

**THE IMPACT OF THE
KENYA NATIONAL CIVIC EDUCATION PROGRAMME
ON DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES, KNOWLEDGE,
VALUES, AND BEHAVIOR**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the findings of the Kenya Civic Education Impact Study, sponsored by USAID/Kenya, which assesses the effectiveness of the Kenya National Civic Education Programme (NCEP) in promoting democratic values, awareness, knowledge, and political engagement among ordinary Kenyan citizens. The Impact Study represents a critical aspect of the NCEP's overall monitoring and evaluation effort. Other aspects of the monitoring and evaluation, organized under the auspices of the Technical Assistance Team of Price Waterhouse Cooper in Nairobi, focus on the organization of the NCEP program, its success in implementing workshops and other activities, the effects of the program on the CSOs involved and on Kenyan civil society in general. The Impact Study sponsored by USAID, however, represents the sole mechanism for assessing the effect of the program on the individuals who have been exposed to NCEP activities

METHODOLOGY AND KEY HYPOTHESES

The Impact Study consists of three separate, though related components. The primary component centers on determining the impact of NCEP workshops. Interviews were conducted between late February and April 2002 with 3,619 individuals, half of whom were to attend one of 181 NCEP workshops sponsored by 26 different civil society organizations (CSOs), and half from individuals in the surrounding communities who were not slated to attend the workshops. The individuals in the “treatment” and “control” groups were matched in terms of their age, educational attainment, gender and place of residence. 2,301 of these respondents were re-interviewed between November 2002 and April 2003, between seven and fourteen months after the initial workshop had taken place.

A second component consisted of interviews with a national sample of 1,761 Kenyan citizens after the NCEP was completed in order to determine country-wide trends in democratic orientations, and the extent to which individuals overall were exposed to a variety of NCEP activities, including democracy workshops, theatre presentations, puppet shows, and public lectures and other events. 1,260 interviews with randomly-selected individuals were conducted in December 2002, and a separate national random sample of 501 interviews was conducted in May 2003.

The third component consists of six focus group sessions, four with individuals who attended NCEP workshops, one with a mixture of workshop participants and facilitators, and one exclusively with workshop facilitators. The goals of the focus groups were to uncover the potential effects of civic education that may be more nuanced or otherwise more difficult to determine from the survey data, and to solicit participants' opinions about how workshops and other civic education activities may be improved in the future.

We hypothesized that NCEP civic education should lead to positive changes in several kinds of democratic orientations and behaviors: 1) *civic competence*, or the extent to which the individual has the knowledge, awareness and personal capabilities to influence the political process; 2) *engagement with politics*, including the individual's level of political interest, attentiveness to politics in the mass media, and actual participation in the political system; and 3) *democratic values*, encompassing adherence to the values of political tolerance, support for the rule of law, support for democracy as a system of government, and trust in others and in democratic political institutions. Based on the NCEP's emphasis on constitutionalism and in encouraging individuals to participate in the ongoing constitutional review process in Kenya, we also included orientations related to awareness and knowledge of the constitution, and attitudes related to the constitutional review and specific reform proposals. Finally, we hypothesized

that participation in NCEP civic education would lead to “secondary effects” as a result of discussion of workshop topics and issues with others.

FINDINGS

To assess the effectiveness of the NCEP program in changing democratic orientations and behaviors, we first analyzed the change in each between the pre and post workshop interviews. In these analyses, the change in each democratic orientation or behavior is predicted from variables that represent the extent of the individual’s exposure to NCEP workshops and other civic education activities, as well as a series of control variables such as income, secondary group memberships, urban/rural status and church or religious attendance. The major results from these analyses are the following (see Chapter III):

- NCEP workshops and other activities were highly successful in promoting individual awareness and knowledge about the Kenyan constitution and the constitutional review process. These effects were the largest identified in the entire study.
- The Programme did not influence the public’s preferences regarding the direction of constitutional reform process nor specific reform proposals. Thus the Programme fulfilled its goal of achieving positive effects on individuals that were not biased toward particular political points of view.
- Programme activities were consistently effective in altering the individual’s sense of civic competence, skills, overall political knowledge, and psychological and actual engagement with the political process.
- The Programme had a limited effect on individuals’ support for democratic values. While there were moderate effects on important orientations such as political tolerance and support for the rule of law, the overall impact on this cluster of orientations was weaker than for awareness, competence and engagement.
- NCEP workshops were generally more effective in altering individual democratic orientations than other kinds of civic education activities, such as drama or puppet shows.

We then analyzed a series of NCEP workshop-related factors that could have affected the impact of the workshops on the participants, including the number of workshops and other activities that the individual attended, how far in the past the workshop experiences took place, the content areas that were covered, the methods of instruction that were employed, the ways that workshop attendees were recruited to participate, and the teaching qualities of the workshop leaders. These analyses yielded the following major findings (see Chapter IV):

- The frequency of NCEP workshop exposure is the most significant determinant of how much individuals change over time, and whether any substantial change is registered at all. Individuals who attended only one or two NCEP workshops often showed little change in democratic orientations, while there were large potential gains from multiple workshop exposures.
- The effects of NCEP workshop exposure are relatively long-lived, as the effects of workshops for very few democratic orientations “faded” over time. Some fade-out effects did occur, however, for the other NCEP activities.
- Workshops conducted with more active, participatory teaching methods were generally more effective in stimulating democratic change. In some instances, moreover, a threshold effect was found, where positive effects only occurred when workshops were conducted with many participatory methodologies.

- The participants' views of the qualities of the trainers who led the workshops were less important in determining change than the frequency of workshop exposure and the extent to which participatory methodologies were employed.
- Workshops of longer duration, that is, those that lasted eight or more hours, were consistently more effective than shorter workshops. In many instances, workshops of four or less hours, which constituted the majority of workshops in our sample, produced little or no change whatsoever in the participants, relative to the control group.
- Workshops that focused on "constitutionalism" and "democratization" were generally more effective than those focusing on "nationhood" and "governance," although there were some exceptions to this general pattern. Workshops that included discussions of community problems, such as crime or HIV/AIDS, were consistently more effective than workshops that did not include these topics
- No consistent patterns were found related to the entry strategy of the implementing CSO into the community in order to conduct the workshops. Entry through local elders and opinion leaders were more effective on some dimensions, while entry through women's groups or other local CSOs were more effective on others.

We investigated whether civic education had greater impact on certain kinds of individuals, than others, such as men or women, older or younger individuals, rural or urban individuals, those of higher or lower socio-economic status, and individuals with different religious orientations. We also assessed what may be termed the "secondary effects" of NCEP civic education, or the extent to which the effects of the workshops were amplified by participants through discussions about the content of the workshop with family, friends, and others in the individual's social network, and whether individuals who themselves did not attend NCEP activities nevertheless may have undergone changes in their democratic orientations as a result of discussing workshop or other NCEP activities with others. The major results from these analyses were as follows (see Chapter V):

- There were generally few differences in the effects of the Programme related to specific demographic categories. NCEP activities affected both women and men, old and young, those from lower and high socio-economic strata, and individuals from different religious groups in mostly similar ways.
- When differences across groups did exist, it was usually the case that individuals from less dominant social groups exhibited greater change from NCEP exposure than individuals from more dominant social strata. In this way the NCEP helped to equalize the pre-existing differences in democratic orientations between many of these groups.
- Individuals who were members of the implementing CSOs or of secondary groups that were invited to NCEP workshops consistently showed stronger effects from the sessions than did non-group members.
- Post-workshop discussions with others were crucial in amplifying and enhancing the impact of the sessions. Participants who spoke with others about their workshop experiences increased on most democratic orientations more so than did other participants. Even more importantly, individuals who were spoken to by participants in NCEP workshops spoke showed substantially more change than individuals who were not spoken to by others who had attended NCEP activities.

The National Survey data were used to estimate the proportion of all Kenyan citizens who were exposed to NCEP activities, and whether participants in NCEP activities were representative of all socio-economic strata in Kenyan society. We also assessed whether NCEP training in general was conducted in the ways that we have identified as those most conducive to program impact. The major results from these analyses are (see Chapter VI):

- NCEP activities reached an estimated 16-17% of the Kenyan population, though this is somewhat higher than estimates obtained through analysis of the Technical Assistance Team’s activities database.
- Participation in NCEP activities was somewhat skewed in terms of the socio-economic status of the participants; we attribute this mainly to the fact that civic education tends to be conducted through existing CSOs, and individuals in lower social strata are less likely to be active within civil society organizations;
- Many individuals who attended NCEP activities were not trained with the kind of frequency, or teaching methods most conducive to greater impact. For example, 39% of individuals exposed to any workshops attended only one, with another 29% attending two, yielding a total of 68% of the workshop participants in the “low frequency” category. Similarly, less than half were trained with many participatory teaching methods, and less than half perceived their instructors to be of the highest quality;
- There were likely to have been significant “secondary” effects of the NCEP program throughout the past year. Over 85% of individuals who were trained in NCEP workshops spoke about their own workshop experiences with at least three other individuals about their own experiences, and over 50% of all individuals had at least three people speak to them about the others’ workshop experiences. However, the number of *non-workshop participants* who spoke to at least three others who did attend workshops was only 15%, indicating that most of the post-workshop discussions took place among individuals who themselves had been trained in NCEP activities.

The focus group discussions with workshop participants and facilitators reinforced many of the key findings of the report, as well as provided important additional insights. New findings from this component of the project were (see Chapter VII):

- Participants reported that the workshops increased their sense of awareness of their rights as individuals against the powers of state authority.
- Participants increased their awareness of the vote as a reflection of their *individual* preferences, as opposed to those of their family, ethnic group or region.
- Muslim participants reported increases in their sense of inclusion in Kenyan politics and society.
- Participants made numerous suggestions to improve workshops and other civic education activities in the future. Workshops should be longer in duration, with more resources devoted to planning the workshops, to training the facilitators, to recruiting facilitators who spoke local languages, to providing inducements to reduce the costs for workshop attendees, and to providing participants with materials to discuss with others after the workshops were completed.
- Muslim participants recommended that Imams be more integrated into the civic education process in their communities

Our overall conclusion is that the NCEP program had a positive impact, with some important qualifications. The findings suggest that NCEP activities were effective in changing many important democratic orientations, values, and behaviors; coupled with the findings from assessments in other countries, there can now be little doubt that civic education can be an important instrument for democratic change. At the same time, the Kenyan results suggest that the effects of civic education are largely dependent on the amount and the duration of the individual’s exposure to workshops and other activities, on the instructional methods used, and on the degree to which participants engage in discussion about democracy issues after their direct exposure to civic education messages. In actual practice, large numbers of individuals were not trained in ways that were *most* conducive to program impact, and to this extent, the Programme’s effects were more limited than they could – and perhaps should – have been.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on these findings, we propose the following recommendations for the design and implementation of future civic education in Kenya, and by extension, in other developing democracies:

- Programs should focus on the specific democratic orientations where civic education is both needed and can realistically be expected to achieve significant impact.
- Programs must be implemented in ways that ensure sustained, multiple exposures to civic education messages.
- Civic Education training must make frequent use of active, participatory teaching methods.
- Training of civic education trainers is also important, as trainers may sometimes produce positive *or* negative changes in democratic orientations;
- Greater efforts should be made to target individuals in lower socio-economic strata, while maintaining the generally group-based focus of Kenyan civic education.
- Programs should emphasize post-workshop discussions by participants, especially with individuals outside of their immediate social network.

I. INTRODUCTION: THE KENYA CIVIC EDUCATION IMPACT STUDY

A. Study Objective

This document reports the results of the Kenya Civic Education Impact Study, a study funded by USAID/Kenya that assesses the effectiveness of the Kenya National Civic Education Programme (NCEP) in promoting democratic values, awareness, and engagement in the constitutional review process among ordinary Kenyan citizens. The NCEP was a coordinated effort by four consortia of Kenyan Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to “equip...citizens with relevant knowledge to contribute to and participate actively and meaningfully in the [country’s] socio-economic, political, and development process” (*Programme Document*, NCEP, 2000). Since late 2001, the member organizations of the NCEP conducted workshops, community forums, theater and drama presentations, and other public events throughout Kenya as means of raising democratic awareness, promoting democratic values, and engaging citizens in the ongoing review of the Kenyan constitution. The Programme was completed before the Kenyan national elections that took place on December 27, 2002. As part of its contribution to the overall NCEP effort, USAID/Kenya commissioned Management Systems International (MSI) to evaluate whether the workshops and other forums have achieved their stated goals, assess when and how civic education produced the greatest impact, and develop recommendations on how civic education programs can best be designed in the future to promote democratic knowledge and engagement in the political process.

The Kenya National Civic Education Impact Study represents a critical aspect of the NCEP’s overall monitoring and evaluation effort – the assessment of the effects of workshops and other NCEP events on the attitudes, values, perceptions, and behaviors of ordinary Kenyan citizens. Other aspects of the NCEP monitoring and evaluation, also supported in part by USAID, have focused on the organization of the program, its success in implementing workshops and other activities, the effects of the program on the CSOs involved and on Kenyan civil society in general.¹ The Technical Assistance Team also conducted an initial Baseline Survey of the national Kenyan population in Spring 2001 that provided important information about the political and social context within which the NCEP activities would take place. The Impact Study reported here, however, represents the sole mechanism for assessing the effect of the program *on the individuals who were exposed to NCEP activities* – how their behaviors, knowledge and beliefs have changed as a result of that exposure. This information is crucial in evaluating the overall impact of the program in promoting citizen input into the constitutional review process and in furthering democratic reform and consolidation in Kenya.

B. Significance of the Methodological Approaches Used

Kenya is the fourth country where USAID-sponsored Impact Assessments of civic education have been conducted. The Kenya study follows assessments in the Dominican Republic and Poland in 1997, and South Africa in 1999. The current assessment builds on those conducted in the previous countries in important ways, notably in the development of the questionnaire and in the sampling strategies that were employed. But the assessment in Kenya has several crucial features that allow substantially more definitive conclusions regarding program impact than was possible previously. Most importantly, a major portion of the assessment consists of interviews conducted with individuals *before and after* they have attended civic education workshops, so that the potential changes associated with civic education can be observed directly. In the three previous countries, interviews were limited to individuals only after they

¹ See Markus Brunner, Thomas Oyieke, and Max Mmuya, *Systems Evaluation of the National Civic Education Programme (NCEP)*, submitted by BiRD GmbH Germany, and Matrix Development Consultants, Kenya, USAID Purchase Order No. 623-O-00-02-00088-00, October 2002.

had been trained in democracy and human rights workshops in the past, making it impossible – despite sophisticated efforts at statistical control – to rule out completely the hypothesis that individuals were already more “democratic” *before* they attended civic education activities. In the Kenyan assessment, we completed interviews with approximately 3600 individuals, half of whom were interviewed before they were to attend one of 181 selected NCEP workshops, and half of whom were to serve as part of the “control group” who were not exposed to a civic education “treatment.” We then interviewed on a random basis 2301 of these same individuals again some months later after the NCEP was completed. We can therefore determine with great certainty the changes in democratic orientations, behavior, and constitutional awareness over time among individuals who attended NCEP civic education workshops, and assess whether these changes were significantly greater than the changes among individuals who were *not* exposed to civic education messages.

Second, previous assessments have been hampered by the fact that the civic education “treatments” themselves have varied widely among the implementing CSOs. As some workshops have addressed voting education, some women’s rights, and some local community problem-solving, it has been difficult to determine whether observed effects have been due to different content areas, different implementation strategies, or the different conditions under which the workshops have taken place. In Kenya, these problems for assessing civic education impact are much more tractable. First, the treatment itself has been standardized to a much greater extent than in other countries. The implementing CSOs in Kenya, in collaboration with donor organizations, outside experts, and consultants, spent nearly two years developing a common curriculum for the overall NCEP initiative. The curriculum is contained in the book *Making Informed Choices: A Handbook for Civic Education*, and in the supplemental teaching manual that was published by the four consortia of the participating CSOs. The curriculum, of course, was modified and adapted to some degree for each workshop, depending on the particular context in which the activity took place, but the core of the curriculum was designed to be relatively similar for all civic education participants.

Third, the rigorous monitoring and control of the NCEP by the Programme’s Technical Assistance Team has enabled us to ascertain many important details about the specific workshops and other activities that we examine in this study. The implementing CSOs were required to provide information about the workshop’s primary topic, duration, target audience, and other aspects of the event’s organization. We used this “objective” information to assess how these factors influenced individual participants. Thus we have much more information at our disposal than has been the case in previous impact assessments – we have knowledge of individuals’ orientations before and after their exposure to civic education, and we have more knowledge of the precise nature of their civic education “treatment.” Taken together, these features of the Kenyan assessment make it the most sophisticated and comprehensive assessment of the effects of civic education that has been possible to this point.²

B. Study Components

The Impact Study consists of three separate, though related components. As discussed above, the primary component involves interviews with a sample of Kenyan citizens before and after they attend NCEP workshops, with quantitative comparisons of their knowledge, attitudes and engagement with a control

² The previous assessments are described in Christopher A. Sabatini, Gwendolyn G. Bevis, and Steven E. Finkel, *The Impact of Civic Education Programs on Political Participation and Democratic Attitudes*, Report prepared for USAID Contract No. AEP-5468-I-00-6012-00, Delivery Order No. 5, Washington, D.C.: Management Systems International, February 2, 1998; and Steven E. Finkel and Sheryl Stumbras, *Civic Education in South Africa: The Impact of Adult and School Programs on Democratic Attitudes and Participation*, Report prepared for USAID Contract No. AEP-I-00-96-90012-00, Task Order No. 10, Washington D.C.: Management Systems International, February 7, 2000.

sample of Kenyan citizens who did not attend NCEP workshops (the “Pre-Post” component). The second component consists of interviews with a national sample of 1761 Kenyan citizens after the NCEP program was completed (the “National Survey” component), in order to determine country-wide trends in democratic orientations, and the extent to which individuals overall were exposed to a variety of NCEP activities, including democracy workshops, theatre presentations, puppet shows, and public lectures and other events. This portion of the study was necessary to provide accurate information about Kenyan public opinion and NCEP exposure as a whole, as opposed to the more limited sample of individuals who attended the 181 workshops that we examine in the Pre-Post component. The third component consists of six qualitative focus group discussions with individuals who attended NCEP workshops, in order to uncover potential effects of civic education that may be more nuanced or otherwise more difficult to determine from the quantitative analyses (the “Focus Group” component). These components are summarized in the table below.

Table I-1. Components of the Kenyan National Civic Education Impact Study

1. Pre-Post Workshop Component	Interviews with 2,301 individuals before and after NCEP workshops on democracy, nationhood, constitutionalism, and governance. Half of the interviews with individuals who attended one of 181 NCEP workshops in February-April 2002, half with similar individuals who did not attend. Follow-up interviews conducted in two waves: one in November 2002, the other in April 2003.
2. National Survey Component	Interviews with 1,761 randomly selected individuals throughout Kenya. Interviews conducted in two waves: one in December 2002 and the other in May 2003.
3. Focus Group Component	Six small group discussions with participants and facilitators of workshops conducted through each of the four NCEP consortia

The Pre-Post Workshop component was completed between February 2002 and April 2003. Research International, the Nairobi-based survey company contracted by MSI to conduct the personal interviews, interviewed 3,619 individuals throughout Kenya between February and April 2002, half with individuals before they were to attend one of 181 NCEP workshops, and half with individuals in the surrounding communities who did not attend the workshops. These 3,619 interviews constituted the “Pre” phase of the “Pre-Post” study component. A report on the pre-test phase of the project, including a description of the procedures through which the interviews were conducted, and basic findings from the initial interviews, including demographic and political comparisons of the workshop participants and control group samples and the overall contours of both groups’ orientations towards democracy and the Kenyan constitutional review process at the outset of the NCEP program, was submitted to USAID in August 2002.³

The “Post” phase of the “Pre-Post” study component was completed in two separate waves of interviews between November 2002 and April 2003. Research International re-interviewed 1,787 individuals from the initial pre-test sample between October 25 and November 24, 2002, with interviews conducted with 901 workshop attendees and 886 members of the initial control group. Thus, individuals in this wave of the study were interviewed between 6 and 9 months after the NCEP workshop took place. Interviews were subsequently conducted with an additional 514 individuals from the initial pre-test sample between March 28 and April 9, 2003, with interviews conducted with 261 workshop attendees and 253 members of the initial control group. Individuals in this wave of the study were interviewed between 12 and 15 months after the 2002 NCEP workshop took place. This design thus enables us to determine the extent to which NCEP workshop exposure had effects on democratic orientations in both the short and longer

³ *Kenya National Civic Education Impact Study: Report on Pre-Test*, Steven E. Finkel with the assistance of Paul Mbatia and David Leuthold, Report prepared for USAID-Nairobi, Contract No.. AEP-I-00-00-000180-00, Task Order #806, Management Systems International, August 13, 2002.

terms, as well as the extent to which the attitudes and behaviors of the NCEP workshop attendees and the control group may have changed in different ways in response to the changes in the Kenyan political leadership after the December 2002 elections.

