are perceived to be knowledgeable, inspiring, and interesting by the students. Teachers who do not engage the participants have little success in changing most democratic orientations, though increases in knowledge exist regardless of the perceived quality of the teachers.

These results are strikingly similar to those found for South African adults. More frequent civics instruction, conducted by better instructors with more participatory training methods, increases the democratic orientations of students as well as adults. And as with adults, the results indicate that the success of civic education programs will turn on whether these conditions are met in practice. Our analysis suggests that the same gap that we observed between the actual and potential civic education effects for adults exists for students as well. Specifically:

- Only 40% of the students trained in the civic education program examined were trained on a weekly basis. Similarly, just over one-half of the students were trained using many participatory methods, and only 40% of the students rated their civic instructors very highly. If civic education were conducted more frequently, with more participatory methods, and with better-trained instructors, the effects we observed on students' democratic orientations in the study would have been greater.

The core findings of the quantitative portion of the study received strong confirmation in the qualitative interviews with civic education trainers, officials of the NGOs involved, and in focus groups of individuals who had attended one or more civic education workshops. Based on the convergence of the qualitative and quantitative analyses, we proposed the following recommendations for the design and implementation of future civic education programs:

- Civic education program designs must ensure repeated exposure for the target audience.
- An assessment of the constraints to repeated attendance should be conducted before a civic education program is implemented.
- Civic education training should use as many participatory teaching methods as possible
- Greater emphasis should be placed on proper training of trainers in the initial phases of program implementation.
- Target civic education to voluntary associations, but there is no need to target specific socio-demographic groups.
- Donors and civic education implementers need to be cautious about the extent to which they can affect democratic values in the short term.
- Civic education programs should include an impact monitoring plan.

The present study has shown unequivocally that civic education *can* matter for the development of democratic political culture. But it can do so *only* when it is conducted in the ways that we have identified. We recommend strongly that policy-makers take these findings into account when designing future civic education programs.

Acknowledgments

About MSI

Management Systems International (MSI) is dedicated to improving performance and management practices within the field of international development, and to achieving results. The firm has been actively involved in helping shape recent initiatives in the democracy and governance arena, and has been awarded a number of contracts by USAID and others for that purpose. One field in which MSI has special expertise is the strengthening of civil society as a vital component of the democratization process. Within that field, the firm has designed new approaches to building the institutional capacity of civil society organizations (CSOs), increasing their ability to analyze and advocate for needed policy reforms, and create coalitions and networks. School-based as well as adult civic education, under the rubric of civil society, is an area of special focus and governments and CSOs strive to create conditions which will help ensure the long-term sustainability of the democratization process.

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I. Overview of the Study

A. Study Goals

The present study was undertaken to examine the impact of civic education programs on political participation and democratic attitudes among South African adults and high school students. The study represents an extension of a similar assessment of civic education programs in the Dominican Republic and Poland conducted by Management Systems International (MSI) for USAID in 1997-98 (Contract No. AEP-5468-I-00-6012-00). As in that study, a professional survey company administered questionnaires to samples of South Africans who had been trained in several different civic education programs. The questionnaires were designed to measure behaviors, attitudes and beliefs in areas relevant to democracy, including: individuals' participation in politics, their knowledge about the political system, and their adherence to a series of democratic norms and values such as tolerance, trust, and belief in their ability to influence the political process.

The impact of civic education in South Africa was ascertained by comparing the responses of individuals who had undergone civic education training to the responses of similar individuals who had not been trained. Further amplification and clarification of the findings were provided through qualitative interviews with civic education trainers, and with focus group interviews with selected adults and students who had received civic education instruction.

The study had three specific goals. First, it sought to determine the extent to which democratic political attitudes and behavior were affected by civic education programs in South Africa. As USAID and other international funding agencies provide extensive support to a variety of NGOs in South Africa that conduct civic education programs, it is important to assess whether the training that is provided by these organizations has had the desired effects. Second, it sought to determine the specific conditions under which civic education is more effective, so that future civic education programs can be structured in ways that maximize their potential impact. The study thus aimed to provide concrete recommendations to policy makers regarding how best to conduct civic education programs in the future.

Third, it sought to determine the extent to which the effects of civic education in South Africa were similar to those found in the earlier study of the Dominican Republic and Poland, and to clarify and extend some of the suggestive findings from that study. The main findings in the Dominican Republic and Poland were that:

- Civic education had greatest impact on political participation, with weaker effects on political knowledge and support for democratic values;
- School-based civic education among Dominican and Polish eighth-grade students was largely ineffective in changing either democratic attitudes or behaviors;
- Civic education had more impact on participation and some democratic orientations if it was conducted with more participatory methodologies such as role-playing, simulations, and group discussions;

- In some domains, civic education had greater effects on men than on women;
- Civic education had greater effects on individuals who were already active in voluntary groups and associations outside of the civic education program.

Replicating these findings in the South African study would increase our confidence that we have identified correctly how and under what conditions civic education can change individual behaviors and attitudes (see also the study of civic education in Zambia by Bratton et al., 1999). In this report, we shall discuss many of the consistencies, as well as some inconsistencies, found in South Africa compared to the Dominican Republic and Poland. The reader is referred to the report on the earlier study, “The Impact of Civic Education Programs on Political Participation and Democratic Attitudes” (Sabatini, Bevis and Finkel 1998), for more details on the previous study’s design, methodology, and results.

The present study sought to extend the Dominican Republic and Poland study in several important ways. First, it was suggested in the previous study that the stimulating effects of civic education on political participation faded over time. In the current study we included more information on the timing of the individual’s civic education exposure and his or her subsequent participation in order to clarify the exact nature of the causal mechanisms between civic education training and future political participation.

Second, the previous study focused on several important democratic values such as political tolerance, trust, and support for democratic liberties. In recent years, political scientists have proposed that support for democratic values should include the individual’s support for democracy *compared to other kinds of political systems*, as opposed to the individual’s support for democratic values in the abstract (Rose et al. 1998; Mattes and Thiel 1998). We have included measures of this kind of support for democracy in this study to determine whether civic education influences overall commitments to democracy, regardless of its potential effect on the individual’s support of the specific norms and values that constitute democratic political systems.

Third, the previous study did not include any information about the individuals who conducted the civic education training. Information about the individual’s civic education experience was limited to how often and how recently the training took place, and the types of teaching methodologies that were employed. In the present study we include a series of questions designed to elicit the individual’s assessment of the quality of the teachers themselves, and to ascertain how differences in teacher quality translate into more or less impact on the individual’s democratic orientations.

Fourth, we expanded the previous study’s qualitative components in order to provide more detailed information about individuals’ reactions to the civic education experience, participants’ views about the strengths and weaknesses of the programs, and the factors that lead to program success and attitudinal and behavioral impact from the point of view of the trainers and those responsible for implementing the programs in the field. All of these additions were designed to improve the previous study and provide more definitive conclusions regarding the impact of civic education.

B. A Framework for Analyzing the Effects of Civic Education

For the past several decades, the United States and many West European countries have devoted considerable resources to promote democratic assistance and strengthen civil society in emerging democracies around the world (Carothers 1996, 1997; Diamond 1995; Quigley 1997a, 1997b). As Quigley (1997a, 564) notes, there are now a “plethora of public and private international actors involved in these efforts ... [including]...most multilateral organizations, regional development banks, major bilateral assistance programs, as well as literally thousands of non-governmental organizations.” Some of these activities center around the training of lawyers, journalists and other social elites in the rule of law, in assisting constitutional reform, and in strengthening democratic political parties, non-governmental organizations, and other elements of a country’s newly-emerging civil society. Some of the activities, though, are directed explicitly at promoting support for democratic norms and values among ordinary citizens. These efforts may be referred to as “civic education programs,” and range from the adoption of new curricula in primary and secondary schools in order to teach young people about democracy, to programs that provide instruction about the social and political rights of women, to voter education programs, to neighborhood problem-solving programs that bring individuals in contact with local authorities for purposes of promoting collective action to benefit local communities.

According to the *International Encyclopedia of Education*, civic education is defined in the following way:

Civic education is broadly concerned with development of citizenship or civic competence by conveying the unique meaning, obligation, and virtue of citizenship in a particular society or the acquisition of values, dispositions, and skills appropriate to that society. (2nd ed., Vol. 7, p. 767)

We can further qualify this by specifying that *democratic* civic education seeks to develop citizens in a democratic society --- as distinct from other societies. Thus, democratic civic education typically seeks to convey a specific set of values thought to be essential to democratic citizenship: values such as tolerance, trust, and compromise. And, just as many conceptions of democracy emphasize the expectation that the democratic citizen will be active in politics, democratic civic education often seeks to instill the skills, dispositions and values necessary for a *participatory* citizen.

The skills, dispositions, and values thought to be “appropriate” to democratic societies are well known to political scientists, and have been researched extensively in both established and emerging democratic systems for the past fifty years. One set of orientations encompasses the individual’s degree of “civic competence,” or the extent to which the individual has the knowledge and personal capabilities to influence the political process. It has long been established in the political science literature that basic political knowledge, civic skills, and perceptions of political influence or efficacy all constitute important resources for meaningful democratic participation (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Scholzman and Brady 1995). Thus, we may expect exposure to civic education to influence the individual’s basic knowledge of the political system, knowledge of basic democratic rights, how democracy works, the structure of the political system, and basic

information about political parties and incumbent politicians. Civic education may also be expected to influence what Verba et al. (1995) call “civic skills,” abilities such as public speaking, problem-solving, working in groups, and the like, that enable individuals to participate more effectively in groups and in the political process more generally. Even more specifically, civic education may influence the individual’s sense of political efficacy, or the extent to which individuals believe that they can have influence in the political system and that the system is responsive to attempts by individuals to exert that influence. Such perceptions of efficacy are critical in determining individual participation in politics; as a systemic factor it is also important in holding elites accountable to ordinary citizens, as elected officials are thought to be more responsive to public pressures when they believe that citizens feel efficacious and may take future collective actions to further their interests. Thus a “civic competence” cluster of orientations that may be affected by civic education includes:

- Knowledge about the political system, institutions and incumbents
- Knowledge about democratic rights
- Possession of skills that facilitate democratic participation; and
- Sense of efficacy that individuals can influence the political process.

Another set of orientations encompasses the individual’s adherence to a set of democratic values and norms. Gibson et. al (1992, 332) describes well the “democratic citizen” as someone who

...believes in individual liberty and who is politically tolerant, who holds a certain amount of distrust of political authority but at the same time is trustful of fellow citizens, who is obedient but nonetheless willing to assert rights against the state, who views the state as constrained by legality, and who supports basic democratic institutions and processes.

This cluster of orientations thus refers to the extent to which individuals have internalized the fundamental norms, values and procedures of democracy, regardless of their degree of knowledge or other aspects of “civic competence.” The democratic citizen is one who adheres to the principles inherent in democracy --- competitive elections with majority rule, political equality, inclusive political participation, civic liberties and protection of the rights of minorities --- and is willing to apply these principles in practice. Individuals should support democratic procedures, be willing to extend procedural liberties even to their political opponents, support the view that governments cannot encroach on certain areas of individual and human rights, and provide some degree of support toward existing democratic institutions (for an overview of the political science literature, see also Finkel et al. 1999).

More recent research into citizen support suggests that democratic political systems --- especially those emerging from communist or authoritarian pasts --- do not require mass internalization of democratic values so much as mass support for democracy as a form of government. This line of research is embodied in the “Churchill hypothesis,” inspired by Winston Churchill’s famous quote that “democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time” (Rose et al. 1998, preface). On this view, citizens evaluate political systems relative to each other. Democratic consolidation is

facilitated when citizens prefer democracy against possible alternative forms --- such as a return to authoritarian rule, military governments, and the like (Rose et al. 1998; Mattes and Thiel 1998; Bratton and Mattes 1999). Civic education may therefore affect different kinds of support for democratic values and democratic political systems. It may influence the internalization of democratic norms and values, and may also influence the degree to which individuals support democracy against alternative systemic arrangements.

The specific democratic values that are included in this cluster of orientations are:

- tolerance, or the extent to which citizens are willing to extend procedural democratic liberties to individuals and groups with whom they may disagree;
- support for the rule of law, or the extent to which the individual believes that all citizens must obey legitimate authority as well the extent to which the individual believes that citizens have rights against the state;
- institutional trust, where citizens should also support basic social and political institutions, though not without some degree of healthy skepticism and willingness to hold elites and the system as a whole to account;
- support for democracy as a form of government against alternative political systems.


We depict these potential effects of civic education on democratic knowledge, skills and values in Figure 1, with the path from civic education to civic competence labeled as path ‘a’ and to democratic values, trust and support for democracy as path ‘b.’ And because, ultimately, civic education attempts to encourage individuals to take part in democratic political life, we include political participation as the final part of the process. We follow political scientists Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) in defining political participation as “legal acts by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take,” eliminating behaviors that are illegal or violent in nature from consideration. We further distinguish two kinds of political participation:

- local level participation, such as participating in town council meetings or neighborhood problem-solving activities;
- participation that is directed at national issues or involves contacting national political leaders.

For students who are not yet eligible to vote, of course, a focus on participation must necessarily be limited either to political participation within the school or approval or willingness to participate in politics in the future.

The potential effects of civic education on participation may operate indirectly through civic competence and values (paths ‘d’ and ‘e’ through paths ‘a’ and ‘b’), or may be the result of direct mobilization efforts (path ‘c’). Our goals in this project, then, are to evaluate the impact of civic education programs by estimating and interpreting the effects of these programs on the individual’s civic competence and support for democratic values, and the direct and indirect effects of the programs on individual participation in the political process.

Figure 1-1
A Model of the Effects of Civic Education



The assessment of the effect of civic education involves not only determining what effects exist and how large those effects are, but also determining the conditions under which civic education is more or less effective. That is, it is important to clarify when civic education appears to matter most in changing individual democratic attitudes and behaviors, and when it matters least. We investigate these issues by focusing on several dimensions of the individual's civic education experience:

- **Frequency of Civic Education Exposure.** Did the individual attend one or two civic education workshops or training sessions, or was the exposure to civic education more extensive. For students, was civics taught in the classroom on a daily or weekly basis or less frequently?
- **Training Methodologies.** Were the methods used in the civic education training more active and participatory, or were they more passive in nature? Were individuals encouraged to express their opinions and participate in games, simulations, role playing, mock elections, and the like, or were they exposed solely to lectures and presented with material with little interaction with the instructors?
- **Trainer Quality.** Do individuals believe that the trainers who conducted the civic education were knowledgeable, interesting, likeable, and competent? For adults, these assessments would pertain to the people who lead civic education workshops or training sessions, while for students these assessments would pertain to their classroom instructors.

Each of these factors is likely to condition the effects of civic education on the individual. We expect individuals who receive more extensive exposure to civic education, exposure to more participatory teaching methodologies, and training by high quality instructors to be more likely to absorb and act on the messages imparted in civic education training. We will test these possibilities by examining the effects of civic education on adults and students who were trained under these differing conditions.

C. Programs Included in the Assessment

Adult Programs

Three programs that conducted civic education among black and coloured adult South Africans were included in the assessment.

1. National Institute for Public Interest Law and Research (NIPILAR). According to USAID, "NIPILAR is the lead organization of a Consortium operating at the national level in the field of public interest law, rights education with emphasis on women and children's rights, as well as the Constitution and Bill of Rights education. The activities aim to promote the 1) respect, practice and fulfillment of human, legal, and civil rights; 2) respect for the rights of women and children and 3) a widespread awareness of human rights and democracy" (USAID/Pretoria Activity Summary 1998). One of the main civic education programs

conducted by NIPILAR over the past several years was its Women's Rights program, designed to promote awareness of the United Nations Women and Children's Rights Convention.

2. Community Law Centre-Durban (CLC). CLC is part of the Consortium described above, and thus has many of the same goals and activities as NIPILAR. CLC operates almost exclusively within the province of KwaZulu Natal, where NIPILAR does not operate. Its primary activities are to coordinate approximately 30 rural legal advice offices in the province. The advice offices provide assistance to community members on legal and human rights issues. Democracy and civic education workshops are also conducted through the advice centers.

3. Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR). LHR is a national organization that aims to increase the awareness of human and democratic rights in South Africa. The organization conducts an extensive series of workshops yearly on democracy and human rights issues, with different aspects of democracy receiving particular emphasis in different years. Workshops in the last two years have emphasized the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and participation in politics, respectively.

The first two groups were selected primarily because of the support that USAID-South Africa has provided for their civic education efforts. LHR was included in the study in order to examine a non-USAID-funded group, and because it is a well-known NGO promoting democracy and human rights in South Africa. LHR also conducted civic education in eight of the nine provinces of South Africa; NIPILAR was also more or less national in focus, while CLC-Durban's area of operation was mainly within one province, KwaZulu Natal.

The three programs operate in generally similar fashion in regards to their civic education activities. Representatives from the central offices conduct training sessions in democracy and human rights instruction for a core group of individuals called "paralegals." These activities, generally known as Training of Trainers (ToT), consume a considerable amount of the group's time and resources. The paralegals then go on to operate offices in villages and towns across country, from which they provide a number of services for individuals in the particular area. Some of these services have nothing to do with civic education, for example providing advice on economic development or labor law. However, the paralegals are also expected to conduct community workshops on different aspects of democratic governance and human rights, and these activities are the focus of our study. According to interviews with the groups' staff conducted by members of our research team, the number of workshops throughout the country are claimed to be in the hundreds yearly by LHR and NIPILAR, reaching many thousands of ordinary citizens.

It is important to note that the kind of civic education offered by these three groups is essentially limited to community workshops and discussions with paralegals at the community advice centers. We did not have the opportunity to examine entirely different kinds of civic education programs as we were able to do in the Dominican Republic and Poland. In those countries, we were able to compare the effects of workshop-type civic education with other kinds of programs such as community problem-solving programs that in some cases provided opportunities for individuals to interact with elected officials or local government bureaucracies. These kinds of civic education programs are less common in South Africa than in the Dominican

Republic or Poland; moreover, most of the groups that conduct civic education were doing workshop-type activities in preparation for the Presidential election held in early June 1999. Thus it should be kept in mind that the civic education programs examined here are not the only kinds of civic education programs that exist, but they do appear to be highly representative of the kinds of programs that exist in contemporary South Africa.

Student Program

The study also included one school-based program that provided civic education to high school students in South Africa. The Centre for Socio-Legal Studies (CSLS), a democracy and human rights NGO based in Durban, operates a program known as Democracy for All (DFA) in conjunction with another South African NGO, Street Law. USAID has provided significant funding for the Democracy for All program in an effort to institutionalize and implement democracy and human rights in formal school education. CSLS provided training for student volunteers from law, social work, and education faculties in various South African colleges. In most instances the students received course credit as compensation for their efforts. These student trainers then provided civic education instruction to pupils in grades 11 and 12 in over one hundred schools across the country. The training sometimes was conducted in conjunction with the pupils' regular teachers, while other times the DFA trainers were the only instructors for democracy and civics topics. The civics classes were designed to be conducted on a weekly basis.

II. Study Methodology

A. Overview of Research Methods

In August 1998, members of the research team conducted interviews with USAID officials in Pretoria as well as representatives for approximately 12 NGOs that conduct civic education in South Africa. From these meetings, the four civic education programs described in the previous section were selected for inclusion in the study. During the same visit, four survey research companies were examined and bids for the survey portion of the study were solicited. Markinor, a respected company based in Johannesburg, was eventually selected to conduct the data collection.