The “National Survey” component of the study was designed to complement the Pre-Post data collection. Immediately upon completing the initial Post-test interviews in November 2002, Research International conducted interviews with a national random sample of 1260 individuals. These interviews were all completed before the December 27, 2002 national elections. A separate national sample of 501 randomly selected interviews was conducted in May 2003, after the final data collection from the Post-Test phase was completed. The national survey portion of the study had several goals. First, it was designed explicitly to enable comparisons to be made with the NCEP Baseline Survey that was conducted in February-March 2001, also by Research International under the auspices of the NCEP Technical Assistance Team.⁴ That is, the results of the national sample may be compared with similar questions asked on the Baseline Survey in order to determine how Kenyan public opinion *as a whole* has changed during the NCEP period. The national sample was also designed to provide information regarding the overall levels of exposure of the Kenyan population to NCEP workshops, as well as other NCEP activities such as theatre presentations, puppet shows, and public lectures. In addition, this sample provides information on the extent to which individuals who attended NCEP activities may have spoken about democracy and constitutional reform issue to family, friends, and others in their social networks and communities. Thus the National Survey and the Pre-Post surveys each provide important information regarding the NCEP program and its effects on Kenyan democratic and constitutional orientations.

The Focus Group component was conducted between August and October 2003. Research International worked with representatives of each of the four NCEP consortia to organize discussion with 8-12 individuals who had attended workshops during the time span of the Programme. The discussions with CRECO and ECEP participants were held in Nairobi on 13 August, the discussion with participants in GENDER workshops was held in Uyugis (Nyanza) on 15 August, and the discussion with CEDMAC participants was held in Mombassa on 30 September. Representatives from ECEP and CEDMAC also made facilitators of their workshops available to us for separate focus group discussions, and these sessions were held on 13 August and 7 October respectively. The primary goals of the focus groups were to explore participants’ experiences with civic education during the NCEP period, to assess how the civic education may have affected them in ways that could not be adequately captured through the quantitative survey data, and to elicit suggestions for how they believe civic education may best be focused and implemented in the future in order to further the process of democratization in Kenya.

C. Organization of the Report

The report begins with a discussion of the framework and methodology used for assessing the effects of NCEP activities. We discuss the orientations that we examine among NCEP participants and the control group, including attitudes about the Kenyan constitution and constitutional review process, as well as more general democratic attitudes, values, and behaviors. Next we describe the implementation of the Pre-Post workshop component of the study, focusing particularly on the process through which individuals interviewed in February-April 2002 were contacted and re-interviewed in the post-test phase. Then we describe the sampling design and implementation of the National Survey study component. Finally, we provide a description of the questionnaire, and the items used to measure democratic attitudes and other orientations in both the Pre-Post and National Survey components.

⁴ For more information about the Baseline Study, see *Kenya: State of the Nation – A Report on the Baseline Survey*, July 2001, report prepared by Strategy and Tactics, Inc. for the Technical Assistance Team of the NCEP.

In the following chapters, we present the substantive findings from the study. In Chapter III, we focus on the basic question of NCEP's impact on the individual's democratic orientations. We analyze the impact of NCEP workshops and other activities on individuals' attitudes and opinions regarding the Constitution and the constitutional review, and orientations towards a series of important democratic values, beliefs, and behaviors. For each orientation, we examine the impact of workshop participation as well as participation in other NCEP activities and compare the magnitude of these effects.

In chapter IV we identify the conditions under which NCEP civic education produced a larger or smaller impact. We focus in this chapter on a number of workshop-specific factors that potentially affect the impact that the NCEP civic education activities had on the individual, including the number of workshops and other activities that the individual attended, how far in the past the workshop experiences took place, the content areas that were covered, the methods of instruction that were employed, the ways that workshop members were recruited to participate, and the teaching qualities of the workshop leaders.

In chapter V, we focus on whether civic education had greater impact on certain kinds of individuals, that is, we analyze whether NCEP civic education was more effective for men or for women, older or younger individuals, rural or urban individuals, those of higher or lower socio-economic status, and those with specific religious orientations. We then turn to the impact of social and group influence on the civic education process, focusing on whether NCEP activities had larger effects on individuals with higher levels of prior involvement in civil society. Finally, we analyze what may be termed the "secondary effects" of NCEP civic education, or the extent to which the effects of the workshops were amplified through discussions by workshop participants with family, friends, and others in the individual's social network, and whether individuals who themselves did not attend NCEP activities nevertheless may have changed their democratic orientations as a result of discussing workshop or other NCEP activities with others.

In chapter VI we present the findings of the National Survey component concerning the extent of exposure of individuals throughout the country to NCEP civic education activities. We assess the proportion of the population that attended NCEP workshops, drama presentations, and other public events; the number of activities that the typical individual attended, how the activity rates may have varied by the individual's socio-economic status, and the extent to which individuals who were exposed to NCEP workshops discussed the issues raised in the workshop with family, friends, and others in their social networks. These results provide descriptive information about the reach of the NCEP program, as well as information about the extent to which individuals in general were trained in the ways that earlier chapters identified as those most likely to bring about positive impacts.

In chapter VII we present the findings of the Focus Group component of the study. We discuss what participants say were the most important things they learned in the NCEP workshops, including some orientations that were not included in the study's quantitative components. We then present a variety of suggestions that were made by participants for improving civic education in the future, many of which reinforce the results from previous chapters. In this chapter, we also devote attention to civic education in the Muslim community conducted by CEDMAC, as Muslim respondents were underrepresented in other components of the study. In chapter VIII, we summarize the study's findings and discuss the implications of the results for the future of civic education programs in Kenya, providing general recommendations for improving the design and implementation of civic education programs in Kenya and in other developing democracies.

II. STUDY FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

A. A Framework for Analyzing the Effects of the NCEP

The Kenyan National Civic Education Programme was an ambitious, countrywide effort of coordinated civic education in order to promote democratic values, awareness, and engagement in politics and the constitutional review process among ordinary Kenyan citizens. As stated in the NCEP's *Programme Document*:⁵

The aim of this programme is to promote general awareness of democratic principles, the practice of good governance, the rule of law, and constitutionalism. Through promoting awareness of these fundamentals, the Programme seeks to contribute to the consolidation of a mature political culture in Kenya, where groups and individuals are not only aware of their rights and obligations but are also able to advocate their positions.

The Programme thus aimed to develop among ordinary citizens those skills, values, dispositions, and levels of knowledge and awareness that support democratic political processes and lead to more effective participation. An assessment of the Programme's impact, therefore, should focus on these specific orientations and how they have changed as a result of program participation. Further, the assessment should examine the conditions under which program participation leads to more or less impact on individuals, the kinds of workshops and other events that lead to greater impact, and the kinds of individuals who are most likely to respond to the messages of the workshops and other Programme activities. The objective of this study, then, is to determine whether the NCEP was successful in changing these democratic orientations, and if so, which ones, under what conditions, and for which kinds of individuals.

The orientations that the Programme sought to influence – awareness, civic skills, support for democratic values and political participation – are well known to political scientists as precisely those aspects of public opinion that are most important for the development and consolidation of democratic political culture.⁶ They have been researched extensively in both established and emerging democratic systems for over fifty years, and hence we have a good deal of knowledge of exactly how these orientations should be conceptualized and measured. At the same time, the NCEP was grounded in the specific Kenyan political context, most importantly the context of the ongoing review of the Kenyan constitution and the run-up to the national elections of December 2002. This context was taken into account in the design and conceptualization of the study, as well as in the specific indicators that were developed. We describe briefly the specific orientations that were examined in the Impact Study as well as our method of determining the secondary impacts of the NCEP educational activities.

1. Civic Competence

The first set of orientations encompasses the individual's degree of "civic competence," or the extent to which the individual has the knowledge and personal capabilities to influence the political process. This is reflected in official NCEP goals, such as "increased civic awareness and improved comprehension of civic issues."⁷ We expect exposure to NCEP activities to influence the individual's basic knowledge of the political system, how democracy works, the structure of the political system, and basic information

⁵ *Programme Document, National Civic Education Programme, Final Draft, 4 December 2000, p.4.*

⁶ See, for example, Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

⁷ *Programme Document, National Civic Education Programme, Final Draft, 4 December 2000, Annex B.*

about political parties and politicians. Given the importance of “constitutionalism” to the Kenyan NCEP, we may also expect the exposure to civic education to lead to increased awareness of the constitution and its contents, as well an awareness of the reform process and specific proposals discussed as part of the Kenyan constitutional review process.

Civic education may also be expected to influence what are known as “civic skills,” abilities such as public speaking, problem-solving, working in groups, and the like, that enable individuals to participate more effectively in groups and in the political process more generally.⁸ Even more specifically, NCEP activities should influence the individual’s sense of political efficacy, or the extent to which individuals believe that they can have influence in the political system and that the system is responsive to attempts by individuals to exert that influence. Such perceptions of efficacy are critical in determining individual participation in politics; as a systemic factor efficacy is important in holding elites accountable to ordinary citizens, as elected officials are thought to be more responsive to public pressures when they believe that citizens feel efficacious and may take future collective actions to further their interests. Thus the “civic competence” cluster of orientations that we examined is:

- Awareness about the Kenyan constitution and the constitutional review process
- Knowledge about the political system, institutions and incumbents
- Possession of skills that facilitate democratic participation
- Sense of efficacy that individuals can influence the political process.

2. *Political Engagement*

Aside from promoting knowledge, political awareness, and civic skills, we anticipate that NCEP civic education results in individuals having a higher level of engagement with the political system. This includes first the individual’s *psychological engagement* with politics, or the level of interest the individual has in keeping up with politics, and the extent to which the individual follow politics and political events in the mass media. Moreover, as noted above, civic education attempts to encourage individuals to become *actively* engaged in democratic political life. We thus focus on the extent to which individuals who receive NCEP training are more likely as a result to take part in a series of democratic political behaviors ranging from local level participation, contact with local and national authorities, electoral participation and peaceful protests and demonstrations.⁹ Therefore, cluster of “engagement” orientations that we examine covers:

- Interest in politics
- Attentiveness to politics in the mass media
- Democratic political participation

3. *Democratic Values*

The final set of orientations encompasses the individual’s adherence to a general set of important democratic values and norms. The goal of changing democratic values is found throughout the NCEP *Programme Document*, as noted in the introductory text above, as well as in the stated goals found elsewhere of “enhancing a culture of constitutionalism” and developing “deeper appreciation for democratic values.” What precise democratic values, however, should NCEP exposure be expected to

⁸ See Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady, *Voice and Equality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).

⁹ We define democratic political participation as “legal acts by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take.” See Sidney Verba, Norman Nie, and Jae-On Kim, *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

change? Political scientist James Gibson and his colleagues provide a useful description of the “democratic citizen” as someone who

...believes in individual liberty and who is politically tolerant, who holds a certain amount of distrust of political authority but at the same time is trustful of fellow citizens, who is obedient but nonetheless willing to assert rights against the state, who views the state as constrained by legality, and who supports basic democratic institutions and processes.¹⁰

Thus, the democratic citizen is one who adheres to the principles inherent in democracy – competitive elections with majority rule, political equality, inclusive political participation, civic liberties and protection of the rights of minorities – and is willing to apply these principles in practice. Individuals should support democratic procedures, be willing to extend procedural liberties even to their political opponents, support the view that governments cannot encroach on certain areas of individual and human rights, and provide some degree of support toward existing democratic institutions, though not without a healthy skepticism and willingness to hold elites to account. Individuals should also adhere to values that support all citizens’ political and social equality, and develop a sense of collective identification with other Kenyans, even those outside their immediate social network or ethnic group. Finally, the consolidation of democratic culture is facilitated when individuals prefer democracy against *all* possible alternative forms of government, such as a return to authoritarian rule, military governments, and the like.¹¹

As a result, we examined the following specific orientations in the cluster of democratic values:

- Political tolerance
- Support for the rule of law
- Institutional trust
- Social trust and adherence to supportive social values of equality and national identity
- Support for democracy as a form of government against alternative political systems

We are confident that these orientations reflect well the specific goals of the NCEP in terms of developing democratic attitudes and values among ordinary Kenyans. They also reflect well the views of political scientists regarding the dispositions that are most appropriate for the deepening and consolidation of democratic political culture in developing political systems.

As noted above, the assessment of the effects of the NCEP involves not only determining what impacts it had, but also determining the conditions under which the workshops and other activities were more effective. We investigate the following issues by focusing on several dimensions of the individual’s experience with the NCEP.

Frequency of NCEP Exposure. Did the individual attend one or two workshops or training sessions, or was the exposure to civic education more extensive?

¹⁰ James Gibson, Raymond Duch and Kent Tedin, “Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union,” *Journal of Politics* 54 (1992), p. 338.

¹¹ For more on the values thought necessary for democratic consolidation, see Richard Rose, William Mishler and Christian Haerper, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Soviet Societies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1998); Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Steven E. Finkel, Lee Sigelman, and Stan Humphries, “Democratic Values and Political Tolerance,” Chapter 5 in John P. Robinson, Philip R. Shaver, and Lawrence S. Wrightman, *Measures of Political Attitudes* (San Diego: Academic Press.)

- *Duration of Workshops Attended:* Did the workshops last for only a few hours, or were they more intensive full-day or longer sessions?
- *Recency of Training:* Were the workshops that the individual attended held recently, or did they take place in the more distant past? Did any immediate effects of NCEP exposure “fade out” over time?
- *Training Methodologies.* Were the methods used in the workshop training more active and participatory, or were they more passive in nature? Were individuals encouraged to express their opinions and participate in games, simulations, role playing, mock elections, and the like, or were they exposed solely to lectures and presented with material with little interaction with the instructors?
- *Trainer Quality.* Did individuals believe that the trainers who conducted the civic education were knowledgeable, interesting, likeable, and competent?
- *Organizational and Recruitment Strategy:* Did the implementing CSO for the workshop organize the activity through a local CSO, through community elders or opinion leaders, or via a religious gathering? Were any of these organization strategies for implementation associated with greater impact on the participants?

Each of the above factors is likely to condition the effects of NCEP civic education on the individual. We expect individuals who receive more intensive exposure to civic education, exposure to more participatory teaching methodologies, and training by high quality instructors to be more likely to absorb and act on the messages imparted in civic education training.

Finally, NCEP civic education activities may have indirectly impacted others through the discussions they stimulated within an individual’s social network. These types of effects are characterized as the “secondary effects” of the NCEP, as they may occur *after* the workshops or other activities may have already exerted their “primary” effects on the participants themselves. Secondary effects of civic education may occur in two possible ways: 1) workshop participants may discuss democracy or constitutional issues with others, thereby amplifying in their own minds the messages that they may have learned in the workshops; and 2) individuals who did not attend workshops may have discussed democracy-related topics with individuals who did, thereby becoming exposed to the messages conveyed in the workshops indirectly.

These kinds of secondary effects of civic education have never before been included in any civic education impact assessment. This represents another strength of the Kenyan study, as previous assessments may have underestimated the overall impact of civic education by focusing solely on “primary” or direct impact on the participants. Moreover, in discussions with donors and implementing CSOs, it is clear that some of the impetus for funding and conducting civic education is precisely because of their belief in both the primary and secondary effects of these activities. All of these direct and indirect effects of NCEP activities will therefore be tested in the analyses below.

B. Methodology for the Pre-Post Workshop Study Component

1. Post-Workshop Sampling Procedures and Selection of Respondents

As described in the August 2002 *Kenya Civic Education Impact Study: Report on Pre-Test*, the pre-test interviews in February-April 2002 produced an overall sample of 3619 respondents, half with individuals before they were to attend one of 181 NCEP workshops throughout the country (the “workshop sample”), and half with similar individuals in the surrounding communities who did not attend the workshops (the “control group”). The procedures used for sampling workshops and selecting respondents in both the workshop sample and control groups were described in Section II of the previous report, which is included here as Appendix A. The workshop sample was designed to provide information concerning individuals who were to be trained in a variety of workshops sponsored by a cross-section of the participating CSOs in the NCEP. The control group sample was designed to provide information on

demographically similar individuals from the surrounding communities who *did not* attend the given workshop. As discussed more fully in the initial, the pre-workshop sample included individuals trained in workshops sponsored by 26 different CSOs throughout seven of Kenya's eight provinces. The control group respondents, moreover, closely matched the treatment group on the relevant demographic factors – age, education, gender, and place of residence – that were specified in the study design.

In October 2002, Dr. Finkel and Dr. David Leuthold of the University of Missouri returned to Nairobi to brief USAID, the Donor Steering Committee, and representatives of the NCEP and the Technical Assistance Team on the results of the pre-workshop interviews. During that trip, procedures for the post-workshop interviews were developed in consultation with Dr. Paul Mbatia of the University of Nairobi and with members of the project team at Research International (RI). The procedures were designed to further several important objectives: 1) to ensure that the post-workshop respondents were precisely the same individuals who were interviewed in the pre-workshop phase; 2) to maximize the overall number of post-workshop interviews, subject to budgetary constraints; 3) to maximize the response rate for the post-workshop interviews, that is, to ensure that as many of the pre-workshop respondents as possible were successfully re-interviewed; and 4) to minimize the potential bias from what is known as “panel attrition,” or the tendency for certain kinds of individuals with potentially different political, demographic and attitudinal characteristics to drop out of follow-up studies because of difficulty in locating them or in obtaining their consent to be re-interviewed.

We first randomly selected 136 of the 181 workshops, with 2700 potential respondents, to be covered in the November 2002 phase of the post-test, with the remaining 45 workshops (900 potential respondents) allocated for the March-April 2003 second post-workshop phase. Then, we developed the specific procedures for selecting respondents from among the workshop and control groups within each of the workshop samples. Based on our projection of a 50% re-interview rate, we required the Research International interview team to complete interviews with at least 12 of the 20 respondents in each workshop sample, with at least 10 of those interviews consisting of 5 pairs of workshop individuals and their specific match in the control group. We instructed the interview teams to conduct the initial interviews with individuals whose pre-workshop identification number ended in the digits 2,3,4,5,7,8 – this provided the interviewer with 14 potential respondents. If the requisite interviews could not be completed after five attempts at contacting these individuals, the interviewer was instructed to contact respondents whose identification number ended in ‘6’, followed by numbers ending in ‘1’, and finally numbers ending in ‘9.’ In this way a rigorous effort was made to ensure that the resultant post-workshop sample would be a random and representative sub-sample of the initial pre-workshop respondents, and not consist only of the 12 most easily accessible individuals from the pre-workshop sample.

During the interview process, field supervisors were required to keep detailed records of the number of contacts that were made with designated respondents, and to make additional assignments to their interviewers as needed to reach the given quotas. The study managers at Research International, in addition, kept track of the number of workshops where the initial 14 respondents were not sufficient to reach the quotas, and were instructed to notify Finkel and Leuthold if more than 25% of the workshops needed respondents 17 and 18 to reach the quotas, and if more than 10% of the workshops needed respondents 19 and 20. Research International recorded the final dispensation of each pre-workshop interview, that is, whether they were designated to be contacted or not in the post-test, whether or not the re-interview was successfully completed, and if not, the reason that the respondent was not re-interviewed (e.g., they had moved, or refused to be interviewed). Finally, the data entry team at RI checked a series of demographic characteristics of the post-workshop respondents – their age, educational status, ethnic group, religion, type of roof on house, family income, and sex – against the same characteristics that were recorded on their pre-workshop questionnaire. If two or more of these characteristics differed from their pre-workshop value, the questionnaire was returned to the field supervisor in order to investigate the source of these discrepancies and for corrective action to be taken.

Intensive training sessions for the RI supervisors and interviewers were conducted by Drs. Leuthold, Finkel and Mbatia in late October 2002 in Nairobi and Kisumu. Following these sessions, fieldwork for the first 136 workshop samples began on October 25, with the final interviews being completed on November 24, 2002. In March 2003, the process was repeated for the remaining 45 workshop samples, with the field period lasting from March 28 until April 9, 2003.

2. *Comparison of the Pre and Post Workshop Samples*

The post-workshop data collection was highly successful in achieving the objectives outlined above. We were able to re-interview a total of 2,301 respondents, 501 more than our initial projections. In addition, the procedures described above worked nearly perfectly to ensure that these respondents represented an unbiased subset of the initial pre-test. The post-workshop sample was an accurate representation of the pre-workshop sample in terms of the CSOs covered, the regions and types of communities represented, the distribution of workshop and control group individuals, and the demographic profile of the respondents.

Re-interview Rate. The response rate for the post-workshop data collection was very high, as shown in the following table:

Table II-1. Re-Interview Rate For The Post-Workshop Data Collection

Post-Workshop Data Collection Period	Number of Eligible Pre-Workshop Respondents	Number of Pre-Workshop Respondents Contacted	Number of Successful Re-interviews	Overall Re-interview Rate
November-December 2002	2719	2009	1787	88.9%
March-April 2003	900	602	514	85.4%
Total	3619	2611	2301	88.1%

As can be seen, it was necessary to contact only 2,611 of the initial 3,619 (or 72.3%) respondents in order to achieve the requisite sample quotas. Of these 2,611 individuals, moreover, successful interviews were completed with 2,301 respondents, for an overall re-interview rate of all individuals of 88.1%. The rate of 88.1% is extremely high in comparison to many follow-up studies conducted in the United States and Europe, where rates in the 70% range are often registered, and rates of 50% are sometimes considered acceptable. The rate achieved in this study is no doubt the product of a number of favorable factors: the rigorous procedures that were implemented to ensure a high degree of success, the relatively low levels of residential mobility over time in the Kenyan population, and the willingness of Kenyan respondents to discuss their views about democracy and the constitution a second time with a trusted and competent interviewer.

There was no bias in the re-interview rates between individuals who attended the NCEP workshops and the matched control group individuals. Table II-2 shows that the proportion of individuals in the workshop sample and control sample was almost exactly 50% in both the pre and post workshop phases.¹² Thus, it proved no more difficult to relocate and re-interview individuals in the workshop sample than individuals in the control group, despite the fact that the pre-workshop interviews for the workshop sample often took place at the workshop site and not at the respondent's home. This also indicates that the

¹² The recontact rate for both groups was also nearly identical, at 71.4% and 72.9% respectively.

procedures that were instituted to locate and verify the post-workshop respondents worked extremely well.¹³

Table II-2. Total Workshop And Control Group Respondents, Pre And Post Workshop Samples

Group	February-April 2002 Pre- Workshop	November/December 2002 Post-Workshop	March-April 2003 Post- Workshop	Total Post- Workshop
Workshop Sample	1832 (50.6%)	901 (50.4%)	261 (50.8%)	1162 (50.5%)
Control Group	1787 (49.4%)	886 (49.6%)	253 (49.2%)	1139 (49.5%)
Total	3619	1787	514	2301

CSO Coverage. The post-workshop sample broadly reflected the pre-workshop sample in terms of the 26 CSOs that sponsored the 181 NCEP workshops in the study. As Table II-2 indicates, the proportion of pre-workshop respondents who were re-interviewed was in the 60-70% range for 25 of the 26 CSOs. Given an overall re-interview rate was 63.6% (as successful re-interviews were conducted with 2,301 of the 3,619 pre-workshop respondents), these figures indicate that the post-workshop sample did not disproportionately include pre-workshop individuals who were trained in workshops conducted by particular kinds of CSOs or particular NCEP consortia.¹⁴

¹³ These procedures included the construction of a detailed address and contact sheet during the pre-test phase and a verification protocol used by the post-test interviewer to attest that the pre and post test respondents were the same persons.

¹⁴ It is the case, however, that some CSOs and consortia were more heavily represented in the initial pre-test survey; the analysis here indicates that the post-test sample accurately reflects the initial pre-test.

Table II-3. Consortia, Organizations and Workshops Covered in Pre and Post-Workshop Samples

	Workshops	Pre-Workshop Interviews	Post-Workshop Interviews	Percentage of Re-interviews
<i>CRE-CO: Constitutional Reform Education Consortium</i>				
ICAD (Institute for Constitutional Affairs and Development)	13	260	157	60%
CREDO (Civic Rights and Democratic Organization)	10	200	136	68%
YAA (Youth Agenda)	10	200	126	63%
4Cs (Citizens Coalition for Democratic Change)	9	180	110	61%
CLARION (Centre for Law and Research International)	8	160	103	64%
MAPAKA (Makueni Paralegal Coordinating Agency)	6	120	74	62%
CHRSE (Centre for Human Rights and Civic Education)	5	100	63	63%
ILISHE TRUST (Ilishe Trust)	5	100	63	63%
UDPK (United Disabled Persons of Kenya)	2	40	28	70%
<i>ECEP (Ecumenical Civic Education Programme)</i>				
	7	140	94	67%
<i>Gender Consortium</i>				
NCSW (National Commission on the Status of Women)	10	200	128	64%
FWG (Federation of Women's Groups)	10	200	118	59%
AMKA (Amka-Space for Women Creativity)	8	160	104	65%
KYECD (Kenya Youth Education and Community Development)	8	160	103	64%
CPDA (Christian Partners Development Agency)	7	140	83	59%
SITWO (Sianya Township Women's Umbrella Group)	5	100	61	61%
BREASTFEEDING (Breastfeeding Information Group)	4	80	50	63%
KOLA (Kenya Oral Literature Association)	3	60	40	67%
PROWED (Programme for Rehabilitation of Women in Socio-Economic Difficulties)	3	60	39	65%
FFD (Foundation for Dialogue)	2	40	27	68%
<i>Unaffiliated CSOs</i>				
BIDII (Benevolent Institute of Development Initiative)	13	259	167	65%
SONGA MBELE (Songa Mbele Women's Organization)	12	240	154	64%
LRF (Legal Resource Foundation)	10	200	134	67%
ECJP (Ecumenical Centre for Justice and Peace)	9	180	116	64%
MAKUPA (Makupa Paralegal Community Forum)	1	20	10	50%
DEEDS (Disabled for Education and Economic Development Kenya)	1	20	13	65%
TOTAL	181	3619	2301	Average 63%

Regional Coverage. The re-interviewed sample was a near-perfect reflection of the pre-workshop sample in terms of the proportion of interviews completed in each of the seven Kenyan provinces. As Table II-4 indicates, the proportion of post-workshop interviews from each of the provinces is within several fractions of a percent from the same proportions in the pre-workshop sample. This is especially noteworthy, given the difficulties that were faced in obtaining the initial pre-workshop interviews in Rift Valley and Western Provinces, as outlined in our previous report. There were no problems in re-

contacting individuals in any parts of the country, nor in converting these contacts into successful re-interviews.

Table II-4. Regional Breakdown Of Workshops And Pre And Post-Workshop Interviews

Province	Workshops	Pre-Workshop Interviews	Percentage of Pre-Workshop Interviews	Post-Workshop Interviews	Percentage of Post-Workshop Interviews
Eastern	51	1019	28.2%	662	28.8%
Nyanza	46	920	25.4%	565	24.5%
Central	29	580	16.0%	377	16.4%
Coast	24	480	13.3%	309	13.4%
Nairobi	17	340	9.4%	211	9.2%
Western	8	160	4.4%	96	4.2%
Rift Valley	6	120	3.3%	81	3.5%
TOTAL	181	3619	100%	2301	100%

Demographic Comparisons. Finally, the post-workshop sample showed no appreciable difference from the pre-workshop sample in terms of its demographic profile. On all of the relevant demographic variables considered in the study – urban versus rural, income, education, age, religion, church attendance, and gender – the overall profile of individuals who were re-interviewed was a near replica of the profile of individuals who were interviewed initially. For example, the proportion of Protestants, Catholics and Muslim respondents in the pre-workshop sample was 64%, 30% and 4%, respectively, while the corresponding proportions in the post-workshop phase were 67%, 28%, and 4%. Similarly, 40% of the pre-workshop sample was age 30 and below, while 38% of the post-workshop sample was in this age category. The only noteworthy difference in the two samples was in their employment status, as 12.1% of the pre-workshop sample was unemployed, compared to only 6.5% of the post-workshop sample. This likely reflects the fact that unemployed individuals in Kenya often move more frequently in search of work, and hence proved somewhat more difficult to locate in the follow-up portion of the study.

Overall, then, the post-workshop data collection phase progressed extremely well. We were able to locate and obtain the cooperation to be re-interviewed of nearly 90% of the individuals who were designated to be part of the follow-up study. The total sample size for the post-phase was nearly 30% larger than our original projections, and the resultant post-workshop sample was a near mirror image of the initial group of individuals interviewed. There were few if any biases that resulted from panel attrition, as the proportion of individuals in different demographic categories was nearly identical in the pre and post-workshop phases, and the post-workshop sample also accurately reflected the pre-workshop sample in terms of the regional breakdowns and the representation of the implementing CSOs and NCEP consortia. As a result, we have an extremely high degree of overall confidence in the scientific credibility of the pre and post-workshop data.

C. Methodology for the National Survey Component

The National Survey component of the study was designed to provide accurate information regarding the extent to which individuals throughout Kenya were exposed to NCEP workshops, drama presentations, and public lectures, and to provide information regarding the democratic opinions, behaviors, and attitudes of the Kenyan population as a whole after all NCEP activities had been completed by late 2002. To achieve these goals, Research International (RI) conducted two national surveys, one in December 2002 after completing the first post-workshop data collection described in the previous section, and one in

May 2003 after completing the second post-workshop phase. The sample size for the first survey was 1,260, and the second survey covered 511 respondents.

We allocated the number of interviews per province to match the proportion of the Kenyan population, as determined by the 1999 Census and reflected in the 2001 NCEP Baseline Survey (see Table II-5 below). We then randomly sampled an appropriate number of divisions within each province, based on a goal of 30 interviews per division, the minimum number we deemed necessary to facilitate comparisons with NCEP’s 2001 Baseline Survey results. For example, six divisions were randomly sampled from Central Province, seven from Eastern Province, and so forth. The probability of selection of each division was proportional to their population, so that divisions with larger populations had a proportionally greater chance of being included in the sample. For the December phase, RI teams were sent to the same locations that were used in the NCEP Baseline Survey, again to facilitate comparisons with Kenyan public opinion since 2001. In both phases, RI then followed its normal random route procedures for household selection, and used the standard “Kish grid” for randomly selecting individuals within the household to interview.

Fieldwork for the December phase began on December 5, 2002, after a training session for supervisors and interviews led by Michael Muindi, the RI project manager, and Dr. Paul Mbatia. Fieldwork for this phase was completed on December 19, 2002. Fieldwork for the May phase began on May 9 and ended on May 28, 2003.

Table II-5. Number of Interviews per Province, National Survey

Province	Number of Interviews		Percent of Interviews	Percent of Interviews, 2001 NCEP Baseline Survey (Weighted)
	December 2002	May 2003		
Nairobi	90	46	7.7%	7.5%
Central	180	65	13.9%	13.0%
Eastern	210	78	16.4%	16.1%
Coast	120	39	9.0%	8.8%
North Eastern	30	---	1.7%	3.4%
Rift Valley	300	130	24.4%	24.4%
Nyanza	180	78	14.7%	15.3%
Western	150	65	12.2%	11.7%
Total	1260	501	100%	100%

The data were post-weighted to reflect the overall Kenyan population figures in terms of gender, household income and educational attainment. The margin of error for the overall survey is plus or minus 2.3%; the margin of error is greater for each phase analyzed separately, and for smaller subgroups of the sample.

D. Survey Instrument and Scales

The survey instrument was based on the USAID impact surveys conducted in South Africa, the Dominican Republic and Poland, with substantial modifications made to tailor the questionnaire to the Kenyan context and to the content areas covered by the NCEP, as outlined in the manual *Making Informed Choices* and other official documents of the NCEP. Where possible, identical items to the NCEP 2001 “Baseline Survey” were included, especially in the National Survey component, in order to increase the ability of the Impact Study to describe the overall change in the Kenyan public opinion over time.

We included questions relating to the constitution and the constitutional review process, and to the main areas where civic education is expected to influence individual democratic orientations: level of psychological engagement with politics; levels of political knowledge and civic expertise; adherence to democratic values and supportive attitudes about democratic political systems; and level of political participation and actual engagement with Kenyan political life. Nearly all of the questions represent either standard measures of the respective items in the political science literature or adaptations of recent surveys that were done in Kenya, in particular the NCEP 2001 Baseline Survey which provided many of the questions related to the constitution and constitutional review.

We also included a series of questions related to the individual's experience with NCEP civic education, including frequency of attending workshops and other activities, the types of instructional methods that were used at the activities, the content areas that were covered, and the perceived quality of the instructors. The individual's rating of the workshop experience was also assessed, as was the extent to which they believed that the workshop had increased their knowledge about democracy and the constitution. As in previous impact assessments, basic demographic and political information about individuals was also gathered in order to determine the effect of civic education over and above other influences on individual orientations, as well as to determine whether civic education has differential effects on certain types of individuals or individuals with certain kinds of prior political attitudes or levels of pre-existing political resources.

The questionnaires were translated into Kiswahili by members of the RI staff in consultation with Dr. Paul Mbatia. Practice interviews were conducted in both Kiswahili and English during the training sessions in order for each interviewer to be comfortable with the questionnaire in both languages. In addition, interviewers who spoke the local language were assigned to each of the regional interview teams, and when a pre-workshop interview was conducted in a local language, the supervisors noted that an interviewer who spoke the local language should also conduct the post-workshop interview. Kiswahili and English were by far the dominant languages in which the interviews were conducted: 53% were conducted in Kiswahili only, 25% were conducted in English only, and 9% were carried out in a combination of the two languages. The remaining 14% of the interviews were conducted in Luo (3%), Kikuyu (3%), Giriama, Pokomo, Bajui, Duruma, Kalenjin, Kamba and Meru (together totaling 2%), or a combination of one of these local languages with either English (1.5%) or Kiswahili (3.5%).

Below we summarize the questions and scaling procedures used to measure the main attitudes and behaviors. The full Pre-Post survey and National Survey instruments can be found in Appendix B of this report. In addition, we present below information about the statistical "reliability" of scales that were used. Reliability in a statistical sense refers to the extent to which a scale that contains multiple questions related to a single topic can be viewed as an accurate measure of the underlying concept. The basic notion is that scales are "reliable" measures of an underlying concept when the individual questions that make up the scale are highly correlated with one another. If the individual questions are not highly correlated, it is very possible that a scale that combines them into a single measure will reflect several different underlying concepts or will contain much random "noise."

The standard statistical measure for assessing the degree of reliability in a scale is Cronbach's alpha, which provides a sense of how well the individual items are correlated with each other and the entire scale. The coefficient represents the ratio of "true score" variation in responses over the total response variation in the scale, that is, how much of the total variation in the scale can be attributed to variation in the respondent's true, underlying attitudes that is separate from random error. Alpha coefficients range from 0, when all the response variation is random error, to 1, when all the response variation results from "true" attitudes. It is not uncommon to see alpha coefficients in the .6 to .7 range in published political

science research, but values of .8 or higher (80% true score variance) are typically desired. *Higher numbers mean a more reliable scale.*

With few exceptions, the scales used in the Impact Analysis proved to be reliable, and well within the range of previous research on democracy-related attitudes in the United States, Europe and the former Soviet Union. They are also well within the range that were reported in the previous Dominican Republic, Poland, and South African impact studies.

1. Constitutional Issues And The Constitutional Review Process

Respondents were asked a series of questions regarding their awareness of the constitution and the constitutional reform process, their attitudes about the extent to which the constitution should be reformed, the degree of public involvement in the reform process, and their opinions about specific proposals to include in a new Kenyan constitution.

Familiarity with the Constitution. Respondents were asked whether they had ever seen a copy of the Kenyan constitution (either the current constitution or the draft constitution that was proposed in October 2002), with the responses coded as “0” for individuals who had not seen a copy and “1” for those who had.

Constitutional and Reform Awareness. Individuals were asked how informed they felt about the contents of the Kenyan constitution, with responses coded as “1” for not informed, “2” for “somewhat informed,” and “3” for very informed. A question was also asked about how informed individuals felt about the “various proposals being discussed to change the Kenyan constitution,” with the same 1-3 scale being used to code the responses.

Constitutional Knowledge. We measured the individuals’ actual knowledge about current constitutional provisions by including one question on the constitution in our overall knowledge scale (to be discussed in section 3 below). The question asks about how amendments to the current constitution are made, with choices ranging from “a declaration of Parliament,” “a simple majority of Parliament,” “a majority vote by the people,” or the correct answer, “a two-thirds majority of Parliament.” Respondents who answered correctly received a score of “1,” with all other individuals receiving a score of “0.”

Support for Constitutional Change. Individuals were asked about the extent to which the current constitution should be changed, with “major changes” coded as “3,” “minor changes” coded as “2,” and “kept as it is” coded as 1.

Support for Public Involvement in Writing the Constitution. Respondents were asked two questions regarding their views on public participation in the writing of the new constitution. First, they were asked whether “writing a constitution is a job for experts, with no role for ordinary citizens,” with the responses coded as 1-4 for “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” They were then asked whether “public participation in the writing of a constitution is important for building national unity,” again with responses coded as 1-4 on a “strongly disagree-strongly agree” scale.

Support for Specific Constitutional Reform Proposals. Individuals were asked their opinions about five specific proposals for including in a new Kenyan constitution: 1) whether the powers of the President should be reduced and those of other institutions should be increased; 2) whether the powers of local councils and provincial governments should be increased and those of the central government should be decreased; 3) whether the rights of minority groups such as women and the disabled should be protected even if the majority of the people do not agree; 4) whether there should be a federal systems of government, “Majimbo,” in which power is split between the central government and distinct regional

units, and 5) whether the president should be limited in the number of terms he can serve in office. All responses were coded on a 1-4 “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” scale.

2. *Psychological Engagement with Politics*

We asked a series of questions regarding the individual’s interest in politics at the local and national levels, and whether the respondent followed politics and political news in the mass media.

Political Interest. Respondents were asked whether they had “a great deal of interest,” “some interest,” or “very little interest” in local community affairs, with their responses coded from 1-3. A second question on interest in “national politics and national affairs” was also asked, with similar response categories and codes. The correlation between the two variables in both the pre and post workshop interviews was moderate at .43 and a “general political interest” variable was created as the average of the two scores.

The National Survey included one additional political interest item in order to compare responses to the 2001 NCEP Baseline Survey. Individuals were asked to rate “how well informed do you think you are about what is happening in Kenya,” with responses coded as “1” for “completely uninformed,” “2” for “poorly informed,” “3” about average,” “4” for “quite well informed,” and “5” for “very well informed.”

Media Attentiveness. Respondents were asked how often they pay attention to news about politics, first on the radio and then in newspapers. Both questions had response categories of “never,” coded as “1,” “rarely,” coded as “2,” “a few times a week,” coded as “3,” and “about every day,” coded as 4.” These variables were also moderately correlated at .47 (.49 for the pre-workshop responses), and a “general media attentiveness” variable was created as the average of the two scores.

3. *Civic Competence: Knowledge, Skills, and Efficacy*

As described above, “civic competence” refers to individuals’ knowledge of politics, specific institutions, and political efficacy, or the perceived ability to affect governmental and political outcomes. We included each of these aspects of civic competence in the questionnaire.

Political Knowledge. Respondents were asked four questions about knowledge of political leaders and institutions in Kenya: whether they could recall the name of the Vice President of Kenya, the name of their Provincial Commissioner, the length of the President’s term in office, and, as noted above, the provisions for amending the Kenyan constitution. We summed respondents’ correct answers to create a general knowledge scale ranging from 0 to 4. The reliability of the scale in the post-workshop interviews was .83, for the pre-workshop .50.