We also recruited two South African specialists to assist us in the study, Robert Mattes of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), and Dumisane Hlophe, a PhD student at the University of Natal-Durban. Mattes is one of South Africa's leading public opinion specialists, and Hlophe is a specialist in democratic consolidation and former researcher at the Democracy Development Program Institute, a South African NGO with extensive experience with civic education. Both Mattes and Hlophe were recruited to assist us in developing the study design, adapting the survey questionnaires to the South African context, serving as liaisons to Markinor and the civic education NGOs, and to assist in the interpretation of the study's findings.

The study contained both qualitative and quantitative elements in order to provide an assessment of the effects of civic education from a variety of methodological perspectives. In the first phase of the data collection, Markinor conducted in-depth qualitative interviews with 17 trainers and paralegals from three of the four NGOs whose programs were examined, Lawyers for Human Rights, NIPILAR, and Democracy for All/Street Law. These interviews were designed to obtain information about the programs from the individuals who actually conduct the democracy training of ordinary citizens. These individuals provided critical information about the content of the training programs, the subjects covered, the methodologies used, the problems encountered, and their assessments of the strengths, weaknesses, successes and failures of the programs in the field. The information provided by the trainers was also instrumental in assisting us in modifying the questionnaires that we used in the next phase of the study.

The next phase consisted of the survey data collection. Markinor conducted a small pilot study from 11 to 14 April 1999, where the questionnaire was tested on 17 individuals who had received civic education from NIPILAR, LHR or the Democracy for All program, and 40 individuals who had not undergone civic education instruction. Final changes in the questionnaire were made in response to problems that emerged from the pilot study. At the same time, Markinor and the research team finalized the sampling strategy that would be used in the data collection. The surveys were then conducted during the period 10 May to 1 June with a total of 1550 respondents: 475 adults who were trained in the LHR, NIPILAR, and CLC-Durban adult programs; 475 adults who were not trained in civic education; 300 high school students who were trained in the Democracy For All/Street Law program; and 300 high school students who were not exposed to the DFA/Street Law training. We describe the sampling strategies in more detail in the next section. Preliminary results of the study were presented to USAID in

Washington and then to USAID-Pretoria and the four NGOs in South Africa in September 1999. These meetings provided valuable feedback and suggestions for the final analyses that are found in this report.

The last phase of the data collection consisted of four focus groups conducted by Markinor in October 1999 with participants in each of the civic education programs examined in the study. During these sessions, participants discussed their reactions to the programs in a more open-ended fashion. In addition, important information was elicited about several issues, including the factors that motivated repeated attendance at civic education workshops and reactions to teaching methodologies, that emerged as crucial findings from the quantitative analyses. In this way the focus groups and the quantitative analyses complemented one another, providing a richer and more detailed account of civic education's effects than otherwise would have been possible. A discussion of the focus group findings for the adults and students can be found in Chapter 5.

B. Sampling Strategy

The sampling for the study was designed to provide information about individuals who were trained in each of the four programs across as many geographic areas of the country as was possible. Markinor began by working with representatives for each of the NGOs and mapping exactly where their civic education activities in the last year had taken place. From these maps, a random sample of areas, stratified by program and size of the community, were selected for inclusion in the study. This process resulted in 54 areas throughout 8 of the 9 South African provinces being included in the planned sample. The Northern Cape province was excluded because it is a very sparsely populated region, and information from the four NGOs indicated that there was very little civic education activity in that province.

Within each of the areas, a set number of interviews with participants was planned, with the aim of eventually interviewing 225 participants from LHR, 150 from NIPILAR, and 100 from CLC-Durban (in keeping with the relative geographic reach of each of the programs). Interviews with 300 students trained in the Democracy for All program were also planned. The number of participant interviews per province ranged from 195 in KwaZulu Natal to 75 in North West. Details of the planned sample are provided at p. 7 of Markinor's technical report (Van der Walt and Greyling 1999).

Markinor then attempted to secure lists of participants, either from national NGO representatives or from the facilitators or paralegals who ran the civic education programs in each of the areas. The goal was to select participants randomly from these lists according to systematic selection procedures. When appropriate lists were available, participants were selected systematically as originally planned. Instructions to the interviewers regarding the systematic selection procedure can be found in Markinor's technical report as Addendum 2 (Van der Walt and Greyling 1999).

There were, however, numerous problems and delays in securing the lists of participants, including difficulties in receiving responses from the NGOs, incomplete or non-existent contact details for the participants, lists for only some of the sampled areas, and the unwillingness of

many schools selected to provide any information about their students. It was therefore necessary to modify the planned sampling procedures in several ways. In cases where no lists of names and addresses existed, the facilitators or paralegals themselves located the requisite number of participants and provided contact information to Markinor. In other cases, interviews planned in a particular area were not completed and the requisite number of participants was instead obtained from other communities where civic education training by the particular NGO took place. The final sample of participants is shown in Table 2-1. As can be seen, the number of participants interviewed from each civic education program was the same as originally planned, but the geographic distribution of the interviews was of necessity somewhat different.

The control group of non-participants in civic education was designed to “mirror” the participant sample on a number of important demographic dimensions. Interviewers were instructed to conduct an interview with a civic education participant selected according to the procedures just described, and then to conduct an identical interview in the same area with a person who had not participated in civic education. The control group respondent was to be the same race, gender, age group, and educational stratum as the participant. Interviewers were instructed to make a systematic selection of houses, beginning with the third house from the civic education participant who had been interviewed, in order to find an appropriate non-participant for inclusion. For the DFA program, interviewers were instructed to find students, matched on age, race and gender, who had not received DFA training in the same school as a DFA-trained student if possible. If such a student could not be found, the interview of the control student took place at a nearby school. Instruction to the interviewers regarding the selection of the “mirror” sample may also be found in Markinor’s technical report in Addendum 2 (Van der Walt and Greyling 1999).

These sampling procedures produced a total of 1550 interviews for the study, with the final data collection conducted between 10 May and 1 June 1999. The sample consisted of: 475 adult participants in civic education; 475 adult non-participants who were matched on race, gender, age and education with the participant group; 300 students who were trained by Democracy for All instructors; and 300 students not trained by DFA who were matched on race, gender, and age with the participant group.

The study did not aim to provide a random sample of the South African black or coloured population. The goal was to provide a representation of individuals who had received training in civic education activities, and to match these individuals with similar people who had not received civics training. In this regard, the research design in the South African study allowed an even more rigorous test of the effects of civic education than was used in the Dominican Republic and Poland studies. By using the matching procedure in South Africa, we ensured that the control group was extremely close to the participant group in residential location as well as race, gender, and educational attainment. In the previous study, this matching was not built into the research design; instead statistical controls for demographic characteristics were introduced at the stage of data analysis. The matching procedure used here is a more conservative design strategy, one that yields even greater confidence that a finding that civic education has impact on individual attitudes and behavior is scientifically valid.

Table 2-1
Final Sample Characteristics of Civic Education Participants and Matched Control Groups

<i>Civic Education Program:</i>		<i>Civic Education Participants</i>				<i>Control Groups</i>	
		DFA/ Street Law	CLC- Durban	NIPILAR	LHR	Students	Adults
Students		300				300	
Adults			100	150	225		475
PROVINCE	AREA						
Eastern Cape	Port Elizabeth (Blacks)	40				40	
	Port Elizabeth (Coloureds)	30				30	
	Mt. Fletcher				14		14
	Qumbu				11		11
		70			25	70	25
Free State	Bethlehem				10		10
	Bloemfontein	50			8	50	8
	Botshabelo				7		7
	Phuthaditjaba/Witsieshoek			30			30
		50		30	25	50	55
Gauteng	Bronkhorstspuit				5		5
	Johannesburg	60				60	
	KwaMhlanga/Bronkhorstspuit			20			20
	Pretoria				5		5
	Soweto			10			10
	Vaal Area				5		5
	West Rand (Johannesburg)				10		10
		60		30	25	60	55
KwaZulu-Natal	Cornfields		25				25
	Durban	70				70	
	Eshowe				13		13
	Muden		25				25
	Pinetown				12		12
	River View		25				25
	Sankotshe		25				25
		70	100		25	70	125
Mpumalanga	Bosbokrand				10		10
	Dennilton			15			15
	Graskop			15			15
	Leandra				5		5
	Siyabuswa				10		10
					30	25	
Northern Province	Lebowakgomo			10	8		18
	Nebo			10			10
	Nebo/Sekhukhune				8		8
	Pietersburg			10			10
	Warmbaths				9		9
				30	25		55
North West	Coligny			15			15
	Lichtenburg				15		15
	Mmabatho	20		15		20	15
	Vryburg				10		10
		20		30	25	20	55
Western Cape	Cape Town	16				16	
	Dysselsdorp	5				5	
	Genadendal				10		10
	Malmesbury				15		15
	Oudtshoorn	9				9	
	Riviersonderend				15		15
	Zoar				10		10
		30			50	30	50
Totals		300	100	150	225	300	475

C. Survey Instrumentation

We used the adult questionnaires that were employed in the Dominican Republic and Poland studies as templates for the South African surveys. These surveys were modified to suit the South African context, as well as to extend the earlier study to include questions relating to several new dimensions of democracy orientations. Markinor's in-house specialists as well as the two South African-based democracy experts that we employed provided important feedback regarding the areas where the survey needed revision or areas that needed to be added to the questionnaire altogether. The survey was also sent to representatives of the four NGOs for their reaction, and additions and corrections were made on the basis of their feedback as well. Many of the newer questions were modeled on items from recent surveys conducted in South Africa by academic, commercial, and non-profit organizations.

We were gratified that the results of the in-depth interviews of trainers and paralegals conducted by Markinor in March 1999 showed that the attitudes and orientations that the survey attempts to measure are precisely the attitudes and orientations that, according to the trainers, the civic education programs attempted to change. For example, the DFA/Street Law trainers mentioned that the aspects they conveyed most successfully were: basic law principles, political tolerance, citizen's participation, intercultural relations, gender sensitivity, and human rights. Attitudes relating to each of these topics were core elements of the questionnaire, including questions relating to knowledge of the law and human rights, tolerance of others' political views, engagement in and approval of political participation, respect for other cultural views and support for women's political rights. There is a similar close correspondence between the attitudes measure on the questionnaire and the stated goals of trainers and paralegals from LHR (Bill of Rights, rights and obligations of individuals, gender awareness, citizen participation) and NIPILAR (Human Rights and Gender Awareness). We are therefore confident that the topics covered in the survey questionnaire are germane --- and indeed are essential --- components of the civic education that these (and other) programs provide.

We included questions relating to the three basic categories of democratic attitudes and behavior discussed in Chapter 1, Section B above: political participation, knowledge and civic competence, and democratic values. As noted earlier, almost all of the questions represent either standard measures of the respective items in the political science literature or adaptations of recent surveys that were done in South Africa by respected survey research outfits. The English-language questionnaires for the South African adults and students can be found as Appendix A of this report. The questionnaires were translated into Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, Northern Sotho, Southern Sotho, and Afrikaans so that respondents could be interviewed in the language with which they felt most comfortable.

We summarize the questions and scaling procedures used to measure the main attitudes and behaviors below. In addition, we present information about the statistical "reliability" of any scales that were used. Reliability in a statistical sense refers to the extent to which a scale that contains multiple questions related to a single topic can be viewed as an accurate measure of the underlying concept. The basic notion is that scales are "reliable" measures of an underlying concept when the individual questions that make up the scale are highly correlated with one another. If the individual questions are not highly correlated, it is very possible that a scale that

combines them into a single measure will reflect several different underlying concepts or simply will contain much random “noise”.

The standard statistical measure for assessing the degree of reliability in a scale is *Cronbach’s alpha*, which provides a sense of how well the individual items are correlated with each other and the entire scale. The coefficient represents the ratio of “true score” variation in responses over the total response variation in the scale, i.e., how much of the total variation in the scale can be attributed to variation in the respondent’s true, underlying attitudes that is separate from random error (or “noise”). Alpha coefficients range from 0, when all the response variation is random noise, to 1, when all the response variation results from “true” attitudes. Alpha coefficients in the range of .8 or higher (80% true score variance) are typically desired in social science research, although it is not uncommon to see alpha coefficients in the .6 to .8 range in published research. Higher numbers mean a more reliable scale.

With few exceptions, the scales used for the adult samples prove to be reasonably reliable, and well within the range of previous research on democracy-related attitudes in the United States, Europe and the former Soviet Union. (see, e.g. Nie, et. al.’s *Education and Democratic Citizenship in the United States*). They are also well within the range that were reported in the Dominican Republic and Poland study. The reliabilities for the student sample were somewhat lower than for adults, but the results found for South African high school students are generally superior to those reported for Dominican and Polish 13 year olds.

Political Participation

Adults

The adult questionnaire asks if respondents participated in 12 political acts in the last year: took part in an organized activity to solve a community problem; attended a meeting of the local town council or government officials; worked for a party or candidate in an election campaign; contacted a local elected official; contacted a national elected official, a member of the Provincial Legislature, an official representing a government agency, or a traditional leader; participated in a protest, march, or demonstration concerning some national or local problem; contributed money to a political party or candidate; lodged a complaint about racial discrimination or unfair labor practices, or other complained otherwise to a government agency such as the Human Rights Commission. Based on a statistical procedure called “factor analysis,” it was determined that two dimensions of political behavior existed: *local level participation*, consisting of the first four behaviors listed above, and the other types of activity, which we call *general participation*. The number of acts that each respondent participated in for each dimension was then totaled, meaning that the local level scale could run from 0 to 4 and the general participation scale could run from 0 to 8. The reliability of the local participation scale was .76 and the general participation scale .82.

Individuals were also asked whether they would be “willing” to participate in three kinds of legal political behaviors in the future, regardless of whether they had participated in these activities in the past. The three behaviors were contacting an elected official or administrative agency, participating in an organized effort to solve a community problem, or taking part in a

protest march. The *willingness to participate* scale therefore ranged from 0 to 3. The reliability of this scale was .76.

Students

For students, we measured participation in different ways because the age of the pupils disqualified them from many of the activities we measured among the adults. We asked students whether they had participated in meetings of the student government or student council, voted in a student government election, or stood as a candidate in a student government or student council election. The resulting school *political participation* scale could run from 0 to 3. We also asked whether students had participated in six different *school clubs* (range 0 to 6) as another measure of school participation. The reliability of the political participation scale was .53 and for the school clubs scale it was .64.

Students were also asked how strongly they approved of a series of political behaviors as “ways that ordinary citizens try to influence politics and the decisions of elected officials.” Their responses produced three separate measures ranging from 1 to 4 corresponding to *approval of voting*, *approval of legal participation* such as taking part in peaceful protest or contacting officials, and *approval of illegal participation* such as joining a violent opposition group or disrupting government meetings. The reliability of the legal participation measure was .63, and for illegal participation it was .67.

Civic Competence

As described above, civic competence refers to individuals’ knowledge of politics, specific political skills, and perceived ability to affect governmental and political outcomes. We included several different aspects of civic competence in the questionnaire.

Political Knowledge. The questionnaire asked eight questions about knowledge of political leaders, incumbent politicians, and the structure of the South African government, such as whether respondents knew the Deputy President of South Africa, the Premier of the respondent’s province, how long the term of office for President is, and the branch of government that elects the President. We summed respondents’ correct answers to these questions to create a general knowledge scale, ranging from 0 to 8. We also created two sub-scales from the four questions regarding knowledge of specific politicians (0 to 4) and the four questions regarding knowledge of political institutions (0 to 4). The reliability of the full knowledge scale is .76 for adults, and .60 for students.

Rights Knowledge. The questionnaire asked 11 questions concerning human and democratic rights for South Africans, including whether “people may criticize the government,” “women have the right to be protected against violence in the home,” “people have the right to practice any religion,” and “children are not protected by law against abusive labor practices.” Correct answers were totaled, and the scale of rights knowledge runs from 0 to 11. The reliability of the rights knowledge scale was .52 for adults, and .40 for students.

Civic Skills: The questionnaire contains four questions asking the respondent to rate the extent to which “in general, you communicate your ideas with others (cooperate with other people, speak in public, know better whom to contact to get things done, direct a group) better, worse, or the same as most other people you know?” We scored an answer of “better than” as two; an answer of “same as” as one; and “worse than others” as zero. We then added up these scores and divided by four to create a scale from 0 to 2. For the students, the reference group was “other high school students that you know.” The reliability of the civic skills scale was .76 for adults, and .64 for students.

Efficacy: The questionnaire asks four questions on efficacy, all asking the respondent to agree or disagree on a four-point scale to a series of questions concerning their views of their influence on the political system. The three questions were: (1) Sometimes politics and government are so complicated that people like me can’t understand what is going on; (2) People like me have no say in what the government does; and (3) I feel well prepared for participating in political life; and (4) If I wanted to discuss my political views, I would know where and how to contact elected officials (asked only for adults). The more efficacious answers were counted as one and the scores for all four questions were added to create a scale from 1-4. For students, the reference group in question (2) was “ordinary people.” The reliability of the efficacy scale was .63 for the four-item adult scale, and .28 for the three-item student scale.

Democratic Values

We asked a series of questions concerning the respondent’s support for democratic norms and values. We divide these questions into three general clusters relating to: support for democracy as a form of government; support for the values that are inherent in democratic governance; and support for current political institutions and the democratic political system.

Support for Democracy as a Form of Government. This cluster of questions is designed to measure the extent to which individuals understand the political arrangements that inhere in democracy, and support democracy against alternative forms of government. These questions were added for the South African study based on recent research in political science (e.g. Rose et al. 1998) and research conducted by one of our South African specialists, Robert Mattes of Idasa (Mattes and Thiel 1998).

Democracy is Best. We asked individuals, “Sometimes democracy does not work. When this happens, some people say that we need a strong leader that does not have to both with elections. Others say that even when things do not work, democracy is always best. What do you think?” This is a simple choice question which is coded as “0” for those who say that the country needs a strong leader, and “1” for those who say that democracy is always best.

Support for Regular Elections. We asked individuals “if a non-elected government or leader could impose law and order and deliver houses and jobs, how willing would you be to give up regular elections and live under such a government?” The coding of responses range from “1” for “very willing” to “4” for “very unwilling.” This question was not asked in the student survey.

Support for Democratic Values and Norms. This cluster contains questions designed to measure the individual's adherence to a core set of values that inhere in democracy. They differ from the previous cluster in that individuals could support democracy governments against alternative forms, or believe that certain characteristics are inherent in democratic government without necessarily adhering to the values themselves. These questions measure the values of the individuals, not his or her evaluation of democracy compared to other kinds of political systems.

Essentials of Democracy. One aspect of the individual's adherence to democratic values is whether they believe that certain characteristics are essential for a political system to be called "democratic." We asked individuals whether four characteristics, including as "regular elections," "majority rule," and "protection of minority rights" and "complete freedom to criticize the government" were essential to democratic government, and created a scale for *Procedural Values* that runs from 0-4. The reliability of this scale was .53 for adults and .44 for students. We also asked individuals whether two economic outcomes, "adequate housing," and "jobs and a fair income," were "essential" for democracy. We created a scale for *Economic Outcomes* that runs from 0-2. The reliability of this scale was .64 for adults, and .66 for students.

Tolerance: The questionnaire asks nine standard questions to test the respondent's willingness to extend freedoms of association, participation and speech to three unpopular groups: atheists, racists ("persons who believe blacks to be genetically inferior") and sexists ("persons who believe women to be genetically inferior"). For each group, it was asked whether such a person should be allowed to speak publicly in your locality; should be allowed to vote, and should be allowed to organize peaceful demonstrations to express his/her point of view. Answers are on a four-point agree/disagree scale. It was found in both the adult and student surveys that the questions regarding voting tolerance were distinct in respondents' minds from tolerance for speaking in public and organizing a peaceful demonstration. We created a tolerance variable for the six non-voting questions (2 questions for the 3 unpopular groups) by averaging the six scores. The scale ranges from 1-4, with the reliability of the scale being .87 for adults, and .74 for students.