Civic Skills. The questionnaire contained two questions asking the respondent to rate the extent to which “when it comes to telling people your ideas,” or “knowing how to contact to get things done,” “you are better than most of the people you know, worse, or about the same as most people you know.” We scored an answer of “better than” as “2,” an answer of “same as” as “1,” and “worse than others” as “0.” We then added up the two scores and divided by two to create a scale from 0 to 2. The correlation between the two scores was .74 for the post-workshop responses and .68 in the pre-workshop interviews.

Political Efficacy. We measured two aspects of the individual’s sense of perceived influence in politics, or political efficacy. To measure the “internal” dimension of efficacy, we asked individuals whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement “I feel well prepared for participating in political life.” Responses were scored as “1” for “strongly disagree” to “4” for “strongly agree.” To measure the “external” dimension of efficacy, or the degree to which individuals feel the political system is responsive to the individual’s attempts at influence, we asked two questions: “People like me have no say in what the government does,” and “People like me cannot influence developments in my community.” Both

questions were coded as “1” for “strongly agree” to “4” for “strongly disagree.” The two “external efficacy” questions were moderately correlated at .42 (.25 in the pre-workshop interviews), and a general external efficacy variable was created from the average of the two scores.

4. *Support for Democracy and Democratic Values*

We asked a series of questions concerning the respondent’s support for democratic norms and values. We divide these questions into four general clusters relating to: support for democracy as a form of government; support for the political values that are inherent in democratic governance; support for certain social values that tend to support democratic politics, and support for current political institutions and the democratic political system.

Support for Democracy as a Form of Government. This cluster of questions is designed to measure the extent to which individuals understand the political arrangements that inhere in democracy, and support democracy against alternative forms of government.

Democracy is Best. We asked respondents, “Sometimes democracy does not work. When this happens, some people say that we need a strong leader that does not have to both with elections. Others say that even when things do not work, democracy is always best. What do you think?” This is a simple choice question which is coded as “0” for those who say that the country needs a strong leader, and “1” for those who say that democracy is always best.

This question was modified for the National Survey to facilitate comparison with the 2001 NCEP Baseline Study, so that respondents “strongly agreed” to “strongly disagreed” with the statement that “What Kenya needs is a strong leader who does not have to worry about holding regular elections.”

Essential Features of Democracy. In the pre and post workshop survey, we asked individuals whether four characteristics - “complete freedom to criticize the government,” “a strong opposition party with a different set of political ideas than the ruling party,” “adequate housing, jobs and a decent income,” and “a small gap between the rich and the poor” - were “essential,” (coded as “3”), “fairly important” (coded as “2”), or “not important for a society to be called democratic” (coded as “1”). The first two features refer to procedural elements of democratic government, and we created a general *Support for Procedural Democracy* variable by averaging the two scores. The latter two features refer to economic outcomes that may be associated with democratic systems, and we created a general *Economic Outcomes of Democracy* variable by averaging these two scores.

These questions were asked in a slightly different fashion in the National Survey in order to facilitate comparison with the 2001 NCEP Baseline Study. The survey contained three questions asking respondents to “strongly agree” (coded as “4”) to “strongly disagree” (coded as “1”) with the following statements: “For good government we must have a strong opposition,” “In order for a society to be called democratic, regular elections are needed,” and “In order for a society to be called democratic, there should be adequate housing, jobs, and a decent income.”

Support for Democratic Values and Norms. This cluster contains questions designed to measure the individual’s adherence to a core set of values that inhere in democracy. They differ from the previous cluster in that individuals could support democratic governments against alternative forms, or believe that certain characteristics are inherent in democratic government without necessarily adhering to the values themselves. These questions measure the values of the individuals, not his or her evaluation of democracy compared to other kinds of political systems.

Political Tolerance. The questionnaire asked four standard questions to test the respondent's willingness to extend freedoms of association and speech to two unpopular groups: atheists, and individuals who want to abolish elections in favor of military rule. For each group, it was asked whether such a person should be allowed to speak publicly in your locality, and whether such a person should be allowed to organize a peaceful demonstration to express his/her point of view. Answers were on a four-point agree/disagree scale. We created a tolerance scale that ranged from 0 to 4 by summing the number of "strongly" tolerant responses given to the four questions, averaging the six scores. The reliability of the scale was .90 for the post-workshop interviews and .82 for the pre-workshop interviews.

The National Survey also contained one additional tolerance item that was included in order to compare responses to the 2001 NCEP Baseline Survey. Individuals were asked whether they agreed with the statement "If a community supports one political party, other parties should not be allowed to campaign in that area," with responses coded as "1" for "strongly agree" to "4" for "strongly disagree."

Support for Rule of Law. We asked respondents about two aspects of support for the rule of law in a democracy. First, we asked whether "people should not have to obey laws which they consider unjust" and whether "suspected criminals do not deserve the same legal rights as everyone else." Each of the questions was coded as "1" for "strongly agree" to "4" for "strongly disagree," and the two scores were averaged to create a general Rule of Law variable. The correlation between the variables was .38 in the post-works interviews and .22 in the pre-workshop interviews.

Social Values Supporting Democracy. This cluster measures three social values that tend to support democratic political systems: an inclusive view of women's social and political participation; a sense that other individuals in society can generally be trusted, and a sense of a national identity as opposed to an identity as a member of a particular ethnic group.

Women's Role in Society. We asked individuals two questions about women's role in Kenyan society, whether "women should participate more than they do now," and whether "women and men should both be allowed to inherit land." Both questions were coded as "4" for "strongly agree" to "1" for "strongly disagree," and the two scores were averaged to create a general Women's Role variable. The correlation between the variables was .46 in the post-workshop interviews and .30 in the pre-workshop interviews...

Social Trust. We asked individuals two questions concerning their views of the trustworthiness of other people, asking "would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you should be very careful in dealing with people," and "do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?" Trusting responses were coded as "2" and distrusting responses were coded as "1," with the two items being averaged to created an overall Social Trust variable. The correlation between the two variables was .39 in the post-workshop interviews, and .29 in the pre-workshop interviews.

National Versus Ethnic Identity. We asked individuals "how important is being Kenyan to the way you think of yourself," with responses coded as "3" for "very important," "2" " for somewhat important," and "1" for "not important." The same question was asked for how important the individual's "tribe or ethnic group" is to the way they think of themselves, with the responses coded on the same 1 to 3 scale. We created a composite National Versus Ethnic Identify variable by subtracting the individual's ethnic identity score from their national identity score, with the value of this composite variable ranging from -2 for individuals with a much greater ethnic than national identity, to a score of +2 for individuals with a much greater national than ethnic identity.

Trust in Government and Satisfaction with the Political System. This set of questions was designed to elicit the respondent's evaluation of the current political system, as opposed to supporting democracy in principle as a form of government or support for democratic or supportive social values. Here we are

concerned with the respondent's trust in current political and social institutions, their estimation of much corruption exists among incumbent politicians, and whether he or she believes that democracy in general is working well in the country at present.

Institutional Trust: Respondents were asked how much they trusted a total of seven political and social institutions, including: churches and religious organizations, the Presidency, local government councils, the police, community-based or non-governmental organizations, and the Parliament. We created a 0-4 scale of Trust in Political Institutions by adding the number of four political institutions – all of the above except for churches and Community-based/non-governmental organizations—in which the respondent had “a lot” of trust. The reliability of this scale was .73 in the post-workshop interviews, and .66 in the pre-workshop interviews.

Perceptions of Corruption. We asked individuals to assess “how many politicians and people who work for the government in Kenya” are “corrupt,” with corruption defined as instances where “people in government and in the civil service illegally use public money for their own benefit, or take bribes.” Responses were coded as “3” for “almost all” politicians and people who work for the government being corrupt, “2” for “some of them,” and “1” for “only a few.”

Satisfaction with Democracy. We asked individuals to rate how satisfied they are with “the way democracy is working in Kenya,” coding responses as “1” for “very dissatisfied” to “4” for “very satisfied.”

5. *Political Participation*

The survey instruments included questions on whether the respondent had taken done any of the following in the past year: worked for a political party or candidate; participated in an organized effort to solve a neighborhood or community problem; attended a meeting of the local town council or with other government officials; contacted a local official; contacted a national elected official; taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration on some national or local issue; and contacted a local chief or traditional leader about a problem. In the post-workshop interview, the questions explicitly called for the respondent to report whether he or she had taken part in any of these activities *since their previous interview, that is, since February (March or April) 2002*. This was done to ensure that the same acts would not be “double counted” if respondents were interviewed less than one year apart, and also to ensure that we would be measuring participation that may have taken place subsequent to the individual's exposure to the NCEP civic education workshop. We summed these responses to create an overall scale of Political Participation that ranged from 0-7. The reliability of the scale was .80 in the post-workshop interviews, and .70 in the pre-workshop interviews.

6. *Experience with NCEP Civic Education*

The primary variables that were used to assess the impact of NCEP civic education are derived from a series of questions asked in the post-workshop interviews relating to the individual's experience with civic education since the time of their previous interview. In the National Survey, these questions were asked with reference to the individual's experience “over the past year,” which corresponded to the time period (late 2001-2002) during which the NCEP was active. Individuals in the workshop sample were first asked questions relating specifically to the particular workshop that they were about to participate in at the time of the pre-test. These questions concerned: the *content areas* covered in the workshop; the extent to which the workshop was taught with *participatory methodologies* such as dramatizations, problem-solving activities, and role playing exercises; and the individual's perception of the *teaching quality* of the instructors. Following these questions, individuals were asked whether they had *spoken to others* about the topics covered in the workshop, with specific questions related to family members,

friends, people at work, and people in “groups to which you belong.” The specific coding schemes used in measure these areas are discussed in the appropriate results sections below.

The particular workshop that the individual attended in February, March, or April 2002 was only one of many possible activities related to the NCEP in which the individual may have participated. In addition, individuals in the “control group” did not attend that particular workshop, but they may have attended *other* workshops or other NCEP activities throughout the year. We therefore included a series of questions for all respondents that were designed to measure the extent to which they were exposed to all kinds of NCEP activities since their previous interview. This cluster of questions was also used for the National Survey respondents in order to measure the individual’s exposure to a variety of NCEP activities since late 2001, and the respondent was therefore asked to recall their participation in workshop and other activities related to democracy and the constitution over the past year.

To measure these kinds of NCEP exposures, we asked the workshop sample whether they had attended *other* workshops related to the Kenyan constitution or democracy since their previous interview, and whether they had attended any *organized teachings* about democracy and the Constitution at their church, mosque, or place of worship. If so, they were asked how many of these workshops they had attended and how long ago the workshop or teachings had taken place. Individuals in the control group and in the National Sample were asked these questions without referring to “other workshops.” If respondents reported that they had attended any of these activities, they were then asked the same questions described above about the *content areas*, *participatory methods*, and *teacher quality*.

Respondents were then asked whether they had attended any “theatre or drama shows,” “puppet shows,” and “public lectures” about democracy and the Constitution. Responses to all of these questions were used to create variables that measured the individual’s overall exposure to NCEP activities: whether and how many workshops and organized church or mosque teachings the individual attended; and whether the individual was exposed to non-workshop activities such as theatre presentations, puppet shows, or public lectures. We shall include both workshop exposure and the individual’s exposure to other NCEP activities in our analyses of the effects of the program below.

Individuals in both the workshop and control group samples were asked whether, regardless of their own participation in democracy or constitution workshops, other individuals had *spoken to them* about the workshops or teachings that *they* had attended, and if so, how many individuals had done so. These responses permitted us to measure the extent to which the NCEP workshops and other activities had “secondary effects” on individuals who themselves may not have participated, through hearing about the topics discussed in workshops attended by their family members, friends, colleagues and neighbors.

Finally, we incorporated additional information about some of the workshops that the Pre-Post Workshop sample attended derived from the forms that the implementing CSOs were required to submit to the Technical Assistance Team after the event took place. These forms, known as “Form Ds,” include information about the number of individuals who attended the workshop, the length of the event, the main topics that were emphasized from the NCEP curriculum, the ways that individuals were selected for recruitment into the workshop, and the “entry strategy” that the implementing CSO employed to reach the target audience (such as through another CSO, through a religious gathering, a sporting event, or a community or traditional ceremony). We were able to obtain the Form Ds for 139 of the 181 workshops covered in the Pre-Post Workshop component of the study, encompassing 1,758, or 76% of the post-workshop respondents. Where appropriate in the results sections below, we use the Form D information to provide more “objective” information about the kind of workshop and the nature of the civic education messages to which the individuals in the workshop sample were exposed. In addition, the information about recruitment and entry strategies enabled us to analyze whether specific kinds of implementing

methods are most effective. All of this information enabled us to assess the kinds of workshops and messages that have the greatest impact on individuals' democratic orientations and engagement.

E. Statistical Procedures

The statistical method that will be used to assess the effects of NCEP civic education is a regression analysis of the *change* from the pre-workshop response to the post-workshop response in each of the democratic orientations discussed in the previous section. In these analyses, the change in each democratic orientation or behavior is predicted from variables that represent the extent of the individual's exposure to NCEP workshops and other civic education activities, as well as a series of control variables. For example, we will attempt to determine whether individuals who were exposed to NCEP activities became more knowledgeable about politics than individuals who were not exposed to NCEP activities, controlling for potentially confounding factors such as educational attainment, household income, gender, previous exposure to civic education, and the like.

We report first the “un-standardized” regression coefficients for the civic education variables. These coefficients represent the net difference in the amount of change in each variable between individuals who were exposed to civic education workshops or other activities such as drama, puppet shows, public lectures, and individuals in the control group who were not exposed to NCEP activities. For example, the overall political knowledge scale ranges from 0 (if the respondent answered none of the 4 questions correctly) to 4 (if the respondent answered all the questions correctly), hence the *change in knowledge* can range from -4 (where the individual answered 4 fewer questions correctly in the post-workshop interview than the pre-workshop interview) to +4 (where the individual answered 4 more questions correctly in the post-workshop interview). If it were shown that the regression coefficient for NCEP workshop exposure is .6, this would indicate that the individuals in the NCEP workshop sample increased their political knowledge by an average of .6 correct answers *more* than the control group, over and above the effects of all other variables included in the models. This .6 difference is then evaluated to determine whether it is “statistically significant,” which means that the results were unlikely to have come about by chance. We report statistically significant relationships at the .10 and .05 level, indicating that the chances of observing the differences between the civic education and control groups if there were no true differences between the groups in the overall population were less than 10% and 5% respectively.

We controlled for a variety of demographic, political, and attitudinal influences on changes in each democratic orientation in the analyses, including

- Education
- Income
- Type of dwelling
- Urban or Rural Residence
- Age
- Gender
- Church or religious attendance
- Number of voluntary organizations to which the individual belongs
- Pre-NCEP Exposure to Civic Education
- Pre-NCEP Level of Political Participation
- Pre-NCEP Level of Political Interest
- Pre-NCEP Level of Media Attentiveness

The specific questions used to measure each of the demographic variables can be found in the Post-Workshop Survey Instrument in Appendix B.

Including these factors into the analysis has several purposes. First, many of them are known from previous research to influence political participation and democratic attitudes. Therefore, including them in the analysis provides a better explanatory model of the change in each of these democratic orientations. Second, and perhaps more importantly, including these variables allows us to estimate the effect of NCEP civic education exposure on change in democratic orientations more accurately. From the earlier *Pre-Test* report, we know that individuals in the NCEP workshop sample were somewhat less likely to be in the lower income and educational strata of Kenyan society, and more likely to belong to civil society groups, to be interested and attentive to politics, and to have higher pre-existing levels of political participation. To the extent that individuals who belong to many civil society groups or who had higher levels of political interest may have been more likely to increase in political knowledge over the course of the study *regardless of their exposure to civic education*, failure to include these factors in the model of change would attribute a greater effect of NCEP civic education on political knowledge than actually exists. In that case, some of the observed “effect” of civic education would really be the result of the confounding factors of civil society membership or political interest on changes in knowledge over time. Including all of these factors into the statistical models is an important way to control for these kinds of known pre-existing differences between the workshop and other individuals who were exposed to civic education and the control group, in order to arrive at more accurate estimates of the unique effect of civic education on changes in all of the democratic orientations between the pre and post workshop interviews.¹⁵

For each of the analyses, we also include a “standardized” coefficient for the civic education variables that represents the un-standardized regression coefficient divided by the variable’s standard deviation.¹⁶ (The standard deviation for a variable signifies how far the typical individual is from the overall sample average. In a “normal,” or bell-shaped distribution, 68% of all individuals are within 1 standard deviation from the overall average, and 95% of all individuals are within 1.96 standard deviations from the overall average). A “standardized” coefficient of .5 indicates that the civic education group increased on the democratic orientation by one-half of a standard deviation more over time than did the control group, once the effects of all other control variables are taken into account. This coefficient, because it is expressed in standard deviation terms, can be directly compared across all of the variables, even those that are measured on different scales. For example, a value of .5 can be interpreted as substantially higher than a standardized coefficient of .1, regardless of whether the variable in question is measured on a 0-4 scale of correct knowledge responses, or a 1-4 “strongly agree-strongly disagree” attitudinal scale. Such comparisons would not be valid for the un-standardized coefficients, which can only be interpreted in terms of the scale of the original variable.

¹⁵ We also include the individual’s pre-test value on each orientation as a final predictor variable in the models; that is, we include the individual’s prior value as a predictor of subsequent change. This is done because of the phenomenon known as “regression to the mean,” whereby individuals who are initially low on a given variable tend to exhibit higher levels of change over time, and individuals who are initially high on a given variable tend to exhibit lower or negative levels of change. Including the prior value of a variable serves to control for this process, so that we may estimate the extent to which NCEP workshop or other civic education exposure effected change, regardless of individual’s initial “starting point” on a given democratic orientation. For a fuller explanation, see Steven E. Finkel, *Causal Analysis with Panel Data* (Sage Publications, 1995), pp. 8-9.

¹⁶ This coefficient is sometimes referred to as the “Y-standardized” coefficient. See J. Scott Long, *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables*, (Sage Publications, 1997). In this context the Y-standardized coefficient is similar to Cohen’s D and other “effect coefficients” that are frequently used in experimental and quasi-experimental research.

III. THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL CIVIC EDUCATION PROGRAMME: BASIC FINDINGS

We begin by presenting the basic findings from the study, that is, the effects of attending NCEP civic education activities on changes in all of the constitutional and democratic orientations described in the report thus far. For each set of orientations, we first describe the overall trends in our sample from the pre- to the post-workshop period, followed by the estimation, using the statistical methods outlined in the previous section, of the impact of the workshops and other NCEP activities on the changes in the orientations over time.

The results of these analyses can be summarized as follows.

- NCEP workshops and other activities were highly successful in promoting individual awareness and knowledge about the Kenyan constitution and the constitutional review process. These effects were the largest seen in the entire study.
- The Programme had no impact on the *direction* of the public's preferences regarding the constitutional reform process or on specific reform proposals. Thus the Programme fulfilled its goal of achieving positive changes that were not associated with particular political points of view.
- NCEP activities were consistently effective in altering the individual's sense of civic competence, skills, overall knowledge, and both psychological and actual engagement with the political process.
- The Programme had limited effect on individuals' support for democratic values. While there were moderate effects on important orientations such as political tolerance and support for the rule of law, the overall impact on this cluster of orientations was much weaker than for awareness, competence and engagement
- NCEP Workshops were generally more effective in altering individual democratic orientations than other kinds of civic education activities

These results indicate that the NCEP as a whole was able to achieve many, though not all, of its basic goals of altering the awareness, competence, values and participation of those individuals who were exposed to Programme training. We discuss each of these findings in more detail below.

Several features of the analyses are important to note before presenting the detailed results. First, we found that significant numbers of our original pre-workshop control group (27%) reported that they had attended some NCEP workshop or organized teaching about democracy and the constitution through their church or religious organization over the course of the study. This makes sense, given that these individuals were selected in order to match the original workshop sample in educational status, age, gender, and place of residence. As these groups represented similar kinds of individuals, it was to be expected that some of the control group would eventually be invited to, or seek out, democracy and constitution workshops and other NCEP activities. We thus shifted these individuals into our "workshop sample," leaving us with an effective number of workshop attendees of 1486 (or 64.6% of the overall sample) and an effective number of control group members of 815 (or 35.4%).

Second, it was important to estimate the effect of workshops and other NCEP activities *at the same time* in each of the models of democratic change. This was the case because of the significantly greater tendency of workshop attendees to also be exposed to other NCEP activities, compared with individuals

in the control group. As is shown in Table III-1 below, 667 (or 30%) of the overall sample reported attending some other NCEP activity such as theatre presentations, puppet shows, or public lectures. However, the proportion of individuals who were exposed to other NCEP activities is nearly 40% of the workshop sample, compared to only 11% of the control group. It is possible, therefore, that some of the differences found between the NCEP workshop and control samples on democratic orientations are in fact attributable to these other NCEP activities. Estimating separate effects for NCEP workshop participation and for participation in other NCEP activities simultaneously in the statistical models enables us to control for this process and provide accurate information about the impact of each kind of NCEP civic education. Further, ascertaining the relative impact of attending democracy and constitution workshops versus other kinds of civic education activities has potentially important policy and programmatic implications in its own right.

Table III-1. Exposure To NCEP Workshops And Other Civic Education Activities, Pre-Post Workshop Component

	Attended NCEP Workshop(s)		Number of Respondents
	No	Yes	
Attended Other NCEP Activities			
No	729 (89.5%)	905 (60.9%)	1634 (71.0%)
Yes	86 (10.5%)	581 (39.1%)	667 (29.0%)
Number of Respondents	815	1486	2301

Third, in this chapter we focus only on the overall differences seen between individuals who were exposed to NCEP activities and individuals who were not. In subsequent chapters we shall analyze in much more detail the conditions under which civic education is more or less effective, that is, the effect of the *frequency* of workshop and other exposures, the *teaching methods* and *teacher quality* that were present in the workshops, the *content areas*, and the effects of other aspects of the individual’s civic education experience. The results reported in this chapter, however, are a critical initial view of the “bottom line” effects of these activities in stimulating change in democratic orientations over time.

A. The Constitution and the Constitutional Review Process

1. Overall Trends

The National Civic Education Programme took place during a time of intense activity surrounding the possible reform of the Kenyan Constitution in the run-up to the 2002 national elections. As such, it is important to examine the overall trends in the country’s awareness, knowledge, and views about the constitution, in order to place the possible effects of civic education and the NCEP into this broader context. We show the changes for the overall Pre-Post samples over the course of the study on a series of orientations about the constitution and the constitutional review in Table III-2. For orientations where similar questions were asked in the 2001 NCEP Baseline Survey and our own National Survey, we report these results as well.

Table III-2 reveals the extent of change in general in Kenyans’ orientations about the constitution and the constitutional reform process. Most noteworthy is that individuals have become substantially more *aware* of the Kenyan constitution and the reform process since 2001 and early 2002. For example, in regards to having seen a copy of the Kenyan Constitution, only 11% of our Pre-Workshop sample had seen a copy and for the Post-Workshop findings this figure rose to 52%. In the National Survey those who had seen a copy of the Constitution increased by 23%, from 5% to 28%. Relatively sharp trends are also evident for two other indicators of awareness: how informed individuals believe that they are about the contents of the constitution, and how informed they believe they are about the reform proposals being discussed as

part of the constitutional review. On both of these measures, the changes over the course of the study were substantial. Three-quarters of respondents reported being very or somewhat informed about the constitution, and 84% reported high levels of awareness about constitutional reform proposals, with these values having increased by 27 and 34 percentage points respectively. Increases of this magnitude over a one-year period are not often seen in public opinion research, and indicate that the Kenyan public overall has a much higher level of constitutional familiarity and awareness than they did in 2001.

There were also significant but more modest changes in the public’s opinions about the extent to which the constitution should be reformed, with approximately 82% believing that there should be *major* changes by the time of the post-workshop period. This represents an increase of 16 percentage points from the Pre-workshop value. The public registered extremely strong supportive of public participation in the constitutional review process from the outset, and remained at these same high levels by the time of the Post-Test period. The Kenyan public thus favors dramatic changes in the constitution being made, along with high levels of public involvement, but these attitudes changed only modestly over the time period covered by the study.

The findings also indicate changes over time ranging from 1 to 15% on several specific constitutional reform proposals. By the end of the post-workshop period, nearly all individuals supported constitutional provisions to reduce the power of the President and to limit the President’s term in office. A slightly smaller but still a large majority (75%) favored increasing the power of local councils and provincial governments vis-à-vis the central authorities by the end of the post-workshop period, representing an increase of 14 percentage points over the course of the study. The one reform proposal that did not garner widespread support concerned “Majimbo,” the idea of a federal system where power is formally split between the central government and regional units. This proposal was supported by just less than one-third of the samples in the pre-workshop period, with support declining to 19% in the post-workshop interviews. There was near-universal support for the protection of minority rights and for Presidential term limits in both the pre- and post-workshop interviews.

Table III-2. Trends in Constitutional Orientations, Pre-NCEP and Post-NCEP

	PRE-NCEP	POST-NCEP
Familiarity with the Constitution		
Have Seen A Copy Of The Kenyan Constitution	11%	52%
Have Seen A Copy Of The Kenyan Constitution (National Survey)	5%	28%
Very Or Somewhat Informed About the Contents of the Kenyan Constitution	48%	75%
Very Or Somewhat Informed About the Proposals to Change the Constitution	50%	84%
Correct Knowledge of Provisions for Constitutional Amendments	22%	32%
Opinions on Reform Process		
There Should Be <i>Major</i> Changes In The Current Constitution	66%	82%
Role For Ordinary Citizens In Writing Constitution	81%	88%
Role For Ordinary Citizens In Writing Constitution (National Survey)	84%	84%
Public Participation in Writing Constitution Essential for National Unity	96%	99%
Opinions on Specific Reforms		
New Constitution Should Reduce The President’s Powers	80%	95%
New Constitution Should Increase Local And Provincial Councils’ Powers	61%	75%
New Constitution Should Protect Minority Groups	98%	99%
New Constitution Should Create A Federal System Of Government (“Majimbo”)	29%	19%
New Constitution Should Limit Presidential Terms	90%	95%

2. *The Impact of Workshops and Other NCEP Activities*

The discussion thus far indicates that there have been some major changes in Kenyans' orientations towards the constitution, most notably in terms of awareness and information about its contents and the proposals for constitutional reform. To what extent, though, did exposure to NCEP workshops and other activities contribute to these changes? We show the estimated effects of NCEP workshops as well as other NCEP activities on changes in all of the attitudes and opinions about the constitution in Table III-3 below. In these models, we examine whether exposure to workshops and to other activities (theatre, puppet shows, lectures) had a significant effect on changes in the constitutional orientations from the pre-test to the post-test period, controlling for all of the potentially confounding variables described previously, such as education, prior political interest or civil society involvement, gender, age and income.¹⁷

Table III-3. The Effects of NCEP Activities on Changes in Constitutional Orientations

Changes in:	NCEP WORKSHOPS		OTHER NCEP ACTIVITIES	
	B	Y-Standardized	B	Y-Standardized
Seen Copy of Constitution (-1-1)	.22**	.40	.08**	.14
Informed About Contents of Constitution (-2-2)	.20**	.28	.01	.02
Informed About Reform Proposals (-2-2)	.20**	.26	.10**	.13
Know Provision for Const. Amendment (-1-1)	.11**	.19	.10**	.18
Favor Major Changes in Constitution (-2-2)	-.02	-.03	.03	.05
Role for Public in Writing Constitution (-2-2)	.07*	.05	.03	.03
Public Participation Important for Unity (-2-2)	.02	.04	-.01	-.02
Limit on President's Term (-2-2)	.02	.01	.02	.02
Increase Powers of Local Governments (-2-2)	-.08	-.06	.07	.04
Protect Minority Rights (-2-2)	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.02
Federal System of Government (Majimbo) (-2-2)	.03	.02	-.03	-.02
Term Limit for President (-2-2)	.02	.02	-.06*	-.06

*p<.10 **p<.05

The table shows both the un-standardized regression coefficient (the "B" column) and the "Y-standardized coefficient" for both NCEP variables. As discussed in the previous chapter, the un-standardized coefficient represents the difference in the estimated change in each variable over time for individuals who attended NCEP workshops, or who attended NCEP theatre, puppet shows or public lectures, compared with individuals who did not attend these activities, controlling for all of the demographic and political characteristics that might also influence the change in the given variable in question. For example, the un-standardized regression coefficient of .20 for "Informed about Contents of Constitution" for the NCEP workshop column indicates that individuals who attended workshops changed on average .20 units more on the -2 to 2 scale than individuals in the control group. The two stars associated with this figure indicate that the difference between the workshop sample and the control group is statistically significant, that is, more than could have been expected by chance alone.

The Y-standardized coefficient indicates the *standard deviation* change in the variable that is associated with NCEP exposures; hence the .28 Y-standardized coefficient for "Informed About Contents" means that individuals who attended workshops increased their awareness of the contents of the constitution on

¹⁷ We also include a variable that signifies whether the respondent was interviewed in the first post-test survey (November 2002) or the second survey (March/April 2003) in order to control for any possible overall trend in these variables since the December 2002 national elections. We explore these possible effects in more detail in the next chapter.

average nearly one-third of a standard deviation more than did individuals in the control group. Because the Y-standardized coefficients are each expressed in standard deviation terms, they are “scale-free” and can be compared across variables regardless of the scale of measurement to determine which orientations were more likely to be influenced by NCEP exposure than others.

The table shows clearly that NCEP workshop exposure had significant effects on all of the variables associated with *awareness* and *knowledge* about the Kenyan constitution. Individuals who attended workshops were more likely to report increased awareness of the contents of the constitution, increased likelihood of having seen the document itself, increased awareness of the various proposals being discussed to reform the constitution. The standardized differences of .26 to .40 seen for the workshop sample compared to the control group on these three variables, in fact, are the *largest effects of NCEP exposure in the entire study*. NCEP workshop exposure is also associated with a significant increase in the individual’s actual knowledge of certain constitutional provisions, with the effects being only slightly weaker than the other awareness variables. Thus the workshops conducted by the National Civic Education Programme can be said to have had considerable success in achieving the goal of increased familiarity with the Kenyan constitution and with proposals for constitutional reform.

At the same time, the table shows that exposure to other NCEP activities also influenced constitutional knowledge and awareness, though the effects were not as powerful as those seen for the workshop sample. Individuals who were exposed to drama, puppet shows, or public lectures increased more than individuals who did not attend these activities on all of the awareness and knowledge variables except for being informed of the contents of the constitution, with standardized effects in the range of .13 to .18. These values are more than 50% smaller than the typical effects of NCEP workshops on these same orientations; nevertheless, they show that public drama presentations and lectures did have *some* impact on individuals’ knowledge and awareness.

Finally, attendance at workshops or other NCEP activities had no impact on orientations associated with the individual’s own opinions about the scope or pace of constitutional reform, and about specific constitutional reform provisions. For example, individuals who were not exposed to NCEP activities showed the same increases on favoring major changes in the constitution over time as did individuals in the workshop or other NCEP activities groups. Similarly, there were no significant differences in the changes among workshop participants on any of the reform provisions compared to the control group; Thus, despite some significant trends in some of these orientations over time, there was no indication that changes concerning the *direction* of constitutional reform could be attributable to NCEP exposure. Thus the Programme appeared to achieve its goal of enhancing citizen awareness and knowledge that is “distinct from political advocacy” (*Programme Document*, p. 1).


We can see the effects of NCEP activities on several of the constitutional orientations more clearly in graphic form in Figures III-1 to III-4. To arrive at these figures, we first divided the sample into individuals who increased on each of these the orientations between the pre- workshop and the post-workshop interviews, and those who did not. We then estimated another regression model predicting the *probability* that the individual will increase on the variable over time, based on their exposure to NCEP activities and all other control variables. In the figures, we show the estimated chance, or probability, that the individual will increase on three constitutional awareness variables (Informed about Contents, Informed About Reform Proposals, and Seen a Copy of the Constitution), and whether the individual Favors Major Changes in the Constitution; these are given for the control group, and then for individuals exposed to different kinds of NCEP activities.

Figures III-1 to III-3 illustrate clearly the powerful and consistent effects of NCEP workshop exposure on constitutional awareness, as well as the additional smaller increment in awareness associated with exposure to other NCEP activities. In Figure III-1, for example, it can be seen that individuals in the


control group have only a .16 chance of increasing on their awareness of the contents of the constitution between the pre-workshop period and the post-workshop period, and this figure rises to only .18 for individuals who were exposed *only* to NCEP activities such as drama presentations, puppet shows, and public lectures. Individuals exposed to NCEP workshops, however, had a .31 chance of increasing their awareness, and this figure rises to .35 for individuals who were exposed to both kinds of NCEP activities. Thus the chances of increasing awareness of the contents of the constitution were *twice as high for individuals who were exposed to NCEP workshops as individuals in the control group*. Similar results are seen for the two other awareness orientations, as exposure to NCEP workshops is associated with nearly double the rate of increase over time as the control group, and individuals who were exposed to both the workshop and other NCEP activities had even higher probabilities of positive change. By contrast, NCEP activities had virtually no effect on how much change the individual desires in the new constitution: the probabilities of positive change for all groups in Figure III-4 is nearly identical.

We conclude that civic education conducted by the NCEP had clear and powerful effects on individuals' familiarity with the constitution and their awareness of its current and prospective provisions, but little effect on the *content* of the individual's constitutional preferences. To this extent, the NCEP activities were highly educational, without swaying individuals a particular way on these controversial issues. In this area, the Programme as a whole achieved substantial positive results.


**FIGURE III-1
THE EFFECTS OF NCEP ACTIVITIES ON
AWARENESS OF THE CONTENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION**




**FIGURE III-2
THE EFFECTS OF NCEP ACTIVITIES ON
AWARENESS OF THE REFORM PROPOSALS**



**FIGURE III-3
THE EFFECTS OF NCEP ACTIVITIES ON
HAVING SEEN A COPY OF THE CONSTITUTION**



**FIGURE III-4
THE EFFECTS OF NCEP ACTIVITIES ON
FAVORING MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES**



B. Civic Competence and Engagement with Politics

1. Overall Trends

We next turn to the results found in our assessment of changes in other important democratic attitudes and behaviors in the Kenyan public, and the extent to which workshops and other NCEP activities may have influenced these orientations. In this section, we focus on the individual's engagement with politics, both psychologically and in terms of their actual behavior, and their sense of civic competence, that is, their levels of political knowledge and skills, and how competent they feel they are as citizens in the political community. We show in Table III-4 the overall trends in these orientations over in the Pre-Post samples and, where available, in the national surveys. For variables such as political interest and knowledge, we present for illustrative purposes the responses to some of the questions that make up the summary scale that is used in subsequent statistical analyses.

Table III-4. Trends In Civic Competence And Engagement In Politics, Pre-NCEP and Post-NCEP

	PRE-NCEP	POST-NCEP
Political Interest		
Great Deal of Interest in Local Politics	73%	82%
Great Deal of Interest in National Politics	53%	68%
Well Informed about What Is Happening (National Survey)	23%	44%
Media Attentiveness		
Follow Political News in the Radio More Than Once a Week	74%	88%
Political Knowledge		
Correct Knowledge of President's Term Of Office	81%	93%
Correct Knowledge of Current Provincial Commissioner	34%	49%
Civic Skills		
<i>Better</i> than Others in Telling People Ones Ideas	44%	44%
Internal Political Efficacy		
I Feel Well Prepared for Political Participation	68%	73%
External Political Efficacy		
People Like Me Are Able to Influence the Community	69%	78%
People Like Me Are Able to Influence the Community (National Survey)	70%	81%
Political Participation		
Participated in Two or Fewer of Seven Political Acts	50%	58%
Participated in At Least Five of Seven Political Acts	18%	15%
<i>Somewhat or Very Likely</i> to Participate in Politics in Future	64%	74%

As indicated in Table III-4, during the time period covered by the study, there were sizable increases in the Kenyan public's psychological engagement with the political process, as well as increases in some aspects of political knowledge and sense of civic competence. These changes are not as large as those seen for awareness of the constitution and the constitutional review process, but nevertheless they show a substantial positive change in the democratic orientations over time. Increases of about 15 percentage points were attained on the interest in national politics measure and in attentiveness to political news on the radio; similarly, in the national sample, the percentage of those who feel *well-informed* about what is happening in Kenya rose by over 20 percentage points. Political knowledge also increased: knowledge of the current Provincial Commissioner rose 15 percentage points and knowledge of the President's term of office increased 12 percentage points.

Changes in the other competence and engagement items are smaller in magnitude, though the Pre-Post samples, and the national sample, do show increases in both the sense that they can influence politics (internal efficacy) and that the political system will respond to the individual (external efficacy). The only engagement variable that shows a slight decrease over time is actual political participation, where the public appears somewhat less participatory by the post-workshop period. We caution, however, that the post-workshop survey asked whether individuals had engaged in a series of activities “since the time of your previous interview;” this time frame was only seven to nine months for a substantial portion of the sample, as opposed to the “one-year” time frame for participation that was asked in the pre-workshop interview.

2. *The Effects of Workshops and Other NCEP Activities*

How did civic education workshops and other NCEP activities contribute to these overall positive trends in engagement and civic competence? We show the results of the more detailed statistical estimation of NCEP influence in Table III-5 below.

Table III.5. The Effects of NCEP Activities on Changes in Civic Competence and Engagement in Politics

Changes in:	NCEP WORKSHOPS		OTHER NCEP ACTIVITIES	
	B	Y-Standardized	B	Y-Standardized
Political Interest (-2-2)	.10**	.15	-.01	-.01
Media Attentiveness (-3-3)	.10**	.12	.07**	.09
Political Knowledge (-4-4)	.30**	.25	.21**	.18
Civic Skills (-2-2)	.07**	.11	.05**	.08
Internal Political Efficacy (-3-3)	.20**	.14	.21**	.15
External Political Efficacy (-3-3)	.11**	.08	.32**	.26
Political Participation (-7-7)	.36**	.17	.29**	.13
Intention to Participation (-2-2)	.08**	.08	.25**	.24

*p<.10

**p<.05

The results of the analyses indicate that NCEP workshops and other NCEP activities had a significant impact on individual’s sense of civic competence and their engagement in the political system. The largest effect was seen on political knowledge, where exposure to workshops led to a .30 greater increase in the knowledge scale for workshop participants than the control group, translating into a one-quarter greater standard deviation change than individuals with no workshop exposure. Slightly smaller effects in standard deviation terms were registered for changes in political participation, interest, media attentiveness and the two types of political efficacy. Individuals who were exposed to NCEP workshops, then, were more likely to increase on political engagement, more likely to increase on political knowledge, and more likely to increase on political participation than individuals with no workshop exposure. This is strong evidence that NCEP workshop exposure was associated with positive change in democratic orientations in general, and was not limited to orientations related to the constitution.

The table shows that exposure to other NCEP activities such as drama presentations, puppet shows, and public lectures, also contributed significantly to changes in engagement and competence. While the effects of these kinds of activities on constitutional orientations were substantially weaker than the effects of workshops, the effects on engagement and competence were roughly equal, and in the case of efficacy and intentions to participate, larger for the other NCEP activities than for NCEP workshops. Taken as a whole, the table shows that NCEP civic education was effective in achieving real change in the way that

Kenyans relate to the political process, their views of the role of ordinary citizens in the process, their knowledge of institutions and leaders, and their willingness to take part in the process in more active ways.

We can see the combined effects of NCEP activities on engagement and competence more clearly in Figures III-5 to III-8. As in the earlier figures, we first divided the sample into individuals who increased on each of these the orientations between the pre-workshop and the post-workshop period,, and those who did not. We then estimated another regression model predicting the probability that the individual will increase on the variable over time, based on their exposure to NCEP activities and all other control variables. In the Figures, we show the estimated probability that the individuals with different amounts of NCEP exposure will increase on political knowledge, interest, internal political efficacy, and political participation.

Figure III-5 shows that the effect of civic education on political knowledge is nearly as large as those seen for the earlier constitutional awareness measures. While individuals with no civic education exposure had a .33 chance of increasing on knowledge over time, this figure rises to .47 for those with either exposure to workshops or other NCEP activities, and to .60 for those individuals exposed to both kinds of civic education. *Thus, individuals with both kinds of NCEP civic education exposure were nearly twice as likely to increase political knowledge as the control group.* For the other engagement orientations, the effects are smaller, but nevertheless indicate differences of approximately .10 to .20 in the chances of increased interest, efficacy, and participation that can be attributed directly to exposure to NCEP civic education.