Rights Consciousness. We asked whether a series of rights that exist in democracy "should always be maintained," or "it depends on the situation." We counted the number of rights that individuals felt should always be maintained, such as the "right to vote," the "right to say unpopular things with which the majority disagrees," the "right to organize groups to ask the government to change the laws" and created a scale that runs from 0 to 5. For the students, opinions about only four of these rights were asked, resulting in a 0-4 scale. The reliability of the adult scale was .59 and the student scale .42.

Civic Duty. We asked individuals about the "responsibilities that citizens have in a democracy," and how important it was for individuals to "vote in local elections," "pay their rates and services," and "take part in political decisions that affect their community." To assess commitment to civic duty, we added the number of these responsibilities that individuals felt were "very important," and the resultant scale runs from 0 to 3. The reliability of the adult scale was .69 and the student scale .64.

Women's Participation. We asked individuals whether women should participate “more than they do now,” “less than they do now,” or “about the same as they do now.” We coded the responses as 0 for “less” to “2” for “more.”

Support for Rule of Law. We asked respondents about two aspects of support for the rule of law in a democracy. First, we asked whether “people should not have to obey laws which they consider unjust” and whether sometimes “it might be better to ignore the law and solve important problems rather than wait for legal solutions.” Each of the questions was coded as “1” for “strongly agree” to “4” for “strongly disagree,” and the two questions were averaged to create an *Obey the Law* measure. The reliability of this scale was .48 for adults. We also asked respondents whether “suspected criminals can be detained without being formally charged with a crime,” and whether “suspected criminals do not deserve the same legal rights as everyone else,” following recent research by Gibson and Gouws (1997). These questions, also on a 1-4 scale, were averaged to create a *Rights for Suspected Criminals* variable. The reliability of the adult scale was .61. For the students, we asked only one question for each aspect of the rule of law, and combined them together into a single *Support for the Rule of Law* variable, with a reliability of .28.

Support for Cultural Diversity. We asked people four questions regarding their views of other cultures, including “It is easy for you to like people who have different views to your own,” and “you can usually accept people from other cultures, even when they are very different to you.” Answers were coded as “1” for “strongly disagree” to “4” for “strongly agree,” and the four questions were averaged to create a single scale. The reliability of this scale was .69 for adults, and .75 for students.

Trust in Government and Satisfaction with the Political System. This set of questions is designed to elicit the respondent's evaluation of the current political system, as opposed to supporting democracy in principle as a form of government or as a series of democratic values. Here we are concerned with the respondent's trust in political institutions, whether he or she believes that the system is capable of producing or is producing desired outputs, and whether democracy in general is working well in the country at present.

Institutional Trust: Respondents were asked how much they trusted a total of thirteen political and social institutions, including: the legal system, the media, the church, the President, the Constitutional Court, the African National Congress, and Big business. We created a 0-13 scale of trust by adding the number of institutions in which the respondent had “a good deal” of trust. We created a 0-6 sub-scale for *Political Trust* by focusing on the six institutions that clearly relate to institutions of the South African government (President, provincial legislature, local council, constitutional court, national government, African National Congress). For students only 8 questions were asked, so the student scale ranges from 0 to 8. The reliability of this scale was .83 for adults, and .75 for students.

Evaluation of Past, Present and Future Political Systems. We asked respondents to rate, on a 0-10 scale, “how well things are going” in the current system of government. We also asked respondents to perform the same evaluation for the “former apartheid government,” and “our system of government five years from now.”

Satisfaction with Democracy. We asked individuals to rate how satisfied they are with “the way democracy is working in South Africa,” coding responses as “1” for “very dissatisfied” to “4” for “very satisfied.”

D. Statistical Procedures

The statistical method used to assess the effects of civic education is regression analysis. In these analyses, each democratic orientation or behavior is predicted from variables that represent the extent of civic education that the individual received, as well as a series of control variables. We report first the unstandardized regression coefficients for the civic education variables. These coefficients represent the net difference between the civic education group and the control group (those who received no civic education) on the variable in question, over and above the effects of the control variables. For example, the 8-item overall political knowledge scale ranges from 0 (if the respondent answered none of the questions correctly) to 8 (if the respondent answered all of the questions correctly). If it is shown that the regression coefficient for knowledge is .6 for individuals who were exposed to multiple civic education workshops, this would indicate that the average number of correct answers for these individuals is .6 higher than for the control group. This .6 difference is then evaluated to determine whether it is “statistically significant,” which means that the results were unlikely to have come about by chance. We report statistically significant relationships at the .10 and .05 level, indicating that the chances of observing the differences between the civic education and control groups if there were no true differences in the overall population were less than 10% and 5% respectively.

In the adult analyses, we controlled for a variety of demographic influences on democratic values and political participation, including

- education
- income
- age
- gender
- community size
- time lived in the community
- household size
- number of children
- employment status
- student status
- church attendance
- involvement in church activities
- number of voluntary organizations to which the individual belongs.

The specific questions used to measure each of these variables can be found in Section A of the adult questionnaire in Appendix A.

Including these demographic factors into the analysis has several purposes. First, many of them are known from previous research to influence political participation and democratic attitudes. Therefore, including them in the analysis provides a better explanatory model of each of these democratic orientations. Second, and perhaps more importantly, including these demographic variables allows us to estimate the effect of civic education more accurately. We know that civic education programs tend to train certain kinds of individuals more than others, for example, individuals who are already members of voluntary social groups and associations. To the extent that associational memberships are related to democratic orientations, failure to include this factor in the model would attribute a greater effect of civic education on democratic attitudes than actually exists, as some of the “effect” of civic education would really be the result of civic education attracting people who were already more democratic, or who would be expected to become more democratic *regardless of their exposure to civic education* as a result of their group affiliations. Including these kinds of demographic factors into the statistical models is an important way to control for these kinds of pre-existing differences, and to arrive at more accurate estimates of the unique effect of civic education.

Yet even after taking demographic factors and organizational memberships into account, we may still not have eliminated all of the potential selection biases. Indeed, it may have been the case that individuals within all of these demographic groups who found their way into the treatment groups were also those who -- for some unknown or unmeasured reason -- possessed higher levels of democratic orientations. Statistical methods exist to combat this problem, but they depend on certain methodological assumptions we were unable to sustain in the current analysis (see Achen 1986; Judd and Kenny 1981). As a partial corrective to this problem, we included two additional variables as controls:

- interest in politics
- attention to the mass media.

The reasoning behind including these factors is that they are good measures of an individual’s overall political awareness and sophistication, and hence may serve as a proxy for the individual’s prior attachment to democratic norms and political engagement. One possible drawback to this strategy is that our estimates of treatment effects may be attenuated if civic education has a *causal* effect on interest and media use; in that case we would be controlling for a variable that actually represents a potentially intervening variable between the treatment and other outcomes of interest. We think the problem of selection bias is likely to be more serious in this instance, and for that reason believe that our analytic strategy is the most appropriate, given the empirical and measurement constraints that we faced.

For the student analysis, we controlled for the following demographic variables:

- age
- race
- gender

- education
- parent's education
- parent's employment status
- whether the individual planned to attend college after high school graduation.

We also included variables related to the political involvement of the individual's family and peer group, as these factors have traditionally been found to influence a child's level of political interest and democratic orientations to a far greater extent than classroom education. These variables include:

- respondent's view of how much interest in politics exists in his or her home
- whether family members are participatory in politics
- whether family members discuss politics often
- whether the respondent's friends are highly interested in politics.

Similar problems of selection bias potentially exist in the student data, and thus we included measures of political interest and media attentiveness to serve much the same function that these factors did in the adult analyses. Exact question wordings for the student control variables can also be found in Section A of the student questionnaire.

For the regression analyses, we also include a statistic known as the "effect coefficient" or "Cohen's d " that is frequently used as a scale-free measure of treatment effects in experimental and quasi-experimental research (Kiess 1989; Judd and Kenney 1981). In the multiple regression context, d is equal to the unstandardized regression coefficient divided by the standard error of estimate, which conveys a sense of how much of an effect a treatment has *in standard deviation terms* on the dependent variable. (The standard deviation for a variable signifies how far the typical individual is from the overall sample average. In a "normal," or bell-shaped distribution, 68% of all individuals are within 1 standard deviation from the overall average, and 95% of all individuals are within 1.96 standard deviations from the overall average). A d coefficient of .5 indicates that civic education increases responses on the dependent variable by one-half of a standard deviation, or in other words that respondents in the treatment group are on average one-half of a standard deviation higher on the dependent variable than respondents in the control group, once the effects of all other control variables are taken into account. There is no definitive standard for what represents "high" and "low" values of d , but Kiess (1989, 505) suggests values of .2 as representing a small effect, .5 a medium effect, and .8 a large effect.

We also provide in the appendices a measure of the explanatory power of the equations predicting each of the dependent variables. In the regression framework this corresponds to the "R-squared" measure. This value represents how much of the total variation in the dependent variable is accounted for through knowledge of *all* the independent variables in the equation, including civic education and all the control variables. This figure will give the reader a sense of how successful these models are in predicting the dependent variable; larger numbers indicate a better explanatory model, with 1 being the maximum value. In previous cross-national democracy research, R-squared measures typically range between .15 and .35 for democratic

values and civic competence, and between .30 and .50 for the prediction of political participation.

Before turning to the results of the statistical analyses, it is important to acknowledge that the assessment of the size of treatment effects is not solely a statistical issue. Effect sizes must also be assessed in light of the results of prior research and the expectations of the researcher, program administrators, and funding agencies. An increase of .2 standard deviations in a dependent variable such as political tolerance may be small in statistical terms, but it may be large relative to the expectations of a social scientist. For example, attitudes of intolerance are usually thought by scholars to be deeply rooted in individuals' early socialization and cognitive structures, with tolerance being to some degree an "unnatural" attitude that must be learned over time. At the same time, even an increase of .5 may be disappointing in view of the expectations of the program administrators and in particular to funding agencies, depending on how large an expenditure was needed to bring about such a change for the numbers of people involved in the program. In this sense the coefficient d or any other statistical measure of effect size is only one piece of data for program administrators or policy analysts to consider in evaluating the "success" of a program.

E. Focus Group Procedures

The focus groups were designed to provide more in-depth information about the nature of civic education participants' views about democracy and human rights, about the experiences they had in the civic education training itself, and about the ways that they felt the training could be improved. The focus groups were also instrumental in exploring the implications of several of the key statistical findings of the study. As we will show, there is strong evidence that on many democratic orientations, civic education training must be done in particular ways for *any* effects on individuals to be seen. Specifically, individuals must be trained often, with participatory methodologies, and with high-quality teachers and trainers in order for changes in democratic orientations to take place. Hence we explored the specific methodologies that respondents found most engaging, the types of trainers that they found most effective, and the ways that they believe more people can be encouraged to attend follow-up workshops to ensure a greater frequency of civic education exposure. We also explored, at the behest of USAID officials in Pretoria, the extent to which individuals received democracy information from sources other than civic education workshops (e.g. mass media, discussions with friends and family), and the extent to which the workshops were more or less effective in teaching individuals about democracy than the other societal means of information transmission.

Four focus groups were conducted in October 1999. The CLC-Durban group was convened on 5 October in Durban with 10 civic education participants. The NIPILAR group was convened on 6 October in Kwa Ndebele near Pretoria with 9 participants. The LHR group was convened on 9 October in Malmesbury, a coloured community near Cape Town, with 8 respondents. The Democracy for All student focus group was convened on 7 October in Johannesburg with 7 students. Experienced moderators from Markinor facilitated the sessions, which lasted approximately two hours each. All group discussions were tape-recorded and verbatim transcriptions of the discussion were supplied to the research team.

After presentation of the statistical findings, we discuss the information provided by the focus group sessions, and how the quantitative and qualitative results of the study complement and reinforce one another.

III. Results: South African Adults

A. Basic Findings

We begin by discussing the overall effect of civic education on each of the democratic orientations and behaviors outlined in the previous section. The results are based on a comparison of the 475 individuals in the control group with 465 individuals whose frequency of civic education could be ascertained (10 respondents in the treatment group were therefore lost due to “missing data”). As noted earlier, we have grouped these factors into three main categories: political participation, political knowledge and civic competence, and democratic values, including support for political rights, tolerance, the rule of law, and trust in government. Table 3-1 provides a summary of the effects of civic education on each variable; the full set of regression results for these variables are provided in Appendix B as tables B-1 to B-25.

For each variable, we show both the unstandardized regression coefficient and the “effect coefficient” d that was discussed previously. The unstandardized regression coefficient represents the difference in the average level of each variable for individuals who attended 1 or 2 workshops, or 3 or more workshops, compared to people who were not exposed to any civic education --- controlling for all the other demographic and political characteristics that might also influence the variable in question. For example, the unstandardized regression coefficient for “Participation in Local Politics” for individuals who attended 1 or 2 workshops is .24, indicating that the average score on the participation index was .24 larger for those individuals than for individuals who received no civic education. The two stars next to the coefficient of .24 indicate that this difference is statistically significant at the .05 probability level; one star indicates that the difference is statistically significant at the .10 probability level.

The figure in the next column is the “effect coefficient” d , which indicates in this case that individuals who attended 1 or 2 workshops have an average score on the local participation index that is .23 (or nearly $\frac{1}{4}$) more *standard deviations* than individual who received no civic education. The d coefficient, because it is expressed in standard deviation terms, can be directly compared across all of the variables, even those that are measured on different scales. For example, the value of .23 for local participation can be interpreted as substantially higher than, for example, the corresponding d coefficient of .02 for “Political Tolerance” for individuals who attended 1 or 2 workshops. Such a comparison is not valid for the unstandardized coefficients, because the participation scale runs from 0-3, with each increase representing an additional behavior, while the tolerance scale runs from 1-4, with increases representing the degree to which individuals agree or disagree to a series of attitudinal statements.

Table 3-1
The Effect of Civic Education on Democratic Orientations: South African Adults

	Frequency of Civic Education			
	1 to 2		3 or more	
	B	<i>d</i>	B	<i>d</i>
<i>Political Participation</i>				
Participation in Local Politics (0-4)	.24**	.23	.54**	.52
Participation in General Politics (0-7)	.06	.04	.18	.14
Willingness to Participate in the Future (0-3)	-.13*	-.13	.28**	.27
<i>Knowledge and Competence</i>				
Political Knowledge (0-8)	-.14	-.10	.32**	.23
Institutional Knowledge (0-4)	.06	.08	.23**	.27
Knowledge of Rights (0-11)	.13	.08	.01	.01
Knowledge of Leaders (0-4)	-.21**	-.20	.10	.09
Civic Skills (0-2)	.08**	.19	.15**	.36
Political Efficacy (1-4)	.05	.08	.27**	.44
<i>Democratic Values</i>				
Essentials of Democracy: Procedures (0-4)	-.04	-.03	.20	.16
Essentials of Democracy: Economic Outcomes (0-3)	-.03	-.03	.07	.08
Democracy is Always Best (0-1)	-.01	-.03	.02	.05
Support for Regular Elections (1-4)	.08	.07	.25**	.22
Political Tolerance (1-4)	.02	.02	.21**	.26
Rights Consciousness (0-5)	.00	.00	.10	.08
Civic Duty (0-3)	.05	.05	.10	.10
Women's Participation (1-3)	-.02	-.03	.05	.08
Support for Rule of Law I: Obey Law (1-4)	.01	.02	.16*	.19
Support for Rule of Law II: Rights of the Accused (1-4)	-.05	-.06	.13	.16
Support for Cultural Diversity (1-4)	.03	.07	.10**	.22
<i>Trust and Performance Evaluation</i>				
Trust in Political Institutions (0-13)	.35	.12	.86**	.29
Evaluation of Apartheid Regime (0-10)	-.15	-.06	-.52**	-.23
Evaluation of Current Regime (0-10)	.38**	.18	.55**	.26
Evaluation of Future System (0-10)	.24	.12	.39*	.19
Satisfaction with Democracy (1-4)	.05	.06	.13*	.17
Number of Cases: Total=940 (Control Group = 475)	331		134	

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$

The results of Table 3-1 can be summarized as follows:


- Civic education has relatively strong effects on local political participation, with increases of up to one-half of a standard deviation on the participation scale that can be attributable to workshop attendance. This translates into a nearly 20% increase in the percentage of people who are highly active politically at the local level.
- There are moderate effects of civic education on civic skills and political efficacy, two orientations that are powerful predictors of political participation in their own right.
- The effect of civic education on political knowledge is somewhat weaker. The effects on knowledge are concentrated on knowledge of the structure of the South African political system; knowledge of particular political leaders as well as democratic and human rights were relatively high regardless of the extent of the individual's exposure to civic education.
- Civic education has relatively weak effects on most democratic values. There are, however, significant effects on several important orientations --- tolerance, support for regular elections, support for the rule of law, support for cultural diversity --- though these effects are smaller in magnitude than for participation and civic competence.
- Civic education has consistently positive effects on the individual's political trust and evaluation of the performance of the political system. These effects are of similar magnitude to other democratic values.

We discuss each of these findings in more detail below.

Political Participation

As in the Dominican Republic and Poland studies, we found the strongest effect of civic education on political participation. The effects in South Africa, however, were concentrated exclusively on what we termed "local participation," behavior such as participating in a neighborhood or community problem-solving group, attending a local council meeting, or contacting a local elected official. As mentioned above, individuals who attended one or two civic education workshops scored almost one-quarter of a standard deviation higher on the local participation index than individuals in the control group ($d=.23$). Individuals who attended three or more workshops showed even stronger effects, with their scores over one-half a standard deviation higher on the participation index than the control group ($d=.52$). The corresponding effects on other kinds of participation are .04 and .14, respectively, indicating that civic education is a relatively powerful impetus to increased involvement of the individual in local community affairs, as opposed to an undifferentiated stimulus for all kinds of political participation. This finding makes sense in light of the goals and materials used in civic education training, which often focus on the ways that individuals can influence politics in their own community.

FIGURE 3-1
Effects of Adult Civic Education Frequency on
Participation in Local Politics



The effects of civic education on local level participation can be seen more clearly in graphic form in Figure 3-1. In this figure, we separate individuals who participated in at least 2 out of the 4 local level behaviors and classify them as “high” on the participation index; individuals who did not participate in any or in only one local level behaviors were classified as “low.” We then graph the estimated proportion of individuals in the “high” category for people who had no civic education training, people who attended one or two workshops, and people who attended three or more sessions. Again, these graphs represent the differences in proportions between these three groups after controlling for all of the political and demographic factors discussed earlier.

The figure illustrates clearly the relatively powerful effects of civic education on local participation. Whereas 30% of the control group participated in at least 2 of the behaviors, this figure rises to almost 40% of those who attended one or two workshops, and nearly 50% of those who attended three or more sessions. *This increase of almost 20% from the control group to the group with more frequent civic education exposure is the largest effect in the entire study.* Exposure to democracy training sessions translates directly into increased involvement in the political system, especially at the local level.

We explored the effect of civic education on participation more intensively in several ways. First, we re-analyzed the models after including the individual’s self-report of previous participation in the 1994 Presidential and 1995 local elections. These variables provide additional controls for the individual’s tendency to participate, separate from the exposure to civic education. In all of these analyses, exposure to civic education training remained a statistically significant and substantial predictor of local level participation over and above the effects of past behavior, as well as the other control variables. For brevity’s sake we do not report these results in a separate table.