Interestingly, the findings thus far contrast to some extent those found in the previous USAID-sponsored civic education impact analyses. In the Dominican Republic, Poland, and South Africa, the most powerful effect of civic education was on political participation, with significant though smaller impacts on political efficacy, and more limited effects on knowledge. The opposite pattern is seen for the Kenyan NCEP, as the largest effects are seen on political knowledge, as well as on constitutional knowledge and awareness, as discussed in the previous section. While there may be several reasons for these divergent findings, they seem most likely to reflect the intensive emphasis, as reflected in the training manual *Making Informed Choices: A Handbook for Civic Education*, that the NCEP gave to basic *instruction* about politics and the constitution. In the other countries, several of the programs examined concentrated primarily on mobilization and community participation as opposed to civics instruction; the differential effects seen on program participants thus appear to reflect well the goals and emphases given by the programs to different aspects of democratic orientations and behavior.

FIGURE III-5
THE EFFECTS OF NCEP ACTIVITIES ON POLITICAL INTEREST







FIGURE III-6
THE EFFECTS OF NCEP ACTIVITIES ON POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE



**FIGURE III-7
THE EFFECTS OF NCEP ON INTERNAL EFFICACY**



**FIGURE III-8
THE EFFECTS OF NCEP ACTIVITIES ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION**



C. Support for Democracy and Democratic Values

1. Overall Trends

The last set of democratic orientations that are examined concern the individual's support for democracy as a form of government, adherence to democratic values and social values that support democracy, and the individual's trust in current political institutions and the current workings of the democratic system. Table III-6 provides the trends found in these values in our Pre-Post samples and, where available, in the National Surveys. Thereafter, we describe the estimated impact of NCEP civic education on all of these orientations.

There are several important trends to note from Table III-6. First, overwhelming majorities of the citizenry now believe that democracy is "always" the best form of government, and reject the notion that Kenya may "need a strong leader who does not have to bother with elections." Support for democracy extends to the specific procedural aspects of democratic government as well, including the necessity of a strong opposition and the freedom to criticize the government. These orientations were already relatively strong among the pre-workshop samples, though only 36% of individuals believed that "democracy is always best" in the 2001 NCEP Baseline Survey. By the post-workshop period and the time of the National Surveys, support for democracy as a form of government was much more widespread, as gains of between 13 and 17 percentage points were registered in the Pre-Post samples, and a gain of 43 percentage points being seen in the National Survey. This is evidence that Kenyans overwhelmingly favor democracy against alternative forms of government, and have increased in their support over the past year and a half. In addition, there was a surge in the proportion of respondents who were very or somewhat satisfied with how democracy is working in Kenya: it rose from 28% to 47%.

On many of the specific values that underlie a democratic system, however, there were much lower levels of initial support, and very little positive change over time. Aside from the view that women should have the right to own land, which was supported at both points in time by large majorities, every other supportive democratic or social value was supported by no more than 50% of the sample in the pre-NCEP period, with little or no positive change by the time of the post NCEP survey period. . On the fundamental value of political tolerance, where individuals are willing to extend democratic liberties even to individuals or groups that they do not like, the Pre-NCEP samples registered relatively low initial levels of between 26% and 38%, with slight *decreases* over the course of the study. A slim majority of individuals believed that suspected criminals deserved the same legal rights as others, and this figure rose only 10 percentage points by the post-test period. Levels of ethnic identity were extremely strong, though they did register some decrease from 80% to 67% in the post-workshop period. This decline in strong ethnic identities, however, did not result in individuals extending trust in others, as only 13% believed that "most people can be trusted" at the time of the pre-workshop interviews, with a decline to only 9% at the post-test period. The study results also indicate a decline in trust in local councils and in the Parliament by the time of the December 2002 elections.

Table III-6. Trends in Democratic Values and Political Evaluations, Pre-NCEP and Post-NCEP

	PRE-NCEP	POST-NCEP
Support for Democracy		
<i>Democracy is Always Best</i>	76%	93%
<i>Democracy is Always Best</i> (National Survey)	36%	78%
<i>Support for Procedural Democracy: Strong Opposition is Essential</i>	58%	79%
<i>Good Government Needs Strong Opposition</i> (National Survey)	78%	89%
<i>Support for Economic Outcomes of Democracy: Adequate Housing, Jobs and Income Are Essential</i>	93%	98%
Democratic Values		
<i>Political Tolerance: Would Not Forbid Atheists To Speak</i>	38%	34%
<i>Would Not Forbid Militarists to Demonstrate</i>	26%	26%
<i>Parties Have Right to Campaign in Unpopular Areas</i> (National Survey)	75%	92%
<i>Support for Rule of Law: Suspected Criminals Deserve Equal Legal Rights</i>	53%	63%
Social Values Supporting Democracy		
<i>Women’s Rights: Women Should Be Able to Inherit Land</i>	78%	86%
<i>Both Women and Men Should Own Land</i> (National Survey)	77%	78%
<i>Social Trust: Most People Can be Trusted</i>	13%	9%
<i>National Versus Ethnic Identity: Ethnic Identity or Ethnic Group is Very Important</i>	80%	67%
Institutional and Political Evaluations		
<i>Institutional Trust: A Lot of Trust in the Local Councils</i>	19%	13%
<i>A Lot of Trust in the Local Councils</i> (National Survey, December)	41%	22%
<i>A Lot of Trust in the Parliament</i>	32%	28%
<i>A Lot of Trust in the Parliament</i> (National Survey, December)	54%	39%
<i>Political Corruption: Almost All Politicians in Kenya Are Corrupt</i>	53%	55%
<i>Satisfaction with Democracy: Very or Somewhat Satisfied With How Democracy is Working in Kenya</i>	28%	47%

All of these factors – political tolerance, social trust, national versus ethnic identities, support for the rule of law – are presumed by many political scientists to be key elements of democratic political culture. As was noted in the *Pre-Test* report, the low levels recorded on these variables provide some cause for concern. This is especially the case, given the fact that the study did not reveal overall increases during a time of intense politicization that produced sharper increases in *other* democratic orientations.

. A relatively low level of trust was revealed at the time of the Pre-NCEP interviews for each of the four political institutions that we measured – the Parliament, Local Councils, the President and the Police, and the Post-NCEP interviews showed that the level of trust in these institutions had decreased.. Moreover, slightly more than half of the respondents believed that “almost” all politicians in Kenya are corrupt. Hence there appeared to be very substantial dissatisfaction with both the performance of current institutions and the overall democratic regime. However, the patterns of change over time suggest an interesting process: Kenyans register much more satisfaction with the democratic process as a whole, as revealed in the nearly 20% increase in the Satisfaction with Democracy responses,, but they had even *less* confidence in the workings of particular political institutions over time. This indicates that among the

Kenyan population increased support for democracy and increased satisfaction with democracy were coupled with increased *distrust* in key political institutions.¹⁸

2. *The Impact of NCEP Workshops and Other Activities*

What effect did civic education workshops and other NCEP activities have on support for democracy, democratic values, and institutional trust? We show the results of the more detailed statistical estimation of NCEP influence in Table III-7 below

The table shows that NCEP activities in general had limited effects on most of these orientations. While the previous table showed substantial increases among Kenyans in support for democracy as a form of government, the results here suggest that individuals who attended workshops and other NCEP activities were no more likely to change than individuals with no civic education exposure. In this case, the dominant effect was of a large overall trend in the population towards more democratic support, with no added impact of the NCEP activities. Similarly, neither NCEP workshops nor other activities had any effect on changes in support for women's rights, though, as noted earlier, this orientation was already at very high levels in the overall population. There was virtually no effect of civic education on personal or institutional trust, or on perceptions of corruption in politics, or overall satisfaction with democracy aside from a small anomalous *negative* influence of exposure to other NCEP activities.

Table III-7. The Effects of NCEP Activities on Changes in Democratic Values and Political Evaluations

Changes in:	NCEP WORKSHOPS		OTHER NCEP ACTIVITIES	
	B	Y-Standardized	B	Y-Standardized
<i>Support for Democracy</i>				
Democracy is Best (-1-1)	.01	.02	-.004	-.01
Support for Procedural Democracy (-2-2)	.01	.02	-.01	-.01
Support for Economic Outcomes of Democracy (-2-2)	.02	.04	-.005	-.01
<i>Democratic Values</i>				
Political Tolerance (-4-4)	.23**	.14	.15**	.09
Support for Rule of Law (-2-2)	.13**	.10	.07	.06
<i>Social Values Supporting Democracy</i>				
Women's Role in Society (-2-2)	.08	.08	-.06	-.06
Personal Trust (-1-1)	-.01	-.01	.001	.004
National Versus Ethnic Identity (-2-2)	.14**	.16	.11**	.12
<i>Institutional and Political Evaluations</i>				
Institutional Trust (-2-2)	-.06	-.04	-.03	-.02
Corruption in Politics (-2-2)	.04	.04	-.002	-.003
Satisfaction with Democracy (-2-2)	.03	.02	-.17**	-.12

*p<.10 **p<.05

However, NCEP activities did show significant impact on three of the democratic and social values studied: political tolerance, support for rule of law and national versus ethnic identity... Exposure to NCEP workshops was associated with larger changes in political tolerance over time, with an added increment associated with exposure to other NCEP activities as well. While these effects are not as large as those seen for constitutional awareness, general political knowledge, and some of the competence

¹⁸ As will be seen in the next chapter when responses from the period *after* the 2002 elections are disaggregated, levels of institutional trust show substantially higher values.

items in previous sections, nevertheless, the impact on political tolerance is of fundamental importance to democratic processes, and one that has often been viewed previously as relatively impervious to change. The finding suggests that civic education may be useful in changing more “difficult” attitudes and democratic values, while it may not be needed on variables such as Support for Democracy as a form of government, a more widely shared value that may also be affected more strongly by the outputs of the political system. We shall return to this point later in the report.

Similar positive effects of NCEP activities are seen for Support for the Rule of Law, though these impacts are fairly small in magnitude and are associated only with NCEP workshop exposure. On the individual’s relative strength of identification as a Kenyan or as a member of particular ethnic group, however, the table shows that workshops as well as other forms of civic education again have had a positive impact. Given that nation and ethnic group evoke deep-seated psychological associations and are reasonably important components of the individual’s overall identity, the effects are impressive in much the same way as those for political tolerance.

We can see these effects more clearly in graphic form in Figures III-9 and III-10. In these figures, we show the probability that the individual changed *positively* over time on tolerance (Figure III-9) and in the relative strength of national versus ethnic identities (Figure III-10), for respondents exposed to different levels and types of NCEP activities. In both cases, it can be seen that individuals in the control group – those with no exposure to any NCEP activities – were extremely unlikely to change positively on these two orientations. Less than 1 in 7 individuals in the control group registered positive change on tolerance over time, while about 1 in 6 registered positive change on the national/ethnic identity measure. These figures rise steadily for individuals exposed to either workshops or other NCEP activities, and for individuals exposed to *both* kinds of civic education, the chances of increasing on these variables becomes even larger. For the “full” NCEP exposure group, about 1 in 4 individuals shows an increase in tolerance over time, and nearly 1 in 3 shows an increase in the strength of national versus ethnic identity.

The findings here confirm many of the patterns seen in previous impact assessments as well. Compared with their effects on competence, participation, and knowledge, civic education activities have much more limited effects on the individual’s views of democratic political systems, democratic values, and social values that support democratic processes. But the results also confirm the consistent finding across all of the countries studied that civic education can influence political tolerance, and in Kenya, can influence a deep-seated value such as ethnic identity as well. Civic education, then, may be a more promising avenue for influencing certain kinds of political and democratic values that are less easily learned from concrete political experience or from events in the external political environment.

FIGURE III-9
THE EFFECTS OF NCEP ACTIVITIES ON POLITICAL TOLERANCE





FIGURE III-10
THE EFFECTS OF NCEP ACTIVITIES ON NATIONAL VERSUS TRIBAL IDENTITY



IV. THE CONDITIONAL IMPACT OF NCEP ACTIVITIES: WHEN IS CIVIC EDUCATION MOST EFFECTIVE?

The previous chapter centered on a comparison of individuals attending NCEP activities and those who did not in order to identify the impacts of NCEP civic education. We found that exposure to NCEP workshops and other civic education activities led to significant increases in individuals' constitutional awareness and knowledge, general knowledge about politics and a sense of political self-competence, and an increased engagement of the individual with politics, both psychologically and in terms of reported behavior. There were negligible effects of NCEP activities on most democratic values and institutional trust, though workshops and other activities did have some impact on several deep-seated values such as political tolerance and the individual's national and ethnic identities.

In this chapter, we address the question, when is civic education most effective? To answer this, we analyze the conditions under which NCEP civic education took place and their effects on these important democratic and constitutional orientations. Drawing on the wealth of available information on what we term "workshop-specific" factors, we investigated the following factors: the number of workshops and other kinds of activities the individual attended, how far in the past the individual's last civic education activity took place, the instructional methods employed, the content areas covered, the teaching qualities of the workshop leaders, the ways that the workshop was organized by the implementing CSO, and whether the workshop was conducted by CSOs affiliated with different consortia.

Our results paint a definitive picture of the conditions under which civic education is more effective:

- The frequency of attendance at NCEP workshops is the most significant determinant of how much individuals change over time, and indeed whether any substantial change is registered at all. Individuals who attended only one or two NCEP workshops often showed little change in democratic orientations over time, while there were large gains from multiple workshop exposures.
- The changes that occurred as a result of NCEP workshop exposure are relatively long-lived; the effects of workshops for very few democratic orientations "faded" over time. Some fade-out effects did occur, however, for the other NCEP activities.
- Workshops that were conducted with more active, participatory teaching methods were generally more effective in stimulating democratic change. In some instances, moreover, a threshold effect was found, where positive effects *only* occurred when workshops were conducted with many participatory methodologies.
- The participants' views of the qualities of the trainers who led the workshops were less important in determining change than the frequency of workshop exposure and the extent to which participatory methodologies were employed.
- Workshops of longer duration, that is, those that lasted eight or more working hours, were consistently more effective than shorter workshops across a broad range of democratic change. In many instances workshops of four hours or less, which constituted the majority of workshops in our sample, produced little change in the participants, relative to their control groups.
- Workshops that focused on "constitutionalism" and "democratization" were generally more effective than those focusing on "nationhood" and "governance," although there were some exceptions to this general pattern. Workshops that included discussions of community problems, such as crime or HIV/AIDS, were consistently more effective than workshops that did not include these topics.

- There were no consistent patterns related to the entry strategy of the implementing CSO into the community in order to conduct the workshops. Entry through local elders and opinion leaders were more effective on some dimensions, while entry through women’s groups or other local CSOs were more effective on others.
- There were only minor differences in the effects of workshops conducted by CSOs from the four different consortia. ECEP workshops stimulated the largest amount of political participation from attendees, while workshop conducted through the other consortia had greater impact on constitutional orientations and the individual’s sense of Kenyan identity.

A. The Frequency and Variety of Civic Education Exposure

By far the most important determinant of the impact of NCEP activities is the sheer number of workshops and other events in which the individual took part. Below we report on analyses that incorporate the actual number of workshops and organized church teachings the respondents had attended since their previous interview; we call this variable the *Frequency of Workshop Exposure*. Although the respondents were not asked the exact number of theatre, puppet shows and lectures that the individual attended, we did ascertain whether the individual attended all three of these kinds of other NCEP activities, only one or two of them, or none of them since their previous interview. We call this factor the *Variety of NCEP Activities* in our analysis. Our analysis involved a re-estimation of the regression models of the previous chapter by including the *Frequency of Workshop Exposure* and *Variety of NCEP Activities* variables in place of the simple indicators of whether or not *any* exposure to workshops or other activities took place.

We present the results of these analyses in Table IV-1 below. To facilitate the presentation, we show the results only for three to four important variables in each cluster of constitutional and democratic orientations that have been examined thus far. These variables are those where effects were found in the analyses reported in the previous chapter, or are the most theoretically important factors to examine, regardless of whether the NCEP effects were significant in the initial analyses. For the constitutional orientations, we examine whether the respondent has seen a copy of the document, and how informed they believe they are about the contents and the proposals for constitutional reform. For engagement and civic competence, we examine political interest, political knowledge, internal political efficacy, and political participation. For democratic values, we examine support for democracy being the best form of government, political tolerance, national versus ethnic identities, and institutional trust.

Table IV-1. The Effects of Frequency and Variety of Civic Education Exposure

Changes in:	FREQUENCY OF NCEP WORKSHOPS		VARIETY OF OTHER NCEP ACTIVITIES	
	B	Y-Standardized	B	Y-Standardized
Seen Copy of Constitution (-1-1)	.08**	.14	.02	.03
Informed About Contents of Constitution (-2-2)	.07**	.10	-.01	-.02
Informed About Reform Proposals (-2-2)	.08**	.11	.07**	.09
Political Interest (-2-2)	.04**	.06	-.01	-.02
Political Knowledge (-4-4)	.14**	.12	.05*	.04
Internal Efficacy (-3-3)	.07**	.05	.14**	.10
Political Participation (-7-7)	.21**	.10	.21**	.09
Democracy is Best (-1-1)	.01**	.03	-.01	-.02
Political Tolerance (-4-4)	.14**	.08	.03	.02
National Versus Ethnic Identity (-2-2)	.08**	.09	.02	.02
Institutional Trust (-4-4)	-.03	-.02	.02	.01

*p<.10 **p<.05

The coefficients in Table IV-1 can be interpreted in the following manner, using Political Knowledge as an example. The B coefficient indicates that for every additional workshop that the individual attended, he or she increased by .14 on the knowledge scale between the pre-workshop and the post-workshop interview. Each additional kind of other NCEP activity, moreover, led to an increase of .05 on the knowledge scale during this same time period.. The Y-Standardized coefficients put these effects in standard deviation terms, so that each workshop is associated with a .12 standard deviation increase in the knowledge scale, and each kind of other NCEP activity leads to a .04 standard deviation increase in knowledge over time. Thus, the results indicate that a) the more workshops the individual attended, the greater the increase in political knowledge, and b) the more exposure to different types of other NCEP education activities leads to greater increases in political knowledge.

The results of the analyses (Table IV-1) extend the basic pattern of findings from the previous chapter in several important ways. First, *it shows unequivocally the large potential gain from multiple exposures to NCEP workshops*. For example, if individuals attend 5 workshops, they are predicted to increase their political participation by one additional act; 5 workshops is also associated with a one-half of a standard deviation change on awareness of the contents of the constitution, a .40 standard deviation change on political tolerance, and a .45 standard deviation change in national versus ethnic identity. These are very large and substantively meaningful effects that can be brought about under the condition of frequent workshop exposures.

On the other hand, the results presented in the table indicate the relatively weak effects for one or two workshop exposures, even on the variables where NCEP workshops have the greater overall effects. For example, a single workshop exposure leads at most to only a .10 to .15 (one-seventh to one-tenth) of a standard deviation change in any of the orientations in the table, and in many cases the effects are of even smaller magnitude. This illustrates one of the most important findings of the study: *that one or two workshop exposures are insufficient to bring about substantial change in democratic orientations*. Civic education *can* produce meaningful impacts, but multiple exposures are needed to achieve this goal.

Given this pattern, it is essential to determine how many individuals were exposed to multiple NCEP workshops and how many to only one or two, in order to assess whether sufficient numbers of individuals were trained in the most beneficial conditions. We defer a more detailed discussion of this issue until Chapter 6, when we present the findings from the national sample regarding overall NCEP exposure. For now, we note that three-fourths of those exposed to NCEP workshops in the Pre-Post Workshop component attended only one or two sessions and only 26% of our workshop sample was exposed to three or more events. This is not a sufficient ratio for generating the most powerful impacts of civic education, and we shall return to this theme in subsequent chapters of the report.¹⁹

Finally, the table shows that, once the number of NCEP workshop exposures are taken into account, the impact of other NCEP activities become somewhat less powerful than suggested by the results presented in the previous chapter.. In three instances -s having seen a copy of the constitution, political tolerance, and national versus ethnic identity - the effects of other NCEP activities become insignificant altogether, and in many other instances their effects are diminished in magnitude. Thus, we conclude that the bulk of

¹⁹ In previous impact assessments, we found evidence of a so-called *threshold effect* of civic education, where *no* impact was seen at all unless the individual attended 3 or more workshops. In Kenya, we found several examples of absolute threshold effects (rule of law, media attentiveness, external efficacy), but the overall patterns in Table IV-1 nevertheless indicate that the effects for low exposure levels are relatively weak. Thus the findings here reinforce the substantive implications of the previous country studies.

the NCEP's impact came from the democracy and constitution workshops, with a less powerful, though not insignificant increment linked to other NCEP activities.