Second, we were able to provide more persuasive evidence of the causal effect of civic education on participation than has been possible in previous studies. We asked individuals whether the behaviors in which they engaged took place within the past six months or between six months and one year ago. We also asked individuals when they attended the civic education workshops. The most powerful evidence in favor of a direct causal effect from civic education to local participation would be seen if civic education that took place *more* than six months ago influenced participation that took place *less* than six months ago; for this process there would be little danger of individuals opting to attend civic education workshops *after* they participated in politics. In all of these analyses (not shown in tabular form), the effects of civic education were statistically significant and of similar magnitude as in the overall sample.

Finally, in previous studies we found evidence of a “fade-out” effect, whereby civic education that took place more recently had a more powerful effect on participation than did civic education that took place in the more distant past. To investigate this possibility in South Africa, we again separated the sample into individuals who were trained more recently (within the past six months) and those who were trained six months to a year prior to the data collection. The results (not shown in tabular form) showed that reported participation rates were essentially equal for these two groups, indicating that *no fade-out effect was observed in the South African data.* This means that whatever stimulus civic education provides for individual participation,

the effects do not dissipate at least by the end of one year. Taken together, all of these analyses strengthen one of the main findings of the study: that civic education has consistent, relatively powerful, and enduring effects on the individual's level of involvement in local political affairs.

Civic Competence

Effects of relatively substantial magnitude were also found on two important orientations related to “civic competence:” individuals' assessment of their “civic skills,” their ability to work with others, communicate effectively, and engage in group leadership activities; and individuals' “political efficacy,” the extent to which individuals feel able to influence politics and participate effectively in political life. These orientations are important components of democratic civic culture in their own right; they have also been found in decades of political science research to be crucial antecedents to political participation (see Verba et al 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). The effect of civic education on each of these variables is shown under the “Civic Competence” cluster in Table 3-1, and in graphic form in Figure 3-2.

As can be seen in Table 3-1, attending one or two workshops increases the individual's score on the civic skills index by .19 standard deviations, and attending three or more doubles that effect to .36 standard deviations. For political efficacy, the effects of civic education are concentrated among individuals who attended three or more workshops; efficacy for this group is almost one-half a standard deviation ($d = .44$) higher than the control group. In Figure 3-2 we show these effects in graphic form by classifying individuals as “high” on civic skills if they rated their own skill level as “better than most other people” on two of the four skills that comprise the index, and as “high” on political efficacy if their score on the index was between 3 and 4 on the 1-4 scale. The figure shows that the percentage in the “high” category on skills rises from 29% in the control group to 46% for individuals who attended three or more workshops. Similarly, the percentage of individuals who are “high” on political efficacy rises from 21% in the control group to 37% among the group with the highest exposure to civic education. These effects underscore the ability of civic education to influence individuals' supportive participatory *orientations* such as efficacy and confidence in their political skills, as well as actual behavior.

The last component of civic competence is the extent of the individual's political knowledge, that is, awareness of political institutions, rights, and leaders. Activating individual's knowledge of the structure of the political system, who is in power, and what rights citizens hold is an important component of most civic education in South Africa and elsewhere; in addition, such knowledge, like civic skills and efficacy, is a significant predictor of subsequent political participation. The relevant results from the regression analyses regarding all of these aspects of knowledge are shown in the “Civic Competence” cluster in Table 3-1, and in graphic form in Figure 3-3.

FIGURE 3-2
Effects of Adult Civic Education Frequency on
Civic Skills and Political Efficacy





FIGURE 3-3
Effects of Adult Civic Education Frequency on
Knowledge of Politics, Institutions, and Rights



The analyses show that the effects of civic education on political knowledge are weaker than for participation, skills or efficacy. Attending three or more workshops increases the individual's score on *overall* knowledge by about one-quarter of a standard deviation ($d=.23$), while attending one or two workshops has a statistically insignificant negative effect on knowledge. Interestingly, the effects on knowledge are concentrated in the area of *institutional knowledge*, that is, the individual's knowledge of such structural features of the South African system as the name of the chambers of Parliament, the length of the President's term in office, and the branch of government that has the power to declare laws unconstitutional. The effects of civic education on knowledge of political leaders and knowledge of democratic and human rights, by contrast, are insignificant.

The effects are seen clearly in Figure 3-3, and demonstrate the differential impact of civic education on several of the knowledge components. We classified as "high" on overall knowledge all individuals who answered 5 or more of the 8 knowledge questions correctly; we classified as "high" on institution knowledge individuals who answered *any* of the 4 institutions questions correctly; and we classified as "high" on rights knowledge individuals who answered 8 or more of the 11 rights questions correctly. The figure shows that 27% of individuals who attended three or more civic education workshops were "high" on overall political knowledge, compared with only 20% of the control group. For institutional knowledge, the differences were more pronounced, as 36% of individuals who attended 3 or more workshops were "high" on this kind of knowledge, compared with 25% of the control group. These effects are in the 10% range, statistically significant but noticeably smaller than those seen for skills, efficacy, and political participation.

There were no significant differences between any of the groups on rights knowledge. Knowledge about basic democratic and human rights was relatively widespread among respondents in the sample regardless of whether they participated in civic education workshops. This suggests that civic education was able to impart awareness of more "difficult" aspects of the political system, namely the way that laws are made and the constitutional functions of each of the branches of government. Such knowledge is held by very few South African respondents, in contrast to widespread awareness of human rights, as well as awareness of political figures such as Desmond Tutu, Thabo Mbeki, and the Premier of the respondents' particular province.

As noted above, all of the civic competence variables ---- skills, efficacy, knowledge --- have been found in previous research to be significant predictors of political participation. We find this pattern to hold in South Africa as well. Controlling for all other variables in the regression analyses described in Table 3-1, higher levels of civic skills, political efficacy, and overall knowledge are all associated with significantly higher levels of local political participation. The effects of civic education on local participation still remain, indicating that civic education affects participation in two ways: by directly influencing the individual's behavior; and by indirectly influencing behavior by increasing the individual's feelings of personal competence, political influence, and political knowledge. This is more evidence that civic education can alter not only the ways that citizens behave, but also influence the skills and information that facilitate future participation as well.

Democratic Values

Support for Democracy as a Form of Government

As a means of inculcating democratic values, the effects of civic education are not as powerful as the effects seen for participation and civic competence. We asked questions that measured the individual's support for democracy as a form of government, support for certain fundamental democratic rights and procedures, and a series of questions related to support for institutions of government and the performance of the political system. In no instance were the effects as large as those observed for local participation, civic skills, and political efficacy; in some cases, however, the effects were as large as those observed for political knowledge.

We asked several questions regarding the individual's support for democracy as a form of government, questions that are designed to gauge intrinsic evaluations of democracy and evaluations of democracy compared with other forms of government. As noted above, these questions are designed to provide evaluations of democracy that are as independent as possible from evaluations of the specific performance of incumbents and current governmental institutions (Rose et al 1998; Mattes and Thiel 1998). We asked whether respondents believed that "democracy is always best," even "if it is not working properly," and we asked whether individuals would be willing to "give up regular elections" if a leader would impose law and order and "deliver housing and jobs."

As can be seen in Table 3-1, civic education has no effect on the *Democracy is Best* response, but there is a significant effect on *Support for Regular Elections*. Attending three or more workshops increases the individual's score on this factor by just over one-fifth of a standard deviation ($d=.22$). We note that the average level of support for democracy among our respondents is relatively high, as, approximately 70% of respondents believe that "democracy is always best," and nearly 60% are "unwilling" or "very unwilling" to give up regular elections. Civic education has a relatively small effect on only one of these orientations.

Support for Democratic Rights, Duties and Values

The next cluster of orientations gauged the individual's support for specific rights, duties and values that are embedded in democratic systems. We asked respondents, for example, whether fundamental characteristics such as "elections with two or more competing parties," "majority rule," and "protection of minority rights" were "essential" features of a democratic system or not. We also presented a series of economic outputs to individuals, such as "jobs and a fair income," "adequate housing," and a "small gap between the rich and the poor" and asked whether such features were "essential" to a democracy or not. Respondents were asked whether they would extend democratic liberties such as freedom of speech and assembly to unpopular groups ("political tolerance"), whether the extension of individual rights should be limited in some cases ("rights consciousness"), whether voting and being politically informed was important for individuals ("civic duty"), whether individuals were obligated to obey the law and grant legal rights to suspected criminals ("support for the rule of law"), whether women should be encouraged to participate more in politics ("Women's participation"), and whether other cultures were worthy of respect ("cultural diversity"). Table 3-1 shows a nearly uniform pattern

of results, with civic education having no effect on most of these orientations. Nevertheless, attending three or more civic education workshops has a statistically significant effect on *political tolerance* and *support for cultural diversity*, with the magnitude of these effects being of approximately the same size as that seen for *support for regular elections*.


We show the effects of civic education on support for regular elections, political tolerance, and support for cultural diversity in graphic form in Figure 3-4. Individuals are recorded as “high” on the variables if they are “unwilling” or “very unwilling” to give up regular elections, and if they score between 3 and 4 on the 1-4 political tolerance or support for cultural diversity scales. The results are consistent for each of these attitudes: there is a difference of about 10 to 12 percentage points between those with no civic education training and those who attended three or more civic education workshops.

These findings support the view that changing democratic values is a difficult task, and that attending a few civic education training sessions is certainly not sufficient to alter fundamentally the individual’s support for democratic rights, values, and procedures. Nevertheless, given the substantial impediments to changing such deep-rooted and abstract values, the results may be viewed with encouragement. A 10 percentage point change in political tolerance is not negligible, considering the fact that previous research has often assumed that this attitude is relatively impervious to change. In fact, the effect of attended three or more workshops is one of the largest single effects in the model predicting political tolerance; after years of formal education and race (indicating that South African blacks are less tolerant than coloured respondents), civic education has the largest impact --- larger than factors such as age, urban residence, and media exposure that previous research has found to be relevant to the development of this democratic attitudes. It is also noteworthy that the size of the effect of civic education on tolerance in South Africa was larger overall than the corresponding effects seen in the Dominican Republic and Poland analyses, although several individual programs in those countries showed comparable effects.

What is perhaps most important is that the democratic values that civic education was shown to influence in these analyses are all of critical importance to democratic political culture in general and South African democracy in particular (e.g. Gouws 1996). Support for regular elections is the mainstay of a democratic government; willingness to extend procedural liberties to unpopular groups is the cornerstone of a democratic system, and support for cultural diversity is a vital goal in the multi-racial South African society. In short, though the effects of civic education are not overwhelmingly large in the area of democratic values, the effects are significant on several important orientations that have long been viewed as difficult to change.

FIGURE 3-4

**Effects of Adult Civic Education Frequency on
Political Tolerance and Support for Cultural Diversity and Regular Elections**



Trust in Government and Satisfaction with the Political System

The final component of democratic values in our analysis concerns the individual's trust in government and satisfaction with institutions and the political system. In contrast with the cluster of democratic values discussed above, these orientations do not relate to abstract concepts regarding democratic procedures or liberties. Rather, they relate to the individual's evaluations of how governmental institutions are performing, how well these institutions are likely to perform in the future, and how much the institutions and structures of government deserve the trust of the citizenry. There is some debate in the academic literature about the degree to which these evaluations are relevant to "system support" as opposed to the performance of specific incumbents; for our purposes this distinction is less important than the notion that these orientations reflect performance evaluations to a considerable degree as opposed to the understanding or endorsement of democratic principles.

We asked questions regarding trust and performance evaluations in a number of ways. First, we asked individuals to rate how much trust they had in 13 political and social institutions, including the legal system, the press, the President, local council, constitutional court, ANC, and others. We also asked individuals to rate the former apartheid government, the "current system of government with elections and many parties," and "our system of government five years from now" on a 0 to 10 scale of "how well things are going." Finally, we asked individuals to rate on a 4 point scale how satisfied they are with "the way democracy is working in South Africa."

The results show that civic education has consistent effects on trust and these kinds of performance evaluations, with the magnitude of the effects being in the same range (10%) as the democratic values discussed above. Attending one or two civic education workshops, for example, is associated with an increase in institutional trust of .35, or a standard deviation change of .12, while attending three or more workshops increases the standard deviation change to .29. Focusing only on six specifically political institutions (President, provincial legislature, local council, constitutional court, national government, African National Congress) yields similar though somewhat sharper results, with *d* effects of .15 and .36. Civic education led to more negative evaluations of the former apartheid regime (*d* of -.06 and -.23) and more positive evaluations of the current system (*d*= .18 and .26) and the system in the future (*d*=.12 and .19). The individual's general satisfaction with democracy showed a significant increase from civic education as well.


These effects can be seen in graphic form in Figure 3-5, which displays the results for institutional trust, satisfaction with democracy, and evaluation of the political system in the future. As in previous graphs, we separate respondents into "high" and "low" categories on the variables and then display the effect of civic education in terms of the increase in the percentage of individuals who received civic education who are "high" on the various attitudes. "High" trust means having "a good deal of trust" in 4 or more of the 6 political institutions, "high" evaluations of the current system mean that individuals rated the system as 8 or above on the 10 point scale, and "high" satisfaction with democracy means that individuals said they were "very satisfied" with the way democracy is working in South Africa. The results show a 10 percentage point difference between the control group (no civic education) and individuals who attended three or more workshops on institutional trust, a 7 point difference between these groups on

satisfaction with the current system and satisfaction with democracy, and an 11 point difference in these groups' expectations for the future. These effects confirm what was displayed in Table 3-1: civic education has some positive influence on the individual's assessment of how the political system is working; how well institutions are performing; and how democracy in general is working.

The results in this section, though not of overwhelming magnitude, are striking when viewed in cross-national perspective. First, in the Dominican Republic and Poland, we found no effects whatsoever of civic education on satisfaction with democracy. In South Africa, the individual's global assessment of the current democratic system is influenced to some degree though exposure to democracy training workshops. More significantly, the effects on institutional trust in the previous two countries, when they existed at all, were *negative*, in that civic education tended to increase individuals' skepticism about the trustworthiness of political institutions. We have hypothesized in a previous study that the direction of this effect would depend to a considerable degree on the stance of the civic education groups vis-à-vis the government, that is, whether the groups were oppositional or supportive of the current incumbents and the current performance of the system (Finkel et al., forthcoming). The results in South Africa are fully in line with this hypothesis, as the civic education groups are, with obvious reason, highly supportive of the current institutional arrangements compared to the previous regime. It may be expected, then, that civic education in South Africa would have positive effects on the individuals' institutional assessments. In the Dominican Republic, civic education training instead raised civic consciousness regarding the relatively poor performance of the current incumbents, and heightened dissatisfaction regarding the relatively slow pace of democratization and replacement of the vestiges of the old authoritarian regime.

FIGURE 3-5

Effects of Adult Civic Education Frequency on Trust in Political Institutions, Evaluation of Future Political System, and Satisfaction with Democracy



B. When is Civic Education Most Effective?

The preceding analyses have established that civic education can increase local political participation as well as individuals' estimation of their political efficacy, skills, and knowledge of the political system. In addition, some democratic values, notably political tolerance, support for the rule of law, and trust in government, are also affected by civic education, though to a lesser degree than participation, efficacy, and skills. In this section we explore the conditions under which civic education has larger or smaller effects. That is, we attempt to answer the question, when is civic education most effective? Our results provide very definitive answers to this question. We will show that civic education is more effective:

- When individuals attend three or more workshops. Less frequent exposure to civic education often has no impact whatsoever; that is, individuals who do not attend at least three democracy training workshops are indistinguishable on many democratic orientations from the control group.
- When workshops are conducted with more participatory methodologies, such as role playing, simulations, mock elections, and the like. Lecture-based civic education has negligible impact on democratic orientations.
- When trainers are perceived by the participants to be knowledgeable, inspiring, and interesting. Trainers who do not engage the participants have little success in transmitting democratic knowledge, values, or participatory inclinations

The fact that civic education often has effects only under certain identifiable conditions indicates further that the success of civic education programs will turn on whether these conditions are met in practice. Our analysis indicates that, in South Africa, these conditions were met only to a limited extent. As we will show:

- There is a large difference between the *potential* effects and the *actual* effects of civic education seen in South Africa. When individuals are trained frequently and properly, there are significant and often substantial effects on individual attitudes and behaviors. But less than half of civic education recipients were trained frequently and properly, and over one-quarter of all recipients of civic education were trained in ways that we have identified as ineffective.

These findings have important implications for implementing civic education programs in the future, as we will discuss in Chapter 6 below.

We measured the factors that could influence the effects of civic education in the following ways. As described above, we asked individuals how many civic education workshops they attended, and we divided the sample into people who had no civic education exposure (the control group), people who had attended one or two workshops, and people who had attended three or more. We call this factor "*Frequency of Civic Education*" in the following analyses.

To measure the ways in which the civic education training was conducted, we asked respondents if they could recall whether “any of the following activities took place” at the workshops or meetings that they attended: breaking into small groups to discuss material; staging plays or dramatizations; playing games; trying to solve problems and develop proposals; using simulations or role playing; staging mock trials of legal proceedings; or staging mock elections or other kinds of political activities. We counted the number of these activities so that each individual received a value of 0 to 7. We then separated the sample into three categories: individuals who had no civic education exposure, individuals who received civic education with three or fewer of these participatory methodologies, and individuals who received civic education with four or more participatory teaching methods. We call this variable “*Participatory Methods.*”

To measure individuals’ perceptions of the quality of their civic education instruction, we asked respondents to rate how well the following words “describe the people who ran the workshops:” knowledgeable, interesting, likeable, understandable, and inspiring. We divided the sample into individuals who received no civic education training, individuals who thought that some of these words described their trainers only “well” or “not very well,” and individual who thought that these words described their trainers “very well.” We label this factor “*Trainer Quality.*”

It is important to note that this variable measures only the *perception* of the quality of the instructor or trainer, as we have no objective evaluation of who the trainers were for each individual, what methodologies or teaching styles they had, nor the exact information that they conveyed. We may interpret these ratings as one might, for example, interpret student evaluations of a professor at a university. They capture how students (workshop participants) feel about their professor (trainer) rather than whether the professor in some objective sense is a good instructor. Of course, student feelings about their instructors are important predictors of how well they learn, and in this sense the evaluations used here are expected to have the same effect.

We present the results for all of the variables for which civic education had a significant effect in Table 3-1. The regression effects for each of the civic education conditions, along with their associated effects in standard deviation terms (*d*) for each variable are given in Table 3-2.

Table 3-2
Effects of Participatory Methods and Perceived Instructor Quality on Democratic Orientations: South African Adults

	Participatory Methods				Perception of Instructor Quality			
	Less than 3		4 or More		Low		High	
	B	<i>d</i>	B	<i>d</i>	B	<i>d</i>	B	<i>d</i>
<i>Political Participation</i>								
Participation in Local Politics (0-4)	.16**	.16	.58**	.55	.30**	.28	.34**	.32
Willingness to Participate in the Future (0-3)	-.15*	-.14	.18*	.17	-.24**	-.23	.17**	.17
<i>Knowledge and Competence</i>								
Political Knowledge (0-8)	-.16	-.11	.20	.15	-.03	-.02	-.01	-.01
Institutional Knowledge (0-4)	.07	.09	.16**	.20	.11	.14	.10	.12
Civic Skills (0-2)	.06**	.16	.15**	.36	.05	.13	.13**	.33
Political Efficacy (1-4)	.04	.06	.23**	.36	.05	.08	.16**	.26
<i>Democratic Values</i>								
Support for Regular Elections (1-4)	.10	.09	.17	.15	.00	.00	.24**	.21
Political Tolerance (1-4)	.00	.00	.19**	.24	-.01	-.01	.14**	.18
Obey Law (1-4)	.03	.03	.09	.11	.03	.04	.07	.08
Rights of the Accused (1-4)	-.01	-.01	.01	.02	-.02	-.02	.01	.02
Support for Cultural Diversity (1-4)	-.01	-.01	.15**	.31	-.07*	-.14	.16**	.34
<i>Trust and Performance Evaluation</i>								
Trust in Political Institutions (0-15)	.21	.07	.93**	.32	-.02	-.01	.94**	.32
Evaluation of Apartheid Regime (1-10)	-.27	-.12	-.21	-.09	-.19	-.08	-.30	-.13
Evaluation of Current Regime (0-10)	.21	.10	.78**	.37	.25	.12	.58**	.27
Evaluation of Future System (0-10)	.14	.07	.51**	.25	.03	.04	.10*	.14
Perceived Increased Political Freedom (1-4)	.01	.02	.18**	.26	.15	.07	.40**	.20
Satisfaction with Democracy (1-4)	.04	.05	.12*	.16	-.02	-.02	.16**	.23
Number of Cases: Total=940, Control Group=475	274		191		206		259	

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$

In addition, the results for seven key variables are summarized in graphic terms in Figures 3-6 to 3-12. These graphs show the estimated proportion of individuals in the “high” category for the following variables for each civic education condition: local political participation, civic skills, political efficacy, political tolerance, support for regular elections, overall satisfaction with democracy, and trust in political institutions. These variables were among those that showed the strongest effects in the previous section; they also give a good sense of the relative effects of different types of civic education in the realms of behavior (local participation), civic competence (civic skills and political efficacy), endorsement of democratic values (tolerance and support for regular elections, and trust and performance evaluations (institutional trust and satisfaction with democracy).

The results in Table 3-2 and the figures confirm that the effects of civic education vary dramatically by the three factors that we have identified: frequency of exposure to civic education, exposure to participatory teaching methods, and perceptions of trainer quality. Table 3-2 shows that exposure to workshops that used few participatory methods increased only two democratic orientations and behaviors: local participation and civic skills. For all other variables, *it was necessary to be trained with four or more participatory methods in order for any change over the control group to occur*. Similarly, if individuals perceived that their instructors were not of the highest quality, positive democratic change occurred on only local level participation. For all other variables, *it was necessary to be trained with instructors of high perceived quality in order for any change over the control group to occur*. Finally, a close re-examination of Table 3-1 shows the same pattern for *frequency of civic education exposure*. If individuals attended one or two workshops, significant change occurred on only three orientations and behaviors: local participation, civic skills, and the evaluation of the current political system. For all other variables, *it was necessary to attend three or more workshops in order for any change over the control group to occur*.

These findings represent strong evidence of “threshold” effects for civic education: the training must pass certain thresholds in terms of frequency, methodology, and trainer quality in order to impact individual attitudes, and to a lesser extent, behavior. The importance of these threshold patterns cannot be overestimated; they are the core findings of the study in terms of the conditions under which civic education matters at all for the development of democratic political culture.

These findings can be seen graphically in Figures 3-6 to 3-12. Figure 3-6, for example, shows first, that more frequent exposure to civic education workshops leads to a 20% increase in the percentage of individuals who are “high” on local participation (this portion of Figure 3-6 is identical to Figure 3-1). In the middle graph of the figure, it can be seen that 50% of the individuals who were trained with more than 4 participatory methodologies were “high” on local participation, compared with only 30% of the control group. Thus the *type* of training the individual received, not simply whether they were trained or not, made a significant difference in how much civic education stimulated political participation. Individuals who were trained with fewer participatory methods were more active in local politics than the control group, but much less active than those who were trained with more involving, participatory teaching methods.

FIGURE 3-6
Effects of Adult Civic Education Frequency, Participatory Methods, and
Instructor Quality on Participation in Local Politics




FIGURE 3-7
Effects of Adult Civic Education Frequency, Participatory Methods, and
Instructor Quality on Civic Skills




FIGURE 3-8
Effects of Adult Civic Education Frequency, Participatory Methods, and
Instructor Quality on Political Efficacy




FIGURE 3-9
Effects of Adult Civic Education Frequency, Participatory Methods, and
Instructor Quality on Political Tolerance




FIGURE 3-10
Effects of Adult Civic Education Frequency, Participatory Methods, and
Instructor Quality on Support for Regular Elections




FIGURE 3-11
Effects of Adult Civic Education Frequency, Participatory Methods, and
Instructor Quality on Satisfaction with Democracy




FIGURE 3-12
Effects of Adult Civic Education Frequency, Participatory Methods, and
Instructor Quality on Trust in Institutions




Figure 3-7 presents the results for civic skills. As with local participation, individuals who were trained less often, with fewer participatory methods, and with trainers who are perceived to be less effective, exhibit some change over the control group. But greater change still is observed among individuals with greater exposure, with more participatory methodologies, and with instructors of higher perceived quality.

Figure 3-8 presents the results for political efficacy, and here strong evidence of the threshold effects can be seen. The results show that for this variable, frequency of civic education exposure, exposure to more participatory methodologies, and perception of high quality trainers all increase the proportion of individuals who are “high” on political efficacy. Moreover, in this domain, almost all of the increase is registered for individuals who attended three or more workshops, who were trained with many participatory methods, and who perceived their instructors to be of high quality. That is, attending one or two workshops had virtually no effect on the individual’s sense of political efficacy; it was necessary to attend at least three workshops in order to achieve any significant effects from civic education. Similarly, individuals who were trained with few participatory methods differed little from the control group, as virtually all of the effect of teaching methodologies was concentrated among those who were trained with four or more active, participatory methods. And individuals who perceived that their instructors were of high quality showed significant effects on efficacy, while individuals who perceived that their instructors were not of the highest quality were not much different than those who were not trained at all.

Clearly for political efficacy, there are important *threshold effects* of civic education. Figures 3-9 to 3-12 show similar threshold effects for four other important variables: political tolerance, support for regular elections, satisfaction with democracy, and trust in political institutions. For example, in Figure 3-9 it can be seen that individuals who were trained only once or twice had levels of political tolerance that are indistinguishable from the control group. The *only* effects of civic education on tolerance were seen among those who were trained more frequently. Those who were trained with few participatory methods were no more tolerant than individuals who received no civic education, while one-third of all individuals who were trained with many participatory methods were highly tolerant, compared with 22% of the control group. Similarly, those who perceived their trainers to be of less than the highest quality were no different on tolerance than individuals who received no civic education; all of the increases in tolerance were concentrated among those in the high quality instructor group. The same kind of threshold effects can be seen for support for regular elections, overall satisfaction with democracy, and to a lesser extent, trust in political institutions. In order to have *any* significant effect on these political attitudes, civic education must be done *often* (more than twice), using *participatory training methods*, and using *high quality trainers*. In short, civic education can influence the individual’s support for democratic values and norms, but only if it is done in certain ways.

The importance of these factors for the success of civic education is unequivocal. But how many of the participants in civic education have been trained “correctly,” that is, in the ways that we have demonstrated are critical for change in democratic orientations to take place? Here the results are less encouraging. In Table 3-3 we report the percentage of civic education recipients whose training was either “low” or “high” on the three factors that we have identified

as important for success. We also present the figures for each of the three adult civic education programs separately. Only 29% of all individuals who received civic education training attended three or more workshops; the vast majority attended only one or two. Just over 40% (36%) of civic education recipients were trained with many participatory methods; 60% received mostly lecture-based training. Trainers themselves, however, were perceived to be of generally high quality, as 56% of civic education recipients rated their trainers as high on the series of qualities that made up the index. Still, almost half rated them as not high. Taken together, it is apparent that while civic education can matter if it is done in certain ways, in practice it does not matter as much as it could because many individuals are trained in what we have demonstrated are ineffective ways.

Table 3-3
Percentage of Civic Education Participants Receiving Different Kinds of Training
South African Adults

	Overall	By Civic Education Program		
		LHR	NIPILAR	CLC-Durban
Frequency of Exposure				
1 or 2 workshops	71.2	63.5	70.1	89.9
3 or more workshops	28.8	36.8	29.9	10.1
Participatory Methods				
1 to 3	58.9	50.2	57.8	79.8
4 or more	41.1	49.8	47.2	20.2
Perceived Quality of Trainers				
Not Highest Quality	44.3	45.2	37.4	52.5
Highest Quality	55.7	54.8	62.6	47.5
Number of Cases	465	219	147	99

Moreover, the quality of the instruction that individuals received varied dramatically from program to program. Whereas 37% of the LHR civic education recipients were trained more than twice, only 10% of the CLC-Durban respondents attended three or more workshops, with NIPILAR at 30%. CLC-Durban trainees also reported the fewest number of participatory methods used, with only 20% receiving training with 4 or more active methodologies, compared to 42% and 50% for NIPILAR and LHR, respectively. In the area of perceived quality of the trainers, NIPILAR respondents are most satisfied at 63%, followed by LHR at 55% and CLC-Durban at 48%. Clearly some programs are more able than others to deliver the kinds of civic education that we have identified as likely to be successful. We explored some of the reasons for these findings in qualitative interviews with NGO officials, with civic education trainers and participants, and we discuss these issues in greater detail in Chapter 5 below.

Putting Positive Civic Education Training Factors Together

The analysis above shows that under certain conditions, three civic education training factors --- frequency of exposure, participatory methods, and quality of trainers --- produced positive outcomes for democratic orientations in South Africa. We attempted to discover which of the three factors is *most* important by estimating a model for each democratic orientation that

contained variables related to all three factors at the same time. These models were somewhat difficult to estimate statistically, because the three factors are interrelated to a significant enough extent to make it difficult to achieve reliable estimates of their separate effects. That is, many individuals who were trained with highly participatory methods also perceived that the quality of their instruction was high; similarly, many individuals who were trained infrequently were trained with fewer participatory methods when they were trained. This situation of high *collinearity* between variables makes separate statistical estimates problematic. Largely because of the degree of multicollinearity, the results of these kinds of multivariate analyses for the seven key democratic orientations were inconclusive regarding which of the three civic education factors was most important. Participatory methods were significant in four of the seven models, while frequency of exposure and perception of teacher quality were each significant in three of the seven analyses.

However, we were able to assess the *combined* impact of these three positive civic education training factors in a different way. We measured the number of positive training conditions to which the individual was exposed. That is, we tallied whether the individual was trained more than twice, whether he or she was trained using 4 or more participatory methods, and whether he or she perceived the trainers to be of high quality. We then arranged individuals into five groups: those who received no civic education, those who received civic education with none of the positive aspects of training that we have identified, those who received civic education with only one of these positive aspects, and those who received civic education with two and then three of these positive aspects. We then re-ran the analyses from Figures 3-6 to 3-12 and estimated the proportions of individuals who were “high” on each of the democratic orientations and behaviors. These kinds of analyses can tell us whether individuals who are exposed to *more* of the positive civic education training features are more democratic in their orientations than individuals exposed to fewer such features --- regardless of what those specific features are. The results also can show how many positive training features are necessary for democratic change to take place, that is, whether frequent exposure, participatory methods, or high teacher qualities by themselves can influence democratic orientations or whether two or more of these training features are needed. We show the results in graphic form for local participation, political efficacy, political tolerance and support for regular elections as Figures 3-13 to 3-16.

The results confirm that there are important threshold effects of civic education, and also that there are incremental improvements in democratic orientations as individuals are exposed to more and more of the favorable training conditions. In all of the analyses except local participation, individuals who had poor civic education training--- that is, with none of the positive features we have identified --- were indistinguishable from the control group, and sometimes even *less* democratic than the control group. This indicates that *civic education conducted “poorly” will most often have absolutely no effects on individuals’ democratic orientations.*

FIGURE 3-13
Effects of Good Civic Education Qualities in South African Adults on
Participation in Local Politics




FIGURE 3-14
Effects of Good Civic Education Qualities in South African Adults on
Political Efficacy




FIGURE 3-15
Effects of Good Civic Education Qualities in South African Adults on
Political Tolerance





FIGURE 3-16
Effects of Good Civic Education Qualities in South African Adults on
Support for Regular Elections



In all of the analyses, moreover, increases in democratic orientations were seen as individuals were exposed to more and more positive training features. Individuals who experienced civic education with only one positive feature, whether it is frequent training, more participatory methods, or better trainers, showed some increase in their democratic orientations over the control group, and individuals who were exposed to two, and especially all three of the positive features, showed the largest effects. For example, Figure 3-14 shows that 28% of individuals who were trained with one positive feature were “high” on political efficacy, compared with 21% in the control group. This figure increases to 30% for individuals who were trained with two positive features, and to 43% for individuals who were trained with all three positive civic education features. In general, at least one-third and sometimes nearly one-half of the group that were trained with two features were in the “high” category on the democratic orientations, compared to between 22 and 39% of individuals who received no civic education at all. And if individuals were trained with all three of the positive features, they showed even greater effects, sometimes showing proportions in “high” categories of a democratic orientation that were nearly twice as large as for the control group. These are all substantial differences, indicating that the *potential* for the effects of civic education is fairly high *when it is conducted in certain ways*.

At the same time, less than one-half of the recipients of civic education are trained in ways most conducive to seeing positive democratic effects. Over one-quarter of all civic education recipients received training with *none* of the positive features that we have identified; that is, they were trained only once or twice, with very few participatory methods, and with trainers that they did not rate particularly highly. This is a recipe for “no effects.” Further, one-third of the recipients of civic education received training with only one of the three positive features, indicating that nearly 60% of the individuals who we interviewed received what we would term insufficient and inadequate training. 28% of the individuals received training with two positive features, and only 12.5% received training with all three. As we have shown, individuals in these two categories, and sometimes *only* these individuals, were the ones whose democratic orientations and behaviors were altered by civic education.

These findings demonstrate that the *actual* effects of civic education may differ substantially from the *potential* effects. In this section we have shown that civic education can change democratic attitudes and behaviors, but only under some conditions. And these conditions are not often met in practice. One of the key issues facing policymakers, then, is to design civic education programs and their implementation so that they may have the greatest possible effects. That is, it is critical to design and implement programs so that as many recipients as possible fall into the training categories that maximize attitudinal and behavioral effects. There are many obstacles to achieving these goals, some more easy to overcome than others. We explored some of these issues in more detail in our focus group discussions with civic education participants, as well as with trainers and administrators of the various programs. We discuss these findings in chapter 5 below, followed by our recommendations for the implementation of civic education in chapter 6.

C. For Whom Does Civic Education Have the Greatest Effects?

It is also important to determine whether civic education has differential impact for different kinds of individuals. For example, if civic education is found to be ineffective in rural areas compared to smaller town or metro centers, then policymakers might adjust their allocation of resources to support programs where demonstrable effects are taking place. Similarly, civic education could have greater effects on political attitudes among men than women, as was seen for certain knowledge-based attitudes in the Dominican Republic. It has also been speculated that an elite-based strategy for civic education – that is, one that targets more highly educated individuals, might have greater effect on individuals both in the short term and long term, as the value change among educated individuals may eventually filter down to the general population. We investigate these issues in this section. The results suggest that:

- There is little evidence that civic education systematically matters in a consistent fashion for some demographic groups more than for others. Civic education has generally similar effects for men and women, and for other demographic categories the differential effects are inconsistent.
- Civic education does have somewhat greater influence on individuals who belong to more secondary groups and associations. Individuals who are more socially isolated exhibit less change from exposure to civic education than individuals who have more extensive social networks. This finding suggests that conducting civic education workshops through existing social and neighborhood associations will have the greatest impact.

We test these processes in a very straightforward manner. First, we divided the sample into women and men respondents, and examine the effect of civic education (none, 1-2 workshops, 3 or more workshops) on each of the seven democratic orientations and behaviors analyzed in the previous section. The unstandardized regression coefficients and the *d* coefficient for these analyses are shown in the left-most columns of Table 3-4A.

It can be seen that the effects of civic education on political participation are nearly identical for men and women, as are the effects of civic education on civic skills and political efficacy. Civic education affects women's political tolerance and support for regular elections but not men's, while influencing men's overall satisfaction with democracy but not women's. We conclude that there are no important, systematic differences in how civic education affects men and women, certainly no differences that provide a consistent enough basis for making recommendations for changes in policy or implementation.

In the next set of columns we present the findings for different educational groups. We divided the sample into those with a high school (matrix) diploma (1/3 of the sample), and individuals who had not received their high school diploma (2/3 of the sample). It can be seen that civic education influences both groups' level of political participation and political efficacy. On four other variables, civic education influences those with lower levels of education *more* than those with high school degrees; on only one variable (support for regular elections) are

Table 3-4a
Effects of Civic Education by Gender and Education
South African Adults

	Gender				Education			
	Female		Male		No HS degree		HS degree	
	B	<i>d</i>	B	<i>d</i>	B	<i>d</i>	B	<i>d</i>
<i>Participation in Local Politics (0-4)</i>								
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	.27**	.26	.18	.16	.21**	.20	.25*	.24
3 or More Workshops Attended	.55**	.54	.49**	.45	.60**	.58	.53**	.50
<i>Civic Skills (0-2)</i>								
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	.05	.11	.15**	.35	.11**	.27	.12**	.30
3 or More Workshops Attended	.14**	.35	.13*	.31	.27**	.64	.05	.13
<i>Political Efficacy (1-4)</i>								
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	.07	.11	.06	.09	.06	.09	.13	.17
3 or More Workshops Attended	.26**	.42	.31**	.50	.26**	.40	.37**	.64
<i>Political Tolerance (1-4)</i>								
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	-.03	-.03	.14	.18	.02	.03	.03	.03
3 or More Workshops Attended	.36**	.45	-.10	-.12	.27**	.36	.15	.17
<i>Support for Regular Elections (1-4)</i>								
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	.10	.09	.05	.05	.09	.08	.03	.03
3 or More Workshops Attended	.25*	.22	.19	.18	.12	.11	.37**	.34
<i>Trust in Political Institutions (0-13)</i>								
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	.23	.08	.51	.18	.35	.11	.44	.15
3 or More Workshops Attended	.65*	.22	1.08**	.37	1.07**	.36	.33	.11
<i>Satisfaction with Democracy (1-4)</i>								
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	.04	.06	.08	.11	.08	.10	-.09	-.13
3 or More Workshops Attended	.09	.12	.29**	.40	.24**	.31	.01	.01
Number of Cases	617		323		642		298	

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$

Table 3-4b
Effects of Civic Education by Community Size
South African Adults

	Community Size					
	City		Town		Rural	
	B	<i>d</i>	B	D	B	<i>d</i>
<i>Participation in Local Politics (0-4)</i>						
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	.22	.19	.53**	.52	.07	.07
3 or More Workshops Attended	.76**	.67	.69**	.68	.34*	.33
<i>Civic Skills (0-2)</i>						
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	.07	.18	.01	.03	.12**	.27
3 or More Workshops Attended	.16**	.42	.01	.02	.25**	.56
<i>Political Efficacy (1-4)</i>						
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	.11	.17	.18**	.31	-.03	-.05
3 or More Workshops Attended	.30**	.46	.19*	.33	.35**	.55
<i>Political Tolerance (1-4)</i>						
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	.06	.07	.00	-.01	.04	.06
3 or More Workshops Attended	.38**	.45	-.13	-.16	.39**	.53
<i>Support for Regular Elections (1-4)</i>						
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	.18	.15	.18	.14	.03	.03
3 or More Workshops Attended	.27	.23	.16	.14	.24	.22
<i>Trust in Political Institutions (0-13)</i>						
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	.27	.11	.66	.20	.23	.08
3 or More Workshops Attended	.09	.04	.71	.22	1.34**	.45
<i>Satisfaction with Democracy (1-4)</i>						
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	-.08	-.11	.23**	.31	.01	.02
3 or More Workshops Attended	.09	.12	.17	.23	.17	.22
Number of Cases	252		270		418	
* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$						

Table 3-4c
Effects of Civic Education by Age and Group Membership
South African Adults

	Age				Group Membership			
	18-34		34 and older		0 or 1		2 or more	
	B	<i>d</i>	B	<i>d</i>	B	<i>d</i>	B	<i>d</i>
<i>Participation in Local Politics (0-4)</i>								
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	.26**	.24	.19*	.18	.19**	.42	.29**	.26
3 or More Workshops Attended	.72**	.67	.37**	.36	.42**	.47	.59**	.52
<i>Civic Skills (0-2)</i>								
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	.03	.08	.14**	.35	.03	.07	.11**	.28
3 or More Workshops Attended	.12**	.30	.16**	.37	.28**	.67	.14**	.35
<i>Political Efficacy (1-4)</i>								
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	.02	.03	.28**	.45	-.01	-.02	.08	.13
3 or More Workshops Attended	.08	.13	.23**	.37	.13	.21	.30**	.49
<i>Political Tolerance (1-4)</i>								
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	-.02	-.03	.06	.07	-.05	-.06	.04	.05
3 or More Workshops Attended	-.04	-.05	.42**	.51	.26	.33	.21**	.27
<i>Support for Regular Election (1-4)</i>								
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	-.03	-.03	.20	.17	.25*	.24	-.07	.06
3 or More Workshops Attended	.18	.16	.28*	.24	-.19	-.18	.24**	.21
<i>Trust in Political Institutions (0-13)</i>								
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	.55*	.19	.10	.03	.19	.14	.44	.14
3 or More Workshops Attended	.30	.10	1.27**	.42	1.71**	.62	.72**	.24
<i>Satisfaction with Democracy (1-4)</i>								
1 to 2 Workshops Attended	.03	.04	.05	.06	.17*	.22	.02	.13
3 or More Workshops Attended	.15	.20	.13	.17	.04	.05	.16**	.22
Number of Cases	491		449		304		636	
* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$								

there differential effects for those with higher levels of education. If anything, then, civic education has *greater* effect on individuals with less formal education, but we believe that the effects are neither consistent nor strong enough to base firm policy recommendations on them at this point. We may say, however, that there is *no support* for a more elite-based civic education strategy, at least insofar as educational and elite status are related. It is definitely not the case that the effects of civic education are concentrated on more highly educated South Africans.