B. The Recency of Civic Education Exposure and the Possibility of “Fade-Out” Effects

Another important factor that may influence the impact of civic education is the length of time since the individual's exposure to workshops or other types of activities. It may be the case that civic education has immediate effects on individual orientations, but the effects “fade out” over time. Uncovering such “fade out” effects is critical for the overall assessment of the effectiveness of NCEP or other civic education, as it is vital to determine whether exposure to civic education produces long-lasting changes in democratic attitudes, values and behaviors. If the effects of civic education do tend to fade out, then the effort made in teaching individuals about democracy and constitutional issues may not always be worth the cost. At the least, civic education programs may need to be restructured or re-designed in ways to minimize this potential problem.

Accordingly, the study here was designed explicitly to uncover possible fade-out effects from the Kenyan NCEP. The reader may recall that we re-interviewed approximately three-fourths of the post-workshop respondents in November 2002, roughly seven to nine months after their exposure to the initial NCEP workshop in February, March, or April. The remaining one-fourth of the post-workshop respondents (514 individuals) were re-interviewed in March or April 2003, 11 to 13 months after the initial workshop exposure. By comparing the size of the effects of NCEP workshops and other activities among individuals interviewed in the first post-workshop wave (November 2002) and the second post-workshop wave (March/April 2003), we can arrive at an estimate of the extent to which the effects of NCEP exposure tend to fade out over time.

It is also the case that an important event in Kenyan politics occurred in between the two post-workshop waves: the election of Mwai Kibaki in December 2002 to the Presidency and the assumption to power of his NARC coalition government. This presents some complications for assessing the “fade out” hypothesis, as we must also take into account the general trends in public opinion that may have occurred in response to this powerful democratic event. For example, individuals in general may have become more aware of Kenyan constitutional reform issues after the 2002 election, and such an effect could cause individuals in the control group to increase in constitutional knowledge in the 2003 post-workshop wave. This increase in the control group's knowledge could make it appear that the effects of civic education had “faded out,” even if the workshop sample stayed at approximately the same level of knowledge from November 2002 through April 2003. This kind of pattern would be quite different – and much more benign from the point of view of assessing the impact of civic education – than a situation where individuals in the workshop sample simply became less democratic in their responses, relative to a stable control group, from one post-workshop wave to another. We explore these possibilities in the analyses below.

In Table IV-2, we present the estimated difference in the effects of *Frequency of Workshop Exposure* and *Variety of Other NCEP Activities* from the first post-workshop wave in November 2002 to the second wave in March-April 2003. We also indicate whether this difference is statistically significant, and how much any difference in effects represents in standard deviation terms.

Table IV-2. Differences in Estimated Effects of NCEP Activities from the First and Second Waves of the Post-Workshop Survey

Changes in:	FREQUENCY OF NCEP WORKSHOPS		VARIETY OF OTHER NCEP ACTIVITIES	
	Difference in B	Y-Standardized	Difference in B	Y-Standardized
Seen Copy of Constitution (-1-1)	-.03*	-.06	-.01	-.02
Informed About Contents of Constitution (-2-2)	-.02	-.04	.05	.07
Informed About Reform Proposals (-2-2)	-.05**	-.07	-.02	-.01
Political Interest (-2-2)	.00	.01	-.01	-.01
Political Knowledge – Leaders (-2-2)	-.03	-.04	.01	.01
Political Knowledge – Institutions (-2-2)	-.05**	-.07	.01	.01
Internal Efficacy (-3-3)	.03	.02	-.04	-.02
Political Participation (-7-7)	.01	.00	-.38**	-.17
Democracy is Best (-1-1)	.00	.01	-.02	-.04
Political Tolerance (-4-4)	-.01	-.01	-.21*	-.13
National Versus Ethnic Identity (-2-2)	.02	.02	-.04	-.04
Institutional Trust (-4-4)	.08*	.05	-.32**	-.19

*p<.10 **p<.05

The analyses resulted in several important findings (Table IV-2). First, on the large majority of orientations, no significant fade-out effects were found between the first and second waves of the post-workshop survey. Changes in such important variables as political interest, efficacy, participation and tolerance, for example, that were brought about through NCEP activities in 2002 tended to persist even among individuals who were interviewed in March and April of 2003. This is an encouraging finding for civic education.

Nevertheless, the findings suggest that several significant fade-out effects did emerge, and these warrant further attention. On three important knowledge-related variables²⁰ – having seen a copy of the Constitution, being informed about the proposals to reform the constitution, and knowledge of political institutions – the effects of NCEP workshops appear to be weaker for individuals interviewed in March and April of 2003 than for individuals interviewed in late 2002.

On further examination, however, the results paint a somewhat more complex picture. We show in Figures IV-1, IV-2 and IV-3 an estimation of the likelihood that individuals will register an increase on each of the three knowledge variables, based on their exposure to NCEP workshops *and* whether the interview took place in the first or second wave of the post-workshop survey, that is, taking into account the “fade-out” effects recorded in Table IV-2. The results indicate that much of the suggested fade-out, in fact, is due to *increases* in knowledge by individuals in the “no-exposure” conditions, and less due to *decreases* in knowledge among individuals who attended NCEP workshops. For example, in Figure IV-1, it can be seen that 80% of individuals who attended six workshops showed increases in their constitutional awareness (having seen a copy) between the pre-workshop and their post-workshop interview in November 2002. A nearly identical figure, 74%, is found among these same kinds of

²⁰ We separated the overall knowledge scale into two components for this analysis, one pertaining to the two leadership questions (who is Vice President and who is Provincial Commissioner), and the other pertaining to the two institutions questions (President’s term in office and constitutional amendment provisions. This was done because of the changes in leadership after the 2002 elections, which made this part of the overall scale fundamentally different for the two Post-workshop samples.

individuals who were interviewed in March and April 2003. By contrast, 29% of individuals who attended no workshops registered increases on this variable by the time of the first post-workshop wave, while 40% of the “no exposure” group registered an increase in political knowledge by the time of the second wave. In sum, the effects on the high exposure group did not “fade out;” rather low exposure individuals began to show higher levels of constitutional awareness since the 2002 elections.

The same pattern is seen for institutional knowledge in Figure IV-2. At the high ends of workshop exposure, there is nearly no difference between the percentages found on increased knowledge, regardless of whether the post-workshop interview was in November 2002 or March-April 2003. The apparent fade-out effects are actually due to a tendency for individuals with no workshop exposure to *increase* on knowledge from the time of the first post workshop wave to the second wave, while individuals who attended workshops remained equally likely to increase in their knowledge over time. Again, individuals with low levels of exposure nevertheless learned more about institutions after the 2002 elections, while individuals with workshop exposure stayed at their same high levels.

The one variable where true “fade-out” effects did occur, was on familiarity with constitutional reforms. Here individuals in the high exposure group did appear to lose some of their awareness of the reforms over time (78% versus 64% in waves one and two respectively), while individuals in the low-exposure groups showed significant increases. Even here, the picture is complicated by the fact that individuals with one workshop exposure were more likely to show increases in knowledge by the time of the second post-workshop wave than those in the first wave, and individuals with three workshop exposures were equally likely to increase at both points in time. Whatever fade-out effects that do exist, then, appear to have been limited to individuals at the very highest end of civic education exposure.

The results of the analyses (Table IV-2) indicate more serious fade-out effects of other NCEP activities on two important variables: changes in political participation and political tolerance. For both of these variables, the magnitude of the decline suggests that *all* of the effect of the *Variety of Other NCEP Activities* on these orientations fade out over time, such that the exposures matter little for stimulating participation or tolerance by the time of the second post-workshop wave. The findings here detract to some degree from our initial results on the effects of non-workshop activities. While the effects of workshops tend not to fade out over time, some of the more important effects of other NCEP activities appear to be relatively short-lived.

Finally, an interesting pattern emerges for the effects of civic education on institutional trust. For this orientation, what appears to occur is not a fade-out effect but rather a change in the *direction* of the effect over time, from the negative effect seen in Table III-5 to a positive effect as shown in Table IV-2. In other words, civic education was associated with *decreases* in institutional trust before the 2002 elections, while it contributed to *increases* in institutional trust thereafter. This pattern fits well the findings reported in previous analyses of the effects of civic education on institutional trust in other country contexts. In those studies, we hypothesized that the effects of civic education on trust can be either negative or positive, depending on the stance of the implementing NGOs and the country’s civil society in general vis-à-vis the current government. The results in Kenya fit this explanation well, as civil society in Kenya was mobilizing before the 2002 election to speed the democratization of what were perceived to be undemocratic institutions associated with the Moi regime, while the successful outcome of the elections in stimulating a peaceful transition of power to the NARC government no doubt was associated with increased trust of Kenyan civil society (and the public at large) in the political institutions of the new regime.

FIGURE IV-1
FADE OUT EFFECTS ON HAVING SEEN THE CONSTITUTION




FIGURE IV-2
FADE OUT EFFECTS ON INSTITUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE





FIGURE IV-3
FADE OUT EFFECTS ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AWARENESS



C. Teaching Methods and Trainer Quality

In previous impact assessments, we found that the effects of civic education were influenced strongly by two kinds of workshop teaching conditions. First, workshops were most effective when they were conducted with more participatory methodologies such as role-playing, simulations, mock elections, and the like. In comparison, lecture based civic education had negligible impact on nearly all democratic orientations. Second, workshops were most effective when the leaders or trainers were perceived to be knowledgeable, inspiring, and interested. Trainers who did not engage or are not well-regarded by the participants had little success in transmitting democratic knowledge, values, or participatory inclinations. We expected to find the same pattern in the effects for the Kenyan NCEP, especially given the strong emphasis that the instructional manual *Making Informed Decisions* places on active, participatory methods of conveying information about democracy and the constitution.

We measured these factors in similar ways as in the previous impact assessments. Respondents were asked to recall whether any of the following activities took place in the workshops that they attended:

- Breaking into small groups to discuss material
- Stage plays or dramatizations
- Playing games
- Solving problems and developing proposals
- Role playing exercises
- Mock trials
- Mock elections

We counted the number of these activities so that each individual received a value of 0 to 7. We then separated the sample into three categories: no workshop exposure, individuals who attended workshops and experienced three or fewer of these participatory methodologies, and individuals who received civic education and experienced four or more participatory teaching methods. We call this variable “*Participatory Methods*.”

To measure individuals’ perceptions of the quality of their civic education instruction, we asked respondents to rate how well the following words “describe the people who ran the workshops:” knowledgeable, interesting, likeable, understandable, and inspiring. We divided the sample into individuals who received no workshop exposure, individuals who thought that some of these words described their trainers only “well” or “not very well,” and individual who thought that these words described their trainers “very well.” We label this factor “*Trainer Quality*.” It is important to note that the *Trainer Quality* variable measures only the perception of the quality of the instructor or trainer, as we have no objective evaluation of the performance of the individuals who led the workshops. However, the way participants feel about their trainer is an important predictor of how well they learn.

Table IV-3 table shows the results for *Participatory Methods*, with our models of change in each of the orientations being estimated for two groups: individuals who experienced few participatory methods in their workshops, and individuals who experienced many (four or more) of these kinds of instructional techniques. Table IV-4 shows a similar estimation for individuals who thought that their trainers were not of the highest quality, and individuals who thought that all of the positive terms mentioned above describe their trainers “very well.”

The results of our analyses on *Participatory Methods* are relatively consistent, though not as powerful as was found in the previous assessments. As can be seen, individuals who were trained with few participatory methods showed *some* significant change in all of the constitutional awareness and civic competence orientations compared the control group. This differs from the South African results, where evidence of a threshold effect was found, indicating that *no* impact would be registered unless the workshops were conducted with many participatory teaching methods. Moreover, on some variables, notably political participation and political knowledge, the differences in effects between the “few” and “many” participatory methods groups are not large. Thus the effects of civic education do not *require* a high level of participatory methods in all instances.

Nevertheless, the table shows that the effects of civic education on many important democratic orientations are substantially larger when workshops that are conducted with many participatory methods. For example, the effect of NCEP workshop exposure on awareness of constitutional reform proposals is nearly twice as strong when the workshops are conducted with many as opposed to few participatory teaching methods (.19 versus .09). Similarly, workshops conducted with many participatory methods yield changes in internal efficacy that are over twice as large as those from exposure to workshops with fewer participatory methods. And for each of three democratic values under consideration – tolerance, national versus ethnic identity, and institutional trust – strong threshold effects were found, where effects of workshop exposure were seen *only* for individuals whose workshops were conducted with many participatory teaching techniques. Clearly the methods of instruction matter significantly for many key democratic orientations, as more active and involved ways of teaching individuals about democracy and the constitution produce substantially larger effects.

Table IV-3. The Effects of Participatory Teaching Methods on Changes in Democratic Orientations

Changes in:	Few Participatory Teaching Methods		Many Participatory Teaching Methods	
	B	Y-Standardized	B	Y-Standardized
Seen Copy of Constitution (-1-1)	.13**	.23	.21**	.38
Informed About Contents of Constitution (-2-2)	.17**	.23	.11**	.14
Informed About Reform Proposals (-2-2)	.09**	.12	.19**	.26
Political Interest (-2-2)	.04**	.06	.14**	.22
Political Knowledge (-4-4)	.18**	.15	.28**	.23
Internal Efficacy (-3-3)	.19**	.14	.49**	.35
Political Participation (-7-7)	.44**	.20	.48**	.22
Democracy is Best (-1-1)	.00	.00	.02	.05
Political Tolerance (-4-4)	-.02	-.01	.45**	.27
National Versus Ethnic Identity (-2-2)	.03	.02	.34**	.38
Institutional Trust (-4-4)	.03	.02	.06**	.04

*p<.10 **p<.05

Table IV-4. The Effects of Perceived Trainer Quality on Changes in Democratic Orientations

Changes in:	Perception of Instructor Quality: Low		Perception of Instructor Quality: High	
	Difference in B	Y-Standardized	Difference in B	Y-Standardized
Seen Copy of Constitution (-1-1)	.21**	.38	.24**	.43
Informed About Contents of Constitution (-2-2)	.15**	.20	.27**	.37
Informed About Reform Proposals (-2-2)	.14**	.19	.23**	.32
Political Interest (-2-2)	.09**	.14	.09**	.14
Political Knowledge (-4-4)	.32**	.27	.28**	.24
Internal Efficacy (-3-3)	.23**	.16	.12**	.09
Political Participation (-7-7)	.10	.05	.62**	.28
Democracy is Best (-1-1)	-.01	-.01	.03	.07
Political Tolerance (-4-4)	.27**	.16	.14**	.08
National Versus Ethnic Identity (-2-2)	.25**	.28	-.02	-.02
Institutional Trust (-4-4)	-.13**	.02	.04	.03

*p<.10 **p<.05

We can see the importance of the two critical conditions for effective civic education instruction that we have identified thus far in the report – frequent exposures with participatory teaching methodologies – in graphic form in Figures IV-4 through IV-6. We depict the probability of individuals registering an increase in three important orientations (internal political efficacy, political tolerance and awareness of constitutional reform proposals) for individuals who attended differing numbers of workshops and who were exposed to different amounts of participatory methods of instruction. In Figure IV-4, for example, we show the probability of increasing in political interest over time for individuals who attended zero, one, three and six workshops, and who experienced zero, two, or seven active teaching methods.

The results indicate that the effect of each factor is important in its own right in stimulating changes in the individual's psychological engagement with politics. Individuals with no workshop exposures, have only a .28 chance of increasing on political interest between their pre-workshop and post-workshop interviews. This figure rises to .49 among individuals who attended six workshops with no participatory methods, a .21 increase between the lowest and highest workshop exposure group. Similarly, individuals who attend one workshop that used all seven active methodologies have a .55 chance of increasing in political interest, an increase of .24 over the .31 chance of increasing interest for individuals who attended one workshop that used no active methods. But the combination of the two conditions (more frequent workshop exposure and more participatory methods) produces even more powerful effects: nearly two-thirds of all individuals who were exposed to three workshops that made use of many teaching methodologies showed an increase in political interest over time, and nearly three-quarters of all individuals who attended six highly participatory workshops increased in interest as well. Thus, while the basic effects for political interest in the previous chapter showed a fairly modest overall impact of NCEP civic education, the analyses here suggest that, like many other important democratic orientations, under certain conditions the effects are much more substantial.

The same pattern of effects was found for political tolerance (Figure IV-5) and for awareness of the constitutional reforms (Figure IV-6). The frequency of the individual's workshop exposure *and* the number of participatory methods used in instruction are important in producing changes. In the case of tolerance, the combination of many active instructional methods and even three workshop exposures leads to a .39 chance of increasing on tolerance, more than three times the increases identified for those with no workshop exposure, that is the control group. Increasing the number of workshop exposures to six leads to an even greater increase of .53, more than four times the control group's probability of change. The same pattern of effects is found for awareness of constitutional reforms (Figure IV-6). The control group shows a .25 chance of increasing on awareness over time, and there are strong increases associated with both increased workshop exposure and the number of participatory teaching methods employed. When active methods are combined with frequent exposures to workshops, awareness of the constitutional reform process increases in an overwhelming majority of individuals, with the figures reaching 80% in the highest teaching and exposure conditions. This is powerful evidence of the beneficial effects of *both* participatory methods and intensive exposures to civic education messages on changes in Kenyan democratic orientations over the course of the study.

The results for *Trainer Quality* (Table IV-4) are less consistent than those seen for participatory teaching methods. On some orientations, notably those for constitutional awareness and political participation, attending workshops where trainers are perceived to be knowledgeable, inspiring, and interesting leads to significantly greater change than attending workshops where trainers are perceived to lack these qualities. The effects for political participation indicate that individuals who are trained by high quality instructors have about a .12 greater likelihood of increasing on political participation. Similarly, high quality teachers lead to differences of about .10 to .12 in the likelihood of increasing on awareness on the constitutional reform process and on the content of the constitution. Thus, the results indicate that teacher quality can sometimes be an important conditioning factor in determining the impact of civic education.

At the same time, there are many orientations where the perceived quality of the instructor makes little difference in the magnitude of the effects of NCEP workshop participation. On factors such as political interest and knowledge, for example, similar change is observed for individuals who attend NCEP workshops, regardless of whether teachers are perceived to be knowledgeable, inspiring, and the like. And on several orientations, notably values such as tolerance and national versus ethnic identity, high trainer quality is associated with somewhat weaker effect on change. There are no ready explanations for these findings, though we may speculate that trainers who are especially highly regarded may have activated positive feelings of ethnic identification among workshop attendees; this identification may have led to somewhat lower levels of trust and tolerance among the workshop participants. We stress that these effects

are fairly small in magnitude; nevertheless they indicate that feelings of high regard for trainers need not always lead to positive democratic outcomes

FIGURE IV-4
THE EFFECTS OF WORKSHOP FREQUENCY AND PARTICIPATORY METHODS
ON INTERNAL POLITICAL EFFICACY




FIGURE IV-5
THE EFFECTS OF WORKSHOP FREQUENCY AND PARTICIPATORY METHODS
ON POLITICAL TOLERANCE





FIGURE IV-6
THE EFFECTS OF WORKSHOP FREQUENCY AND PARTICIPATORY METHODS
ON AWARENESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM PROPOSALS



D. Workshop Duration, Content, and Organizational Strategies

Following the logic of the findings regarding *Frequency of Exposure*, it may be expected that workshops that are longer in duration will lead to greater change than workshops that last only a short time. Further, we may expect that some of the effects of workshops will be content-specific: workshops that focus on constitutionalism should be associated with greater increases in knowledge and awareness of constitutional issues, workshops that focus on democratization should be associated with greater changes in democratic values, and so forth. It may also be the case that certain topics covered in the NCEP workshops in general did not engage the workshop participants, in which case the effects for these kinds of workshops will be smaller than workshops which cover topics of more interest to the audience. Finally, there may be certain ways of implementing and organizing the workshop that lead generally to larger effects than others, for example, whether the CSOs arranged to conduct the civic education through other civil society groups, through community elders, or through religious gatherings.