We replicate these analyses next for individuals who live in metro areas (defined as areas with 40,000 or more in population) and compare their responses to individuals who live in smaller towns (population 8,000-39,999) and rural areas (7,999 or less). Again, the pattern of effects is inconsistent, as can be seen in Table 3-4B. Civic education influences political participation for all respondents, urban as well as small town and rural individuals, and civic education has universal effects on political efficacy as well. For political tolerance the effects are greatest for urban and rural respondents, and for trust in institutions they are greatest for rural respondents only. There is no evidence that civic education should be targeted in urban areas only, as it is clear that rural respondents can benefit from democracy training as much as their urban counterparts.

The next set of comparisons, between younger (those 18 to 34 in age) and older respondents (35 and above), can be seen in Table 3-4C. Again we see little in the way of consistently stronger or weaker effects for one or the other age grouping. There are stronger effects for younger individuals on political participation (though the effects are statistically significant for both groups); there are identical effects for satisfaction with democracy, and there are stronger effects for older individuals for political efficacy, tolerance, support for regular elections, and trust in institutions.

The final comparison is between individuals who belong to more than one secondary group or association such as sports, hobby, church or neighborhood groups, and individuals who are not members, or members of only one such association. In the Dominican Republic and Poland study, we found evidence that civic education had stronger effects for individuals who were more active in secondary groups. This pattern is replicated in South Africa, as can be seen from the last set of figures in Table 3-4C. Among individuals who belong to more than one secondary group, civic education influences *all* of the seven variables in the Table. For this group, civic education also influences several variables that are not shown in the Table, such as support for the rule of law. Among individuals who are less active in secondary groups, the effects of civic education are sporadic. On several important variables, such as efficacy, tolerance, and satisfaction with democracy, there are no statistically significant effects whatsoever for individuals who are inactive in social groups. This pattern is also found when examining support for the rule of law. Moreover, on several other variables, frequent exposure to civic education has an anomalous negative effect or *less* of an effect than that observed for individuals who attended only one or two workshops. On only three of the variables do the effects reach statistical significance and exhibit a logical relationship with the frequency of the individual's civic education exposure.

There are several possible explanations for these findings. One is that individuals who are "joiners" are the kinds of people who are more receptive to adult learning in general or

democracy issues in particular. We have tried to take these kinds of factors into account by controlling for education and prior political interest in our models, but it may nevertheless be the case that other orientations that lead people to join secondary groups are the same factors that lead to greater receptivity to the messages in civic education training. Another possibility is that the group experience itself reinforces and sustains the messages that are transmitted in civic education workshops. That is, individuals who are more active in groups have the opportunity to engage in the give and take of democratic discourse, and, through the dynamics of the group interactions, have the messages of civic education reinforced and enhanced. Further, it is widely known that groups themselves are often initiators and mobilizers of political participation. It stands to reason, then, that individuals who are more active in groups will have more opportunity to put the ideals learned in democratic civic education into direct practice. The results here, as well as those from the earlier study, thus support the view that civic education can have its greatest effect when targeted toward those individuals who are already members of civil society groups. Those contexts provide the best opportunity for group processes to reinforce democratic messages, and they also provide opportunities through the group setting by which individuals can engage the political system.

It is important to emphasize that the greater effects of civic education on group members do *not* occur simply because group members are more likely to be highly educated or have other kinds of elite-oriented demographic characteristics. We examined the effects of civic education for group members and non-group members after controlling for the individual's educational attainment, and found that among both poorly and highly educated respondents, more consistent effects of civic education were seen for individuals who were more active in civil society groups. This suggests that the more critical factor for targeting civic education should be voluntary associations, regardless of whether the particular groups tend to be comprised of more elite individuals.

IV. Results: South African Students

A. Basic Findings

We turn now to an assessment of the school-based civic education conducted by the Democracy For All/Street Law organization in South Africa. As discussed above, we asked many of the same questions to the high school students as we asked to adults, and we thus have comparable measures of such important orientations as political knowledge, efficacy, tolerance, support for the rule of law, trust in institutions, and satisfaction with democracy. Because of the students' age, however, the questions concerning political participation were modified to elicit the extent of the students' participation in politics *in the school* and his or her participation in *school based organizations*. We also asked students whether they approved of voting and other kinds of behaviors, both legal and illegal in nature, as means of influencing politics.

We present the basic findings for the students in Table 4-1. The table is the equivalent of the adult Table 3-1, and shows the unstandardized regression coefficient for civic education on all of the democratic orientations and behaviors, as well as the *d* coefficient that expresses the effect in standard deviation terms. The full set of regression models, including all control variables, is shown in Appendix C. We created two civic education variables for the students, depending on whether they were exposed to civic education on a *monthly* basis or less, or on a *weekly* basis or more. As with the adults, we expect that the more civic education that individuals receive, the greater the change in attitudes and behavior over the control group. We separate the orientations as we did for the adults into categories of *participation*, *civic competence*, and a series of *democratic values*.

It should also be noted that asking students about the frequency which they had received civic education led us to re-classify them into three groups: those who had received no civic education in their schools whatsoever (215); those who had received civic education but not from the DFA program (124), and those who had received civic education from DFA (261). In the analyses that follow we show the general effect of civic education exposure; there is an additional variable in the models that controls for whether the student was trained through non-DFA means. None of the interpretations that follow would be substantively altered if the non-DFA students were eliminated altogether from the analysis. We discuss below, however, some important differences in the type of training received by students in the DFA versus non-DFA programs.

It was also necessary, as in the adult analyses, to control statistically for other possible sources of influence on these attitudes. Specifically, factors such as students' socio-economic background, the intensity of political involvement and interest at home, their own prior interest in politics, and the democratic structure of student politics at their school could all affect students' attitudes and behaviors independent of the amount of civic education that they received. All of the results that follow take these processes into account, and therefore any effect of civic education that remains can be viewed as operating over and above the effects of these other variables.

The results of Table 4-1 can be summarized as follows:

- Civic education has moderate effects on students' school-based political participation. The effects are weaker, however, than were seen for adults. In percentage terms, the effects translate into about a 14% increase in school participation for students who received weekly civic education compared with the control group.
- Civic education has stronger effects on students' general political knowledge than was seen for adults. In percentage terms, the effects translate into about a 10% increase in "high" amounts of knowledge compared to the control group. There were no effects, however, on other aspects of civic competence such as political efficacy or the development of civic skills.
- Civic education in the schools has virtually no effect on democratic values. Individuals who received civic education were no more supportive of democracy as a form of government, no more tolerant of opponents' political views, no more supportive of the rule of law, and no more supportive of women's political participation. There was a slight effect of civic education on students' perceptions of the duty of individuals to vote and get involved in political life.
- Civic education increased students' overall satisfaction with the way that democracy is working in South Africa, as well the students' expectations for the political system in the future. These results indicate that civic education is having some positive effect on students' overall assessments of the system's performance, though these effects are not overly large in magnitude.

Taken together, the results suggest that civic education has generally weaker effects on students than on adults. In particular, democratic values appear to be extremely difficult to change through classroom-based civic education. Civic education can influence basic political knowledge and the individual's level of activity in school-based political life, but the transmission of core democratic principles, norms and values appears to be very difficult to achieve. We discuss these basic findings in this section, and in the subsequent section analyze the conditions under which civic education in the school appears to be more and less effective.

Table 4-1
The Effect of Civic Education on Democratic Orientations: South African Students

	Frequency of Civic Education			
	Monthly		Weekly	
	B	<i>d</i>	B	<i>d</i>
<i>Political Participation</i>				
Political Participation (0-3)	.13	.14	.33**	.34
School Clubs (0-6)	-.02	-.01	.44**	.30
Approval of Voting (1-4)	.04	.09	.15**	.34
Approval of Legal Behaviors (1-4)	.00	.00	.09*	.20
Approval of Illegal Behaviors (1-4)	.01	.01	.04	.06
<i>Civic Competence</i>				
Political Knowledge (0-8)	.20	.14	.61**	.43
Institutional Knowledge (0-4)	.13	.13	.37**	.39
Knowledge of Rights (0-11)	-.03	-.02	-.22	-.14
Knowledge of Leaders (0-4)	.07	.08	.24**	.28
Civic Skills (0-2)	.03	.07	.04	.11
Political Efficacy (1-4)	.07	.12	-.06	-.09
<i>Democratic Values</i>				
Essentials of Democracy: Procedures (0-4)	.09	.07	.14	.12
Essentials of Democracy: Economic Outcomes (0-3)	.05	.05	-.10	-.10
Democracy is Always Best (0-1)	.07	.14	.00	.00
Political Tolerance (1-4)	-.08	-.11	-.08	-.11
Rights Consciousness (0-5)	.01	.01	.08	.08
Civic Duty (0-3)	.17	.17	.21*	.20
Women's Participation (1-3)	.01	.01	-.01	-.01
Support for Rule of Law (1-4)	.12	.15	-.03	-.04
Support for Cultural Diversity (1-4)	-.02	-.05	.02	.05
<i>Trust and Performance Evaluation</i>				
Trust in Political Institutions (0-15)	-.15	-.08	.01	.01
Evaluation of Apartheid Regime (1-10)	-.05	-.02	.23	.09
Evaluation of Current Regime (0-10)	-.04	-.02	-.19	-.09
Evaluation of Future System (0-10)	.30	.14	.45*	.20
Satisfaction with Democracy (1-4)	.01	.01	.17*	.21
Number of Cases: Total=600 (No Civic Education=215)	204		181	
* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$				

Political Participation

The student results show moderate effects from civic education on political participation. Table 4-1 indicates that students who received weekly civic education were more likely to vote in school elections, participate in student government or student council meetings, or run for office in a student council election than students who received no formal civic education. The *d* coefficient is .34, meaning that the differences between the two groups is approximately one-third of a standard deviation. This effect is one the largest in the student study, but significantly weaker than the *d* of .5 on political participation seen for adults. There were also significant differences between students who received weekly civic education training and the control group on participation in school-based clubs (*d* of .30) and the students' approval of voting (*d* of .34) and legal behaviors such as contacting officials and joining community problem-solving groups (*d* of .20) as means of influencing politics. In general, civic education has the effect of increasing students' engagement with politics and groups within their schools, and their approval of using legal political actions to engage the political system. There are significant effects on participation in clubs outside of school, or in approval (or disapproval) of illegal political behaviors as a means of influencing politics.

We show several of these effects in graph form in Figures 4-1 and 4-3. In Figure 4-1, we divide the students according to whether or not they had ever voted or stood as a candidate in student government, or had taken part in a student government or student council meeting. If they had ever done *any* of these activities, we place them in the "high" category on school participation. Similarly, we code students who belonged to any extracurricular school-based clubs as "high" on school participation, and students whose average was 3.5 or higher on the 4 point "approval of voting" scale were placed into the "high" category on this variable. As can be seen in Figure 4-1, 72% of those who received no civic education were participatory, compared with 77% of students who received monthly civic education, and 86% of students who received weekly civic education. The 14% point difference in political participation is in the same magnitude as the 13% difference in participation in school-based clubs (Figure 4-2) and the 13% difference between the weekly civic education group and the control group in approval of voting as a means of political influence (Figure 4-3). Again, these effects are weaker than the corresponding 18-20% differences seen for adults.

FIGURE 4-1
Effects of Student Civic Education Frequency on
School Political Participation




FIGURE 4-2
Effects of Student Civic Education Frequency on
Participation in School Clubs





FIGURE 4-3
Effects of Student Civic Education Frequency on
Approval of Voting




Civic Competence

In the area of civic competence, political skills, and political knowledge, the effects of civic education are inconsistent. In contrast to the significant and positive effects seen for adults, there are absolutely no effects of civic education on students' level of civic skills or political efficacy, two highly important orientations that predict subsequent adult political participation. However, there is a significant and relatively large effect of civic education on students' political knowledge, and this effect is somewhat larger than that for adults. As Table 4-1 shows, students who received weekly civic education lessons scored .61 points higher than the control group on the eight-question political knowledge index. This means that weekly civic education led to a 7.6% increase in the number of correct answers, controlling for all other variables that are presumed to influence student political knowledge. *This is the strongest effect in the student portion of the study.*

Interestingly, the effects for knowledge about the structure of South African institutions are larger than those for knowledge of political leaders, but both effects are statistically significant. Figure 4-4 shows these effects in graphic form by dividing the students according to whether they answered 5 or more knowledge questions correctly. As can be seen, about one-third of students who received weekly civic education answered 5 or more questions correctly, compared with only one-quarter of the control group. Again, these effects are about 50% larger than those seen for adults in the knowledge domain.

The effects of civic education on students' political knowledge are impressive in three other regards. First, they compare very favorably to those reported in Poland and the Dominican Republic in our previous report. In Poland, civic education produced an approximately 2% increase in the number of correct responses among eighth-grade students, while in the Dominican Republic no effects of civic education on knowledge whatsoever were registered. The findings in South Africa are the largest that we have found in the three countries, indicating either that the DFA civic education program was more effective or that effects in general are likely to be larger among high school than younger students.

FIGURE 4-4
Effects of Student Civic Education Frequency on
Knowledge of Politics



Second, the results compare favorably to the most recent evaluation of civic education among high school students in the United States (Niemi and Junn 1998). In that study, it was found that students with more frequent and more recent civics courses scored 4 percentage points higher on a civics knowledge exam than students with no exposure to civics courses, and these results were described as “run(ning) directly counter to the conclusion that civics classes are worth little” (p. 122). The findings here of a 7.6% increase attributable to weekly civic education training are almost double the size of that effect.

Third, the effect here of weekly civic education is one of the strongest in the equations that predict political knowledge. That is, weekly civic education matters in predicting students’ level of political knowledge as much as their exposure to the mass media, their age and grade level, whether they come from a family that discusses politics often, and whether other members of their family are politically active. These other factors are important determinants of knowledge, but weekly civic education rivals their effects in magnitude. These results show that weekly civic education can have significant influence on student’s overall knowledge about politics and their knowledge about government institutions and leaders. As increasing knowledge is one of the core goals of civic education training, the results show that in this respect the programs should be viewed as highly successful.

Democratic Values

In the area of democratic values, however, the results are almost uniformly weak. Civic education has virtually no effect on students’ support for democracy as a form of government, understanding of the procedural characteristics that are “essential” to democracy, or support for the norms and values of democratic politics. Table 4-1 shows that students who receive civic education, regardless of the frequency, are no more likely to be committed to procedures that we associate with democratic governments, no more likely to believe that “democracy is always best,” no more tolerant of groups with unpopular political views, no more supportive of the rule of law, no more supportive of women’s participation in politics, and no more tolerant of other cultures than students in the control group. This is an important finding, in that it replicates the previous study’s finding of null effects in the Dominican Republic and Poland, and it does so in a context where effects *were* found on other democratic orientations such as political knowledge. The results demonstrate clearly that changing students’ political values --- as opposed to their knowledge or behavior --- through classroom civics training is extremely difficult.

The only pure democratic value that did show some change as a result of civic education was the students’ assessment of the duties of a democratic citizen, what is called “civic duty.” Students who received weekly civics training were more likely to say that “voting in local elections,” “paying rates and services,” and “taking part in political decisions that affect their community” were the responsibilities that citizens have in a democracy” than were students in the control group. These effects were not large, however, registering a *d* coefficient of only .20.

We also asked students a series of questions designed to elicit their assessments of the performance of the political system, political institutions, and democracy in general. We found that civic education had no effect on overall trust in government, trust in political institutions, or the students’ evaluation of the former apartheid regime or current political system. However,

students who received weekly civic education were more likely to be satisfied with “how democracy is working in South Africa” than the control group, and were more optimistic about the future performance of the political system than were students in the control group as well. These effects were not large, with *d* coefficients of .21 and .20 respectively, but they do suggest that civic education has some positive effect on the students’ overall assessment of democracy and belief about the future of the political system. Figures 4-5 and 4-6 display these effects in graph form, where we place students as “high” on democratic satisfaction if they responded that they were “very satisfied” with democracy in South Africa, and “high” on evaluations of the future system if they placed the system as either 9 or 10 on the 10-point scale. It can be seen that weekly civic education translates into a 16 percentage point increase in the proportion of students’ who are “high” on overall satisfaction with democracy, and a 17 percentage point difference in the proportion of students who are “high” on evaluations of the future political system.

In sum, weekly civic education has moderate effects on students’ political participation, relatively strong effects on students’ political knowledge, but virtually non-existent effects on support for democratic norms, values, or procedures. Civics training in the schools has modest impact on overall assessments of the performance of the political system.

FIGURE 4-5
Effects of Student Civic Education Frequency on
Satisfaction with Democracy





FIGURE 4-6
Effects of Student Civic Education Frequency on
Evaluation of Future Political System



B. When and For Whom is Civic Education Most Effective?

As in the adult portion of the study, we also examined the conditions under which student-based civic education is more or less effective. As for the adults, we tested whether the effects of civic education differed according to the frequency of instruction, whether the instruction was conducted with participatory methodologies, and whether students perceived their teachers to be knowledgeable, inspiring, and interesting. In addition, we examined whether the civics instruction covered many different democracy content areas or only a few. All of these factors mattered in predicting the effectiveness of civics training. Specifically, civic education is most effective:

- When students are trained on a weekly basis or more frequently. Those trained only a few times a month or less are indistinguishable from the control group on all democratic orientations and behaviors.
- When civics training is conducted with more participatory methodologies, such as role playing, simulations, mock elections, and the like. Lecture-based civic education has negligible impact on democratic orientations.
- When civics classes cover more areas related to democracy. Students exposed to only a few content areas are generally indistinguishable from the control group, while students exposed to more content areas show increases in participation and some other democratic orientations. Increases in knowledge, however, were not dependent on the number of content areas covered in civics classes.
- When teachers are perceived to be knowledgeable, inspiring, and interesting by the students. Teachers who do not engage the participants have little success in changing most democratic orientations, though increases in knowledge exist regardless of the perceived quality of the teachers.

These results are strikingly similar to those found for South African adults. More frequent civics instruction, conducted by better instructors with more participatory training methods, increases the democratic orientations of students as well as adults. And as with adults, the results indicate that the success of civic education programs will turn on whether these conditions are met in practice. Our analysis suggests that the same gap that we observed between the actual and potential civic education effects for adults exists for students as well. Specifically:

- Only 40% of the students trained in the Democracy For All program were trained on a weekly basis. Similarly, just over one-half of the students were trained using many participatory methods, and only 40% of the students rated their civic instructors very highly. If civic education were conducted more frequently, with more participatory methods, and with better-trained instructors, the effects we observed on students' democratic orientations in the study would have been greater.

We measured *Frequency of Civic Education* as in the previous section, by collapsing students who reported civics instruction every day or once or twice a week into the “Weekly”

category, and students who received civics instruction once or twice a month or less frequently into the “Monthly” category. We measured *Participatory Methodologies* by dividing the students into two groups, those who reported receiving 5 or fewer of a series of active methodologies in their civic education classes, and those who reported receiving six or more out of a total of 12. The methodologies included, for example, discussing current political events, breaking into small groups, visiting local government offices, playing games to illustrate democracy, participating in mock court trials or mock elections, using artistic work, and making class presentations. Many of these methodologies are exactly those that are described in the Democracy for All/Street Law guidebook for trainers in democracy and human rights.

We measured *Democracy Content Areas* by dividing the students into those who reported that their formal lessons on civic education included 5 or fewer of a series of content areas, and those who reported receiving lessons on 6 or more out of a total of 11. The content areas include, for example, discussions on the meaning of democracy, on the advantages of democracy compared to other kinds of political systems, on how ordinary citizens can influence the decisions of the government, on the rights of individuals who are charged with crimes, on the Constitutional Court and its role in the political process, and on the rights of women to be protected from violence in the home.

Finally, we measured *Instructor Quality* in the same way as it was measured for adults, by dividing students into those who thought that a series of adjectives, such as “knowledgeable,” “inspiring,” “likeable,” and “interesting” described their instructors “very well” and those who thought they did not. As we mentioned for the adult analysis, it is important to note that this variable does not measure *objective* teacher quality, but rather the subjective assessment of the teacher’s characteristics by the student.

Table 4-2

The Effect of Participatory Methods, Perception of Instructor Quality, and Democracy Content Areas on Democratic Orientations: South African Students

	Frequency of Civic Education				Participatory Methods			
	Monthly		Weekly		Less than 6		6 or more	
	B	<i>d</i>	B	<i>d</i>	B	<i>d</i>	B	<i>d</i>
<i>Political Participation</i>								
Political Participation (0-3)	.14	.14	.33**	.34	.04	.04	.39**	.41
School Clubs (0-6)	-.02	-.01	.44**	.30	.05	.04	.27	.18
Approval of Voting (1-4)	.04	.09	.15**	.34	.06	.07	.12**	.25
Approval of Legal Behaviors (1-4)	.01	.01	.04	.06	-.04	-.09	.12**	.26
<i>Civic Competence</i>								
Political Knowledge (0-8)	.20	.14	.61**	.43	.25	.18	.47**	.33
Civic Skills (0-2)	.03	.07	.04	.11	-.04	-.10	.11**	.28
<i>Democratic Values</i>								
Procedural Values (0-4)	.09	.07	.14	.12	.01	.01	.21	.18
Civic Duty (0-3)	.17	.17	.21*	.20	.08	.08	.30**	.29
<i>Trust and Performance Evaluations</i>								
Evaluation of Future System (0-10)	.30	.14	.45**	.20	.24	.11	.49*	.22
Satisfaction with Democracy (1-4)	.01	.01	.17*	.21	.06	.07	.09	.11
Number of Cases (Control=215)	204		181		192		193	
* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$								

Table 4-2 (continued)
The Effect of Participatory Methods, Perception of Instructor Quality, and Democracy Content Areas on Democratic Orientations: South African Students

	Perception of Instructor Quality				Democracy Content Areas			
	Low		High		5 or Fewer		6 to 11	
	B	<i>d</i>	B	<i>d</i>	B	<i>d</i>	B	<i>d</i>
<i>Political Participation</i>								
Political Participation (0-3)	.17*	.18	.27**	.28	-.02	-.02	.28**	.29
School Clubs (0-6)	.24	.16	.01	.01	-.10	-.07	.25	.17
Approval of Voting (1-4)	.07	.15	.11*	.24	-.07	-.15	.14**	.31
Approval of Legal Behaviors (1-4)	-.01	-.02	.11**	.24	-.06	-.13	.07	.15
<i>Civic Competence</i>								
Political Knowledge (0-8)	.44**	.30	.22	.16	.40**	.28	.34**	.24
Civic Skills (0-2)	-.01	-.04	.11**	.29	-.03	-.09	.06	.15
<i>Democratic Values</i>								
Procedural Values (0-4)	-.05	-.04	.37**	.30	-.13	-.11	.19	.16
Civic Duty (0-3)	.08	.08	.36**	.35	-.14	-.13	.30**	.29
<i>Trust and Performance Evaluations</i>								
Evaluation of Future System (0-10)	.29	.13	.47*	.21	.09	.04	.45**	.20
Satisfaction with Democracy (1-4)	-.02	-.02	.22**	.28	.04	.05	.09	.10
Number of Cases	261		124		99		286	
* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$								

In Table 4-2, we present the results of the regression analyses for seven democratic orientations and behaviors: political participation, approval of voting as a means of political influence, approval of other legal political behaviors, overall knowledge, civic duty, overall satisfaction with democracy, and evaluations of the political system in the future. As described above, these were the major orientations for which civic education had *any* effects in the student study. The two sets of columns on the first page of the table show the effect of *Frequency of Civic Education* and *Participatory Methods*, while the two sets of columns on the second page show the effect of *Democracy Content Areas* and *Instructor Quality*.

The table shows a very consistent set of findings. As can be seen, there is *no* effect of civic education on any of the students' behaviors or attitudes unless it is done on a weekly basis. Similarly, there is *no* effect of civic education on any of the students' behaviors or attitudes unless it is conducted using highly participatory methods. As with the adult study, civic education must be done often and in particular ways in order to have influence on democratic orientations. This is strong indication of a *threshold* effect for civic education, as demonstrated earlier with South African adults.

Similar effects are observed for content areas and instructor quality. The effects of civic education are almost exclusively concentrated on students who were exposed to many different content areas, and on students who perceived that their instructors were of high quality. Only in the area of political knowledge is it the case that these two variables are irrelevant.

We show these effects in graph form in Figures 4-7 to 4-13. The figures make clear that all of these factors are important predictors of when civic education will be more effective. For example, Figure 4-7 shows a 15 point difference between the percentage of students who were trained with more participatory methods who are "high" on school political participation and students who received no civic education. There is an 11 point difference between these groups depending on the number of content areas covered in the classes, and an 8 point difference depending on the perceptions of instructor quality. Similar differences between the control group and treatment groups are seen for approval of voting (with approximately 8-10 point differences), approval of other forms of legal behaviors (9-13 point differences) and overall political knowledge (6-9 point differences), though differences *within* the treatment group in terms of perceived instructor quality and the number of content areas covered have little impact on student scores.

FIGURE 4-7
Effects of Student Civic Education Frequency, Participatory Methods, Democracy Content, and Instructor Quality on School Political Participation




FIGURE 4-8
Effects of Student Civic Education Frequency, Participatory Methods, Democracy Content, and Instructor Quality on Approval of Voting




FIGURE 4-9
Effects of Student Civic Education Frequency, Participatory Methods, Democracy Content, and Instructor Quality on Approval of Legal Behaviors




FIGURE 4-10
Effects of Student Civic Education Frequency, Participatory Methods, Democracy Content, and Instructor Quality on Overall Political Knowledge




FIGURE 4-11
Effects of Student Civic Education Frequency, Participatory Methods, Democracy Content, and Instructor Quality on Civic Duty




FIGURE 4-12
Effects of Student Civic Education Frequency, Participatory Methods, Democracy Content, and Instructor Quality on Satisfaction with Democracy





FIGURE 4-13
Effects of Student Civic Education Frequency, Participatory Methods, Democracy Content, and Instructor Quality on Evaluation of Future Political System



The results for political participation and approval of legal behaviors, moreover, illustrate clearly the nature of the threshold effects described above. For example, there are virtually no differences in approval of legal behaviors for students who had no civic education and students whose civics instruction was conducted with few participatory methods. By contrast, receiving participatory civics instruction increases the probability of approving of legal participation by 13 percentage points. Similarly, students whose instruction covered fewer content areas or whose instructors were rated relatively poorly showed no increases over the control group; all of the differences were concentrated among students whose instruction covered more content areas and whose instructors were rated very high.

This kind of threshold pattern is also exhibited in Figure 4-11, where the results for civic duty are displayed. Differences between the control group and those whose civics training was less participatory, covered fewer areas, and was conducted by teachers who were not rated highly was non-existent. Only when civics instruction was participatory, extensive in content, and conducted by highly rated teachers were there effects on civic duty in the range of 10-14 percentage points. For overall satisfaction with democracy and students' evaluations of the future political system, the threshold patterns are visible in some of the figures but not others. Nevertheless, in all of the figures the importance of participatory methodologies, content areas, and instructor quality is evident.

Putting Positive Civic Education Training Features Together

As in the South African adult analyses, we attempted to ascertain which of the four positive civic education training features was *most* effective in instilling democratic orientations among students. However, these analyses were hampered by the same high degree of collinearity between the factors that we discussed earlier for adults. This made the estimate of separate effects for each less reliable than desired, and the results were not decisive. For the seven democratic behaviors and attitudes shown in Figures 4-7 to 4-13, each of the four factors was statistically significant in three models once all of the factors were entered simultaneously.

However, we were able to assess the degree to which *more* positive training features – be they more frequent exposure, more participatory methods, more content areas covered, or higher quality instructors --- were associated with increased in democratic attitudes. We added up the number of positive training features to which each student was exposed and then arranged individuals into four groups: those who received no civic education, those who received civic education with none of the four positive aspects of training that we have identified, those who received civic education with one or two of these positive aspects, and those who received civic education with three or four of these positive aspects. We then re-ran the analyses from Figures 4-7 to 4-13 and estimated the proportions of individuals who were “high” on each of the democratic orientations and behaviors. As we showed earlier with the adults, these kinds of analyses can tell us whether students who are exposed to *more* of the positive civic education training features are more democratic in their orientations than individuals exposed to fewer such features --- regardless of what those specific features are. We show the results in graphic form for school participation, approval of legal behaviors, perception of civic duty, and evaluations of the future political system as Figures 4-14 to 4-17.

FIGURE 4-14
Effects of Good Civic Education Qualities in South African Students on
School Political Participation




FIGURE 4-15
Effects of Good Civic Education Qualities in South African Students on Approval of Legal Behaviors




FIGURE 4-16
Effects of Good Civic Education Qualities in South African Students on Perception of Civic Duty





FIGURE 4-17
Effects of Good Civic Education Qualities in South African Students on
Evaluation of Future Political System



The results suggest, as with adults, civic education that is conducted “poorly,” i.e., with none of the four positive features that we identifies, will most often have no effects whatsoever. This can be seen by comparing the proportions in the “high” category for the control group – those with no civic education – to those in the next category, students who were exposed to civic education but with none of the four positive training features. In all of the analyses except school participation, these students are slightly *lower* on the democratic orientation than students who received no civic education whatsoever. As students are exposed to at least three of the four positive training features, however, their democratic responses are always higher than individuals exposed to only one or two of the positive factors. For example, Figure 4-15 shows that 47% of students exposed to one or two positive factors were “high” on approval of legal behaviors, while 64% of students whose civic education encompassed three or four of the positive factors were “high” on this democratic orientation. Similarly, in Figure 4-17, 61% of students who received three or four positive training factors were most optimistic about the future of the South African political system, compared to 52% of students trained with only one or two positive features. We conclude that more positive training features are highly related to increases among students’ democratic orientations, and that civic education conducted with few positive features is unlikely to have any significant effects.

Given that these analyses show that civic education is more effective under some conditions than others, it is important to assess how many students were actually taught under the more favorable conditions. Here, as in the adult analyses, the results suggest that there is much room for improvement in the implementation of democracy training. Only 44% of the students in our Democracy for All sample were trained once a week or more; only 13% received civics training on a daily basis. Only 54% of the DFA students were trained using 6 or more participatory methods, indicating that many of the students were exposed to more lecture-based instruction or instruction that was only sporadically participatory, and only 40% of the DFA students rated their teachers as very high on the personal qualities index. In the area of democracy content areas, however, a large majority of DFA students (78%) are being exposed to a relatively large number of issues related to democracy.

Taken together, the results show even more unevenness in students’ exposure to positive civic education features. Only 10% of the students who received civic education were exposed to all four positive features; 28% were exposed to three, 28% to two, 22% to only one; 11% were exposed to none of the four positive factors. As in the adult analyses, these results point to the difference between the *potential* for civic education effects and the *actual* magnitude of the effects in practice. Put another way, if more students were trained in the ways that this study has demonstrated are effective, important democratic orientations and behaviors among South African students would be far greater. This suggests that the key issue is how to encourage better implementation of civic education in the schools.

Along these lines, it must be noted that the DFA program appears to do *better* in three out of four of these regards than other civic education programs and instructors. In Table 4-3, we show compared the percentage of DFA students who were taught in the favorable categories with the percentage of students in the favorable categories who received some civics instruction but not with Democracy for All. Non-DFA students were somewhat more likely to receive weekly training than DFA students (53% to 44%), but DFA students were taught with more participatory

methods than non-DFA students (54% to 41%), in classes that covered more content areas (78% to 66%), and with better rated instructors (40% to 15%). It may be concluded that the DFA program is generally better in terms of implementation than “normal” civic instruction in the school; nevertheless, implementation of the DFA program is far from ideal. We shall have more to say in the concluding chapters about the ways that civic education can better be structured so that more students are trained in the demonstrably more effective ways.

Table 4-3
Percentage of Civic Education Participants Receiving Different Kinds of Training
South African Students

	Overall	DFA	Non-DFA
Frequency of Exposure			
Monthly	53.0	55.9	46.8
Weekly	47.0	44.1	53.2
Participatory Methods			
1 to 5	49.9	45.6	58.9
6 or more	50.1	54.4	41.1
Perceived Quality of Teachers			
Not Highest Quality	67.8	59.8	84.7
Highest Quality	32.2	40.2	15.3
Number of Democracy Content Areas			
1 to 5	25.7	21.8	33.9
6 or more	74.3	78.2	66.1
Number of Cases	385	261	125

Finally, we examined whether the effects of civic education on students were more pronounced among girls or boys, or students from different kinds of family backgrounds. In the Dominican Republic and Poland, there was some suggestion that school-based civic education was more effective for boys than for girls. In the South African study we found no consistent gender differences between the effects. Civic education sometimes affected girls more strongly than boys (knowledge and civic duty), and sometimes boys more strongly than girls (school participation and satisfaction with democracy). We tested whether civic education mattered more for students from more politically-involved backgrounds, and for students whose parents were more highly educated. No significant differences emerged in these analyses. We conclude that when civic education effects among students do exist, they do not appear to differ by gender or socio-demographic characteristics of the individual.

V. Qualitative Findings

The study included several qualitative components as discussed previously. Before the main data collection took place, Markinor interviewed 17 of the paralegals and trainers who led the civic education workshops in three of the four programs assessed here. After the data collection and preliminary report of the statistical results, four focus groups were conducted with participants who had attended one or more civic education training sessions. One focus group was conducted for each of the four programs. We also had discussions with officials of the four NGOs during our initial visit to South Africa in August 1998, as well as follow-up discussions during our visit in September-October 1999.

These interviews and focus groups provide invaluable supplemental information to the quantitative results presented thus far. In many respects, the qualitative findings reinforce the key findings of the quantitative analyses. But the interviews and focus groups also provided us with an important opportunity to amplify the quantitative results. That is, we were able to explore the reasons why, for example, individuals attended more than one or two workshops, and what could be done to encourage more people to attend workshops more regularly. Similarly, we were able to explore the types of instructional methods and training procedures that respondents found most effective. We were able to listen to suggestions that the trainers, NGO officials, and participants had for improving the workshops in the future. And we were able to evaluate the importance that people place on civic education compared to other sources of information about democracy to which they have access.

The Effects of Civic Education

The overriding message from civic education participants is that the workshops are indeed successful in transmitting information about democracy. Participants on the whole believe that they have more knowledge about democracy and more awareness of democratic and human rights than they did before attending the civic education training. As a student in the Johannesburg focus group said:

I know how to exercise my rights. I now enjoy the freedom of saying what I want to say, any time I want to say it.

Similarly, respondents viewed the workshops as successful in building what we termed efficacy and civic skills. As adults in the Durban, Malmesbury, and Kwa Ndebele focus group said:

It (views on democracy) has changed because those of us who were oppressed had lost their self-esteem but now we are confident people.

Not only my views about democracy have changed, I myself have changed too.

Group discussions taught me to communicate with other people and get to know them better.

Of course, such results are in line with the quantitative finding of increased civic competence among adults and students as a result of civic education. However, the qualitative interviews provide some evidence that at least one important aspect of democratic awareness was influenced by the workshops and was *not* tapped in our quantitative measures. Several participants discussed how the workshops had made them aware of the specific measures that they can take if they perceive their rights as being violated. That is, individuals would know where to go and to whom to go for assistance in defending themselves or asserting their democratic and human rights. As an adult in the Kwa Ndebele focus group said, when asked what a person should do if he perceives the police violating his rights:

He has to approach the advice centers. They will give him direction. Ho matter how long it takes he will ultimately be heard.

Or this from an adult in Durban:

Many people do not know their human rights. Through these workshops people get to know about their rights and what to do when they are abused.

These quotations suggest that civic education is perceived to be helpful in a more practical sense than is captured by our measures of rights knowledge. Though we found no systematic effects of civic education training on rights knowledge in the quantitative portion of the study, these discussions imply that civic education participants may be more aware of what to do and where to go if they fear that their rights are in danger of being undermined. Interestingly, the director of LHR, with whom we spoke in September 1999 mentioned that this aspect of rights awareness, what he termed “Making Rights Real,” was now the focal point of his groups’ training. Officials with CLC-Durban also mentioned that the teaching of how to exercise rights is a fundamental priority of that group’s training efforts. The focus group discussions suggest that this type of civic education strategy may indeed be successful.

Barriers to Repeated Exposure

The results in chapters 3 and 4 show clearly that repeated exposure to civic education is the key to ensuring its effectiveness. Consequently we spent a good deal of time exploring why certain individuals attend workshops more often, and why others attend only one or two and then refrain from further participation. If these decisions were better understood, then civic education programs could be structured in ways that would facilitate more frequent exposure to for the typical participant.

Some of the reasons for attending only one or two workshops relate to quality of instruction and the training (or lack thereof) of the workshop leaders. We defer discussion of these matters until the next section. Here we are more concerned with other structural or monetary constraints that prevent repeated exposure.

The trainers, NGO officials, and participants in the focus groups all agreed that the lack of resources is the key barrier to achieving higher repeat participation in the workshops. The trainers lamented the fact that workshops can only be conducted sporadically in rural areas

because many of the trainers do not have automobiles or other means of transportation. This means that repeated training sessions in many rural areas are simply impossible.

For the school program, trainers complained that school bureaucracies prevented the successful implementation of the program and the repeated training of pupils. Permission needed to be granted from various officials in the education department and schools on a yearly basis, meaning that time was invariably lost and access limited to areas where officials were less enthusiastic about the program. Trainers also reported that many teachers were unreceptive to their presence in the classroom and hence they were unable to train students as often as they desired.

Trainers in adult programs reported similar resistance from local chiefs to democracy training in certain areas. One participant in Durban also noted that:

Chiefs feel threatened that if you teach people about human rights then people will no longer respect them. As they believe in oppressing people they will not be able to do such practices.

Perhaps the main reason for participants to attend (or fail to attend) more than one workshop is the presence of inducements or incentives that are built into the program. One theme of the focus group discussions was that individuals had strong *utilitarian* motivations for attending the civic education workshops. That is, aside from expecting to learn about democracy and human rights, participants expected to receive some tangible goods from taking part in the training sessions. Sometimes these expectations appeared to be unrealistic misunderstandings of the nature of the workshops, as these Durban focus group participants suggested:

Many people today believe when they go to a gathering, then somebody would come with a bag full of money. At the end of the day they expected to receive something. At those workshops no money was given but people received knowledge. So many people did not attend again.

I think some people go there hoping to get jobs. There are lots of people out there looking for jobs. Now when they hear presentations on human rights they say “are they still talking about politics, we’ve long passed that.” That’s how people perceive it and never attend again because what he hoped to get he did not get.

Yet even participants who did not expect money or jobs expected *something* in exchange for their time. At the very least, respondents expected transportation or other costs of attending to be defrayed. As these adults from Durban and Kwa Ndebele said:

People really complain about being offered nothing to eat. Some people say, “what is there for me? When one lady told others that she’d attended a workshop they asked her what were they given...

We get food. If the workshop starts at 09h00 and ends at 16h00, people are offered breakfast and lunch. If the workshop starts at 10h00 and ends at 12h00 people are offered breakfast or tea.

Some don't attend because they don't have money for transport to take them to the workshop venues. The problem is that a lot of people are unemployed and therefore have no money for transport...

Along these lines, the trainers remarked in the in-depth interviews that when food or t-shirts are available, attendance levels are higher. Even students believed that attendance in democracy workshops could be improved if the training was accompanied by some kind of social function to motivate individual participation:

You see, the subject of Street Law is not particularly interesting to many people so maybe they should be topped and find themselves in a situation in which they stay interested. Like if it's our age group a party would be just great and then afterwards involve in a very subtle way. So that they're taking it in but they don't realize it. At the end of the day they walk out with something that they gained.

All of these comments suggest that instrumental considerations are quite important in motivating individuals to attend multiple workshops. Curiosity or the desire to learn about democracy may provide some incentives for workshop attendance, but more concrete material or social incentives appear also to facilitate repeated civic education exposure.

Perspectives on Training Methods, Trainer Quality, and Workshop Subject Matter

The trainers and focus group participants also had clear views on the kinds of training that was most effective, and the kinds of topics that civic education workshops should focus on to ensure audience interest and repeated exposure. It was overwhelmingly agreed that active involvement of the participants, through what we termed “participatory teaching methods,” was essential for the training to have any chance of success. Students reported that role playing, mock trials, and group discussions in particular were the most interesting means of learning the material. Adult participants agreed that active methodologies were the most effective. As an adult in Durban said:

I enjoyed the first workshop but it was not as interesting as the second one. In the second workshop the facilitator gave a presentation and then divided us into discussion groups. We talked about children's rights. We role-played families, for example we did something like a stage play, it was so interesting that I decided I'd attend again even if the same topic was discussed.

All trainers and participants agreed flatly that “lectures do not work.” Students and adult participants complained that some trainers would just read from a book and not explain what was being read. The things that students disliked most was “*when they started lecturing us,*” and “*like there were those who would just talk and talk and talk and we wanted to participate.*”

Adults in Malmesbury and Durban similarly complained that facilitators often talked too much and that:

It was nice, but a bit stiff. It was the same as in school, just sitting and listening, no explaining.

A facilitator should give participants a chance to say something. They should not just listen to you all the time. After the presentation you close your books and go without giving participants the chance to voice their views on their rights.

These remarks echo quite clearly the findings from the quantitative portion of the study, that active participatory methods are essential in achieving the desired goals of civic education. They also make clear that in many instances such active methodologies were not incorporated into the training. In these cases participants appear dissatisfied with their trainers and with the experience as a whole.

Participants also expected trainers to be knowledgeable about democracy but not to portray themselves as superior to the ordinary individuals who they trained. Some trainers were portrayed as pompous, and unwilling to engage the participants on their own level. Students complained that:

I used to raise my hand and then they'd take time calling you up. You'd even forget the question you'd intended to ask. So, we never got to ask questions. They'd say, "I'll get back to you" and they never did.

Yes, they spoke in such a tone as to say "I'm speaking now, you must be quiet."

The issue of trainer quality came through in several adult discussions as well, where it was suggested that many trainers are themselves not thoroughly trained or knowledgeable about democracy or human rights. As adults in Durban, Malmesbury and Kwa Ndebele said:

Yes, though they've been trained this subject is still new to them. It still confuses them. Some were trained long ago, so you need to quickly correct the facilitator...

The person who runs the workshop has no answers. Some people end up straying from the topic that's supposed to be discussed. That happens...

It depends on their capabilities. You will find people coming to talk about Child Protection units on the rights of children. This person will not have received any training. We therefore would not say that these people are good in what they do. They could be 70% good, but not 100%.

Focus group respondents had two other concrete suggestions for the trainers. First, the language of instruction ought not to be English, as many participants are not fully comfortable in that language. Instruction in English was therefore confusing and individuals were unlikely to attend subsequent sessions. Second, participants suggested that they be given a chance to suggest topics that they would like to address, mostly issues that affected them in their daily

lives. In the in-depth interviews with trainers, such sentiments were echoed as well. One LHR trainer described reaction to the Constitution as a civic education topic as follows:

They usually come up with questions like: “Where can we practice it and how?” They say they hear what is being said, but they don’t see it in action.

The trainers felt that topics such as these were more abstract and removed from the participants, whereas Human Rights is something that all individuals can relate to in their own lives. Because of this the trainers observed that human rights workshops were more successfully grasped and enjoyed while Constitution training was less successful. A Durban focus group participant suggested that Constitution training should be linked specifically to human rights as a means of generating individual interest in the topic:

They should have arranged to have a workshop where they spoke about the Constitution only. Teach people about the National Assembly and its activities. This would help as we will get to know how these human rights were agreed upon and by whom.

Clearly, the nature of the training and the quality of the paralegals and other civic education trainers is of paramount importance to the potential effectiveness of these programs. In this respect the qualitative and quantitative findings of the study are mutually reinforcing. Focus group participants and in-depth interviews with trainers supports the view that workshops conducted with active teaching methodologies, by trainers who are knowledgeable, well-trained and sensitive to the concerns of the participants are most effective in changing democratic attitudes. The quantitative results go even further to imply that for many democratic orientations, the training *must* be done in these ways or else *no* effects of civic education will be observed.

Sources of Information about Democracy and Human Rights

A final important consideration for civic education evaluation is its relative importance compared with other sources of information about democracy available to the individual such as the mass media. In the quantitative portion of the study we were not able to analyze this question in much detail, especially because we have included media exposure as a control for selection bias in the regression models. At the behest of USAID Pretoria officials we explored this question in more depth in the focus group interviews. The results suggest that respondents believe that the workshops are more effective in transmitting information about democracy than television and other forms of mass communication.

Respondents report that television and radio, as well as magazines and newspapers do provide information about democracy and human rights, sometimes in special programs devoted to these topics. Television and radio are perceived to be somewhat effective but not to the same standard as a workshop. Workshops are favored because they provide participants with the opportunity to meet, interact, and communicate with the trainer (again showing the desire of participants for active teaching methodologies). As adults in Kwa Ndebele and Malmesbury said:

I think the workshops are better because we see and communicate with the facilitator. On TV we cannot ask these people questions. Sometimes viewers are invited to phone in but some do not have phones...

Magazines are written either in high Afrikaans or difficult English; you need a dictionary to understand it. In a live workshop you can ask for an explanation and ask the facilitator to come down to your level.

Thus the written media present barriers to some individuals that can be overcome in a workshop environment. And all of the mass media are perceived to be non-interactive, making the workshop experience more desirable for the typical individual. We conclude that from the participant's standpoint, the more intensive interaction in civic education workshops is a preferable means of learning about democracy than the more passive absorption of information from the mass media.

VI. Recommendations for Civic Education Program Design

The findings from the quantitative and qualitative portions of the study have direct implications for the design and implementation of civic education programs. The following recommendations address those implications.

1. Civic Education Program Designs Must Ensure Repeated Exposure for the Target Audience.

The need for repeated exposure to civic education cannot be underestimated. If individuals are not exposed to at least three workshops, there will be little if any effect on democratic orientations or behavior. This recommendation has multiple implications for designing and implementing programs.

Missions are often faced with pressure to achieve impact at a national level. However, if funds are limited, we recommend focusing efforts on smaller targeted groups as opposed to having national reach with participants only attending one or two workshops. Although this option presents a trade-off between impact and numbers reached, the approach of focusing on a smaller group with repeated training promises a more sustained change. If there is overriding pressure to achieve national impact and funds are limited, then we would question whether civic education is the best candidate for funding. It is unlikely that such activities will produce measurable impact on knowledge, skills, or behavior of the recipients.

Funding is not the only issue that influences the number of workshops participants attend. Even when programs are designed to target a specific group over time, in many circumstances there are issues associated with the willingness or ability of participants to attend numerous sessions. As we found in our focus group discussions, individuals cited numerous reasons for not attending more than one session, including: the topic was not relevant to participants' lives, unemployed individuals could not afford the costs or tradeoffs associated with attending workshops, adequate incentives (in the form of money, food, and jobs) were not provided, the initial session was not satisfying, the language and content of the training were not appropriate for participants, and the time and/or location of the training was not convenient. Groups conducting civic education must do as much as possible to overcome these constraints.

In the South African case, this means that civic education should be conducted *only* in the local language when participants are not fully comfortable in English. Further, inducements to participation must be provided whenever possible, transportation must be provided, and workshops scheduled at times when participation is most convenient for the participants. These features, moreover, should be built into the program by design. If it is unlikely that these types of features can be incorporated into a civic education program, then individuals will be unlikely to attend more than one session. That, as we have shown, is a recipe for the program's failure.

Although many of these constraints are very context specific, one factor that is likely to apply globally is that civic education programs should be designed around themes that are immediately relevant to people's daily lives. This recommendation is consistent with much of the literature on political participation: people act on specific problems or events that are

immediately important to them. Therefore, in designing civic education projects, program managers should begin with the assumption that the target audience will act in its own self-interest, and then design programs that address those interests. This is not always easy, particularly when the priority interests in the community are not directly related to democracy and governance. In many developing democracies, including South Africa, issues around job creation, crime prevention, AIDs prevention, and pension and maintenance awards are of more immediate concern than broader issues of constitutional rights, for example. If the priority concerns are not directly related to democracy and governance then one approach may be to “piggyback” civic education components onto other training sessions that are addressing these issues of more immediate concern to individuals.

2. An Assessment of the Constraints to Repeated Attendance Should be Conducted Before a Civic Education Program is Implemented.

As we have discussed, civic education must be implemented in particular ways in order to work. We recommend that missions assess the barriers to proper implementation *before* programs begin. If those constraints are not likely to be overcome, then civic education activities should not be funded.

For example, in the DFA/Street Law program, trainers reported that they faced resistance by school officials and teachers in their efforts to conduct civics training in the schools. This, we argued above, may explain why less than half of the students were trained on a weekly basis, despite the program’s goal of weekly training. Similarly, leaders of the NGOs reported that in some regions crime is a large enough problem as to interfere with the implementation of the program, as are political difficulties associated with factional battles within the Provincial or local governments. In all of these instances, an assessment made prior beginning the program’s implementation could have alerted the mission and the NGOs to these potential problem and possible solutions.

3. Civic Education Training Should Use As Many Participatory Methods As Possible

Pedagogy in civic education matters. The greatest emphasis should be on helping the participants develop their own skills and tactics for enhancing their roles as citizens. The most effective approach to achieve this includes the use of a variety of participatory methods. Focus group participants identified role playing/acting, small group exercises that factored in reporting back to the group, and group discussions as the most effective training methods. Not surprisingly, the focus group participants overwhelmingly identified lecture as the least effective method for imparting knowledge.

Participatory teaching methods are important in their own right, as we have repeatedly found that it is *only* when individuals are exposed to these types of methods that civic education is successful. Such methods have an additional effect, in that individuals who are engaged in the training through active pedagogical techniques are more likely to return for repeated exposure. Thus the use of participatory teaching methodologies is linked synergistically to follow-up exposures, leading to the maximum impact of civic education training.

4. Greater Emphasis Should Be Placed On Proper Training of Trainers in the Initial Phases of Program Implementation, and Continuous Monitoring of Training Effectiveness Should Be Built Into Civic Education Programs.

It is crucial that trainers feel comfortable with a broad range of teaching methods as well as the content of the civic education materials. As with repeated exposures and participatory teaching methods, trainer quality is an essential component of program effectiveness. For many democratic orientations, it is *only* when individuals perceive their trainers to be of high quality that there is any effect whatsoever of civic education training. Consequently, we recommend more emphasis on training for the trainers.

Many of the South African civic education programs focus on paralegals. These paralegals conduct civic education workshops in addition to their day to day job of assisting individuals address their legal concerns. In designing these programs, one tactic is to identify potential candidates already residing in the community and then providing him or her with paralegal training. This approach has many positive attributes and two are worth mentioning. First, candidates already living in the community are more likely to remain in the community and thus retain their position as a paralegal for a longer time. This is particularly true -- and important -- in rural communities. Second, since these candidates are already trusted members of the community they are not faced with the additional challenging of establishing this relationship. Not only is this relationship critical to the paralegal's effectiveness but also for someone new in a community it often requires a long time to establish.

On the other hand, there is at least one potential limitation associated with identifying potential paralegals who currently reside in the community. This approach may provide a limited pool of candidates, and a pool with little experience with teaching methodologies and training. In these situations we recommend greater emphasis on assessing the training capabilities of the candidates and providing initial training for these candidates. It is critical that in addition to the paralegal course work the training sufficiently addresses teaching and training methodologies. Ideally, these paralegals would initially "team teach" community workshops with more experienced trainers. We also recommend building in a mechanism to monitor training effectiveness throughout the life of the project. For example, this could include unannounced site visits to civic education workshops to assess the training capacity of these paralegals and to offer them continuing training where necessary.

5. Target Civic Education To Voluntary Associations, But There Is No Need To Target Particular Socio-Demographic Groups.

One factor that does appear to be related to the effectiveness of civic education is whether the individual is a member of other community groups and associations. Individuals who have more extensive group networks are more likely to be impacted by civic education. This may be a selection effect of the kinds of people who join groups or something that happens within group dynamics. In either case, targeting secondary groups would seem to maximize impact. However, program designers should be aware that this strategy might in some instances lead to elite-oriented targets. We caution against an elite strategy unless there is a separate rationale underlying this strategy, as this study found little evidence that targeting elite populations will

bring about a greater democratic impact than targeting more grass-roots or rural participants. Similarly, civic education need not only be targeted on younger adults. Older individuals, at least in South Africa, are similarly affected by civic education as younger adults.

6. Donors And Civic Education Implementers Need To Be Cautious About The Extent To Which They Can Affect Democratic Values In The Short Term.

The immediate effects of civic education on core democratic values are not massive. Among students they are largely non-existent. But we should not expect mass value change as a result of civic education: attitudes and values are deeply embedded in culture, socialization, and environment. On their own terms, the effects that we observed for adults are not insignificant, especially on core democratic attitudes as political tolerance. But missions need to be aware that civic education programs may not be an effective means of value change, not because the programs are inadequate but because effecting value change is an extremely difficult and sensitive task. The main goals of civic education should be to encourage more political participation, develop basic political skills, and develop basic allegiances to democracy and democratic political institutions. Civic education is able to achieve these goals. Value change, however, is a slow process that must be viewed as a long-term undertaking.

7. Civic Education Programs Should Include An Impact Monitoring Plan.

Donors should require impact monitoring plans for civic education programs. Lists of participants should be considered critical supporting documentation. An argument has been made that requiring participants to register will have a chilling effect on workshop attendance. However, focus groups discussions supported this argument only under one condition. Registration does appear to have the impact of chilling attendance with illiterate participants. A registration process that highlights their inability to read or write may embarrass illiterate participants. Therefore, care should be given to the process established for registration if the target group includes a mix of literate and illiterate participants.

Until recently most assessments of civic education programs relied on anecdotal evidence or reports of numbers trained. This told us little about either individual or aggregate-level impact. This information can be critical in designing new programs and assessing impact. It provides a compass to know in what areas, and on which groups, programs are having the greatest impact, and it begins to uncover why. It can reveal flaws in the design of programs and strengths. Without information on impact, it is difficult also to link civic education programs to larger democratization strategies. Civic education programs are only one component of a larger democracy strategy. Evaluation and monitoring plans can help reveal how the impact of civic education relates to other components of that strategy. In short, it is necessary to know how and if programs are having an impact in order to adjust them and fit them in to a larger effort.

VII. Conclusion

Since the mid 1980s, the U.S. and other industrialized democracies have devoted a large amount of resources to strengthening emerging democratic systems in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere around the world. Such democracy assistance has taken various forms, including considerable support for programs that attempt to educate individuals in the rules, procedures, norms and values of democratic government, and that attempt to mobilize individuals to participate in civil society groups and in political affairs more generally. Despite the increased prevalence of these types of civic education programs in emerging democracies, almost nothing is known about the impact these programs have on individuals' attitudes, democratic values, or political behavior. This study, along with the earlier examination of the effects of civic education in the Dominican Republic and Poland, is one of the first attempts to fill this important gap.

The findings here tell a very consistent and in many ways optimistic story. Evidence was presented that civic education activities, especially among adults, have a significant and often substantial impact on South Africans' political participation, civic competence, and political knowledge. Even core values, such as political tolerance and respect for the rule of law, changed under some conditions, although the magnitude of those changes was less than the changes associated with behavior and participatory orientations. Given the skepticism often associated with civic education efforts and democracy assistance more generally, these results provide evidence of more sizeable effects than may have been expected.

At the same time, the analysis showed clearly that the effects of civic education on most democratic orientations were limited to certain types of training and teaching conditions. That is, it was not enough for individuals simply to be exposed to *any* civic education for democratic orientations to be affected. What mattered was the *frequency* and *quality* of the training that the individual receives. Unless individuals are trained frequently, with a preponderance of participatory methods, and with high quality trainers, *no effects are likely to be observed on most democratic attitudes*. These findings were observed in both the adult and student portions of the study, and received strong additional confirmation in the study's qualitative components as well.

The fact that the positive effects of civic education are only observed under some conditions leads to a more cautious interpretation of the effectiveness of civic education programs. We found that less than half of the South African civic education participants were trained in ways that we identified as highly effective; fully one-quarter of individuals were trained in ways that we identified as completely ineffective. This suggests that the key to the success of civic education is to ensure that as many individuals as possible are trained in demonstrably effective ways. From discussions with USAID and NGO officials, civic education trainees and participants, however, it appears that achieving this goal with the limited resources available is highly difficult to achieve in practice.

We conclude that civic education is potentially an effective tool for the development of democratic political culture. The challenge, however, is to overcome the demonstrable barriers to program effectiveness so that this potential of civic education can be realized.

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