As noted above, the implementing CSOs were required to submit to the NCEP Technical Assistance Team a so-called “Form D” for each workshop that they conducted; these forms contain information about each of these characteristics of the given workshop. This information allows us to test whether workshops of a given type, given length, with given organizational strategies or features have greater or lesser impact on individual participants, and thus for the first time link purely “objective” aspects of civic education workshops to changes in democratic orientations.

We were able to obtain the Form Ds for 139 of the 181 workshops covered in the Pre-Post portion of the study, encompassing 1758, or 76.3% of the post-workshop respondents. We constructed a series of variables from the information contained in the Form Ds. First, the forms contain the *Duration* of the workshop, that is, the number of “working hours for the whole activity.” We divided the workshops into three different categories: workshops that lasted a half-working day (4 hours) or less; workshops that

lasted between a half-working day and a full-working day (over 4 and less than eight hours); and workshops that lasted longer than one working day (more than 8 hours). Second, the forms contain information about the major “target issue” or *Topic* of discussion, with the choices being the major topical divisions covered in the NCEP *Making Informed Choices* instruction manual, “Nationhood,” “Democratization,” “Constitutionalism,” or “Governance.” Third, the CSO’s “*Entry Strategy*” into the community was recorded, that is, whether the implementing CSO worked through a “Local CBO or Club,” a “Religious/Cultural or Traditional Ceremony,” a “Religious Gathering,” a “Sporting Event,” though “Local Elders, Leaders, or Opinion Makers,” or through a “Women’s Group in order to conduct the event. We combined the two religious-oriented strategies into a single “Religious Gathering” category, and we excluded “sporting events” from the analysis due to only 5 workshops falling into this category.

The distribution of workshops in the following analysis on all three of these factors is shown in Table IV-5 below. As can be seen, slightly more than half of the workshops were of less than half-day’s duration, while 9% lasted longer than one working day. The main workshop topics were constitutionalism, with nearly half of the workshop, democratization, with another one-quarter, and the remainder split between nationhood and governance. The dominant entry strategy for organizing a workshop was to work through a local CBO (nearly one half of the workshops), and, as women’s group were used by another 19%, this means that nearly two-thirds of the workshops utilized *some* CBO as their entry point into the community. Another one-quarter of the workshops used local elders or opinion leaders, and 10% of our sample of workshops used some kind of religious gathering or ceremony.

Table IV-5. Characteristics of Sample Workshops From Form D Information

<i>Workshop Duration</i>	Percent	<i>Entry Strategy</i>	Percent
4 hours or Less	54.2%	Local CBO	46.7%
More than 4 and Less than 8 hours	36.5%	Women’s Group	18.7%
More than 8 hours	9.3%	Local Elder/Opinion Leaders	24.3%
		Religious Gathering	10.3%
<i>Workshop Topic</i>			
Nationhood	19.6%		
Democratization	25.0%		
Constitutionalism	44.7%		
Governance	10.6%		

We tested the impact of these workshop characteristics on changes in democratic orientations in the following manner. First, we limited our analysis to individuals in our *original* workshop sample, that is, individuals who we could determine with certainty had attended one of the 139 workshops for which Form D information was available. This meant that individuals in our original control group who reported having attended some NCEP workshop were excluded, as we could not link these individuals specifically to the workshops for which we had Form D information. Thus the comparisons in these analyses are between individuals who we know attended *these specific workshops* and individuals who we know did not attend these specific workshops. This is therefore a highly controlled comparison, and one that is more restrictive than what has been the case thus far in the report, where we have examined the effects of *all* workshop exposures and *all* other kinds of NCEP activities. Consequently, we expect the effects shown in these analyses be somewhat smaller in general than in previous tables and figures, as they represent the effects of the *single* civic education exposure represented by the specific workshop in question.

Then, we estimated the probability of change in nine important constitutional and democratic orientations for individuals who were trained in each of the kinds of workshops we have described: workshops of shorter and longer duration, workshops that covered different topics, and that had different community entry strategies. Within each category, we calculate the probability that an individual who attended the workshop would increase on the orientation over time, and the probability that individuals who formed the control group for those workshops would change on the orientation over time as well. The “effect” of the workshop is the difference in these two quantities, that is, the increased chance that individuals who were trained in workshops with certain characteristics changed on a particular democratic orientation, compared with individuals in the control group for those particular workshops. For example, we calculate the effect of workshops of short duration on changes in political interest by examining individuals who attended such workshops and the individuals who represented their matched control group, and estimating the chance that each group registered positive change on interest between the pre and post workshop interviews. The difference between these two figures is the “effect” of attending short workshops on increases in political interest, relative to *not* attending these kinds of workshops. We then estimate the effect for workshops of medium duration and for longer workshops, and compare the magnitude of these effects across categories in order to assess the ways that workshop duration affects the overall results.

Figures IV-7 through IV-15 present the effects of the three different workshop-related variables on three constitutional variables (Seen a Copy, Awareness of Contents, and Awareness of Reform Proposals), four engagement variables (Knowledge, Interest, Participation, and Internal Efficacy), and two democratic values (Tolerance and National Versus Ethnic Identity). For reasons of space, we place the efficacy results along with the values in the final figure for each workshop variable. We consider the workshop characteristics variables in turn.

1. *The Effect of Workshop Duration*

As revealed in Figure IV-7, workshop duration is not *consistently* consequential for predicting changes in the constitutional orientations analyzed. For having seen a copy of the constitution, workshops of greater than four hours produce greater change, relative to shorter workshops, though this difference is not replicated for changes in awareness of the constitution’s content. For awareness of reform, workshops of more than eight working hours produce significantly greater change than shorter workshops, though there are no differences between workshops of short and medium length. Thus, we conclude that there is no general pattern of relationship between workshop duration and changes in orientations towards the constitution; what matters, as was shown in earlier tables, is whether or not the individual was exposed *at all* to NCEP workshops and other activities, the kinds of methods employed and perception of trainer qualities.

All of the other democratic orientations (Figures IV-8 and IV-9) indicate clearly that *workshops of greater duration produced greater positive change*. Individuals who attended a workshop of less than four hours had only a .10 greater chance of increasing in political knowledge than those who did not attend a workshop. Individuals who attended a workshop lasting between four and eight hours registered an boost of nearly .25 in their chances of increasing on political knowledge, and those who attended workshops longer than eight hours increased their chances of gaining knowledge by nearly .30. This evidence is highly consistent with our findings from previous sections of the report. The pattern of increases related to duration was also found on the political interest variable.

For efficacy and the two democratic values (political tolerance and national versus ethnic identity), the pattern is more pronounced (Figure IV-9). On these orientations, we see evidence of a threshold effect, where incremental change is produced *only* when workshops are at least 8 hours. Individuals cannot learn tolerance, alter their own perceptions of political influence, nor alter their identities unless the civic education experiences are long enough for these kinds of abstract messages to be absorbed. This is

powerful evidence that workshops must be structured in certain specific ways in order to influence democratic values and political orientations. And given the fact, as seen in Table IV-5 above, that only approximately one in 10 workshops was at least eight hours long, it becomes evident that the relatively short duration of most of the NCEP workshops limited more positive change in the participants' democratic values and civic engagement.

FIGURE IV-7
THE EFFECTS OF WORKSHOP DURATION ON CONSTITUTIONAL ORIENTATIONS




FIGURE IV-8
THE EFFECTS OF WORKSHOP DURATION ON POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT





FIGURE IV-9
THE EFFECTS OF WORKSHOP DURATION ON EFFICACY AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES



2. *The Effects of Workshop Topics*

We found several significant differences in the effects of workshops topics as well. On two of the three constitutional orientations, workshops whose primary topic was “constitutionalism” produced the greatest effect on workshop participants (Figure IV-10). On the third orientation, being aware of the contents of the constitution, workshops related to “governance” produced the largest effect. “Democratization” and “nationhood” workshops were each associated with moderate amounts of individual change. In general, however, workshops that focused on each of the four general topic areas were somewhat effective in changing orientations about the constitution, with the sole exception being the “nationhood” workshops’ effect on awareness of constitutional reform proposals.

The same pattern is decidedly *not* the case for the effects of different workshops topics on orientations related to civic engagement and democratic values. In Figure IV-11 and IV-12, it can be seen that workshops related to constitutionalism were more effective in stimulating changes in political knowledge, interest and efficacy than any other workshop topic, with these workshops being the *only* kind that influenced meaningful changes in interest and efficacy. Discussing constitutional issues, then, appears to have been a useful strategy for teaching about politics, engaging individuals into the political process, and changing individual perceptions of their role in the system. Workshops related to “nationhood” and “governance”, had very little impact on any of these orientations.

A slightly different pattern was found for the effects of workshop topics on democratic values. Here, “democratization workshops” were the most effective in influencing tolerance, and there was some impact from “constitutionalism” workshops and almost none from “nationhood” and “governance” Workshops. For changes in national versus ethnic identity, the results were somewhat puzzling, as “nationhood” workshops were the *least* effective in actually instilling increased feelings of national identity. All other kinds of workshops led to moderate impact on this value.

While the patterns are not totally consistent across the different democratic and constitutional orientations, several tentative conclusions can nevertheless be drawn: 1) workshops related to “constitutionalism” had the most consistent impact on constitutional and political engagement orientations; 2) workshops related to “democratization” were effective in changing important democratic values; and 3) workshops that focused on “nationhood” were the least effective overall in stimulating democratic change. The findings suggest that workshops that were most directly tied to the specific topics that were prominent on the Kenyan political agenda – constitutional reform and democratization – were most effective in teaching participants in general about politics and instilling supportive democratic orientations.

We tested for the effects of different workshops topic in one final way, using the full Pre-Post study component (i.e., not only respondents from the 139 Form D workshops). The respondents were asked whether a series of topics were discussed in any of the workshops they attended, including “community problems like crime, HIV/AIDS, water or health,” “voting in elections,” “strengthening democracy in Kenya,” and “what a new constitution in Kenya should look like.” Not surprisingly, all these topics were discussed in most of the workshops, with the latter three topics reported by 95% of all respondents. About 10% of the respondents, however, reported that community problems were *not* discussed in their workshops, and this provided an opportunity to examine whether workshops that dealt with community issues as well as general issues related to democratization, constitutionalism, and the like were more effective. We then estimated the probably that exposure to workshops that dealt with community issues would lead to increased change in all of the democratic orientations we have considered thus far, and then estimated the same probability for exposure to workshops that did not discuss community issues.

We found that for each orientation related to the constitution, to civic engagement and knowledge, to support for democratic values, *workshops that also discussed community problems were associated with greater change.* The difference in the probabilities of change for the two kinds of workshops was usually in the range of 5 to 10%. This suggests that the strategy that most NCEP workshops followed, of including some discussion of issues related to the community and community problems, was effective in engaging the participants and relating democratic and constitutional issues to more concrete local conditions.

FIGURE IV-10
THE EFFECTS OF WORKSHOP TOPIC ON CONSTITUTIONAL ORIENTATIONS




FIGURE IV-11
THE EFFECTS OF WORKSHOP TOPIC ON POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT





FIGURE IV-12
THE EFFECTS OF WORKSHOP TOPIC ON EFFICACY AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES



3. *The Effect of Community Entry Strategies*

The implementing CSOs for the NCEP workshops also engaged in different strategies of access to the communities where they conducted the workshops, as some utilized local community or women’s groups, some used local elders or opinion leaders, and some used religious gatherings as a way of targeting and accessing the desired audience. These strategies had mixed impact on the effectiveness of the workshops,

and the lack of a clear pattern in these analyses suggests that there is no single way of organizing workshops to achieve maximum overall success.

As can be seen in Figures IV-13 to IV-15, various entry strategies were associated with workshop success in influencing orientations related to the constitution. Entry through elders or opinion leaders was perhaps the most consistently effective strategy. On the other hand, entry through local CBOs and women’s groups were most important for political knowledge, interest, and the two democratic values, while entry through religious gatherings provided influential in stimulating the highest levels of political participation. These patterns do not provide enough consistency to make firm recommendations regarding the utility of differing entry strategies; more likely, they suggest that what matters most is what *occurs* during the workshop and other features of the instruction that have been discussed thus far in the report.

FIGURE IV-13
THE EFFECTS OF ENTRY STRATEGY ON CONSTITUTIONAL ORIENTATIONS




FIGURE IV-14
THE EFFECTS OF ENTRY STRATEGY ON POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT





FIGURE IV-15
THE EFFECTS OF ENTRY STRATEGY ON EFFICACY AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES



4. *The Effects for Different NGO Consortia*

We tested whether the effects differed for workshops conducted by CSOs belonging to the different consortia associated with the NCEP. It may be expected, for example, that workshops conducted by CSOs affiliated with the GENDER consortium would produce larger effects on issues related to women's rights and women's engagement in politics, while CRECO (Constitution Reform and Education Consortium) workshops may have had larger effects on constitutional awareness and knowledge. Some CSOs conducting workshops were not officially affiliated with the NCEP consortia, and it may be the case that the effects on individuals attending these workshops may differ from those sponsored by affiliated CSOs.

We conducted separate analyses of the effects of workshops conducted by CSOs affiliated with CRECO, GENDER, and ECEP, as well as workshops conducted by unaffiliated CSOs. The results are shown below in Table IV-6. The table shows only marginal differences in the effects of workshops conducted by the various NGO consortia. The only noteworthy difference is in the comparison of the ECEP workshops with those conducted by other groups. ECEP workshops show the largest effects on political participation of any of the consortia workshops (or workshops from unaffiliated CSOs), suggesting that church-related civic education can be most effective in mobilizing individuals to engage the political process.

Workshops conducted by groups from the other consortia and from unaffiliated groups show somewhat larger impact on constitutional issues, and on issues related to national and ethnic identity. All of these differences are relatively small, however, with the dominant finding from the table being that workshop effects were fairly consistent across the different consortia.

Table IV-6. The Effects of Workshop Conducted by CSOs from Different Consortia

	CRECO	GENDER	ECEP	UNAFFILIATED
Changes in:				
Seen Copy of Constitution	.178**	.274**	.122	.214**
Informed About Contents of Constitution	.203**	.231**	.060	.167**
Informed About Reform Proposals	.222**	.197**	.120	.164**
Political Interest	.055*	.130**	.079	.110**
Political Knowledge	.293**	.193**	.267	.439**
Internal Efficacy	.259**	.007	.275	.339**
Political Participation	.421**	.346**	1.18**	.185
Democracy is Best	.024	.020	.065	-.025
Political Tolerance	.214**	.321**	.382	.120
National Versus Ethnic Identity	.173**	.157**	.066	.048
Institutional Trust	.040	-.137*	-.243	-.063
Women's Role in Society	.091*	.132**	.158	.020

*p<.10 **p<.05

V. DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES, SOCIAL INFLUENCES, AND THE SECONDARY EFFECTS OF NCEP TRAINING

In this chapter, we explore the effects of NCEP civic education on different kinds of individuals. Such a determination is useful first in understanding where the NCEP had the most significant impacts in the Kenyan population, that is, which social groups and demographic categories changed the most in response to the workshops and activities organized by the Programme. Equally important, the information will be useful for donors and implementing CSOs in deciding on the most promising target populations for future civic education programs. If, for example, civic education is found to be ineffective in rural areas compared to smaller towns or metro centers, then policy makers and CSOs might adjust their allocation of resources accordingly. And if there is a desire to change the democratic orientations of particular sub-groups, for example, women or young people, and the results of these analyses demonstrate that few effects on these kinds of individuals have occurred, then substantial changes in the *ways* that civic education is delivered to these populations would need to be undertaken.

As in previous impact assessments, we investigate the differential effects of NCEP civic education for the following demographic sub-groups in the Kenyan population:

- Gender (women versus men)
- Age (18-35 versus 36 and above)
- Education (primary, secondary, and high school)
- Household Income (Less than versus More than 5000 Ksh per month)
- Religion (Protestant, Catholic, Muslim)
- Community Size (urban versus rural)

We test for these effects in a straightforward manner. We first separate the sample by gender (youth, education level, community size, etc.) and then estimate models of change for individuals in each category. For example, we will calculate the effects for women of attending NCEP workshops, compared to women in the control group, and then the effects for men of attending NCEP workshops, compared to men in the control group. The difference between these two effects thus provides an indication of whether NCEP workshop exposure affected the two groups differently.

The following conclusions can be drawn from the analyses:

- There were generally few differences in the effects of the Programme across the demographic categories studied. NCEP activities had positive influences on both women and men, old and young, those from lower and high socio-economic strata, and individuals from different religious groups in mostly similar ways.
- When differences across groups did exist, it was usually the case that individuals from less dominant social groups exhibited greater change from NCEP exposure than individuals from more dominant social strata. In this way the NCEP helped to equalize the pre-existing differences in democratic orientations between many of these groups.

The differential effects of civic education may, however, go beyond these kinds of demographic factors. In previous impact assessments, we found that workshop exposure had greater effects on individuals who were more integrated into civil society, that is, who belonged to a greater number of secondary groups and local organizations. We speculated that such individuals have the opportunity to engage in group discussions that reinforce and sustain the messages that are transmitted in civic education workshops;

moreover, the groups themselves are often engaged in political dynamics and mobilization of their own, and thus provide an ideal setting for individuals who have learned about democracy in civic education to put these teachings into concrete practice.²¹ Therefore, we also examined the differential effects of NCEP workshops on more socially engaged and more socially isolated individuals in the analyses below.

This focus on the effect of the individual's group environment in amplifying or inhibiting the impact of civic education leads to a more general possibility that individuals may influence one another's knowledge, attitudes, and values about democracy and democratic political processes. If this is the case, then civic education may have added impact through the political discussions it stimulates within an individual's social network, regardless of (or in addition to) processes that may take place within groups to which the individual belongs. These types of effects may be viewed as "secondary effects" of NCEP or other civic education programs, as they occur *after* the workshops or other activities have already exerted their "primary" effects on the participants themselves. Secondary effects of civic education may occur in two possible ways: 1) workshop participants may discuss democracy or constitutional issues with others, thereby amplifying in their own minds the messages that they may have learned in the workshops; and 2) individuals who did not attend workshops may nevertheless discuss democracy-related topics with other individuals who did, thereby becoming exposed to the messages conveyed in the workshops indirectly. Of course, both of these processes could occur for workshop participants, as they could speak to others about their direct experience with workshops and also hear about workshop topics or messages to which others were exposed.

These kinds of secondary effects of civic education have never before been included in any impact assessment. This represents yet another strength of the Kenyan study, as previous assessments may have underestimated the overall impact of civic education by focusing solely on "primary" or direct impact on the participants.

The following conclusions can be drawn from the analyses:

- Individuals who were members of the implementing CSOs or of secondary groups that were invited to NCEP workshops consistently showed stronger effects from the sessions than did non-group members.
- Post-workshop discussions with others were crucial in amplifying and enhancing the impact of the sessions. Individuals who *spoke with others* about their workshop experiences increased significantly more on most democratic orientations than others, and, even more importantly, individuals *to whom other people spoke* about their own workshop experiences showed substantially more change than other individuals.

A. The Effects of Civic Education on Individuals in Different Demographic Groups

The effects of NCEP workshop exposure for women and men, and for younger and older respondents are provided in Figure V-1 below. The NCEP workshops produced significant change of virtually all of the democratic orientations for both men and women, and the effects are nearly identical in size. When differences do emerge, moreover, the greater impacts were on women: the effects for political interest, tolerance, national versus ethnic identity, and institutional trust are all somewhat greater among women than men. NCEP activities, then, had positive effects on both sexes, and proved especially effective in stimulating change in democratic values and a sense of political engagement among women. This is particularly important, given that women registered lower levels on some of these attitudes in the pre-

²¹ These processes were examined in the two previous USAID civic education reports; a more formal treatment can be found in Steven E. Finkel, "Civic Education and the Mobilization of Participation in Developing Democracies," *Journal of Politics* 64: 994-1020 (November 2002).

workshop interviews. For example, prior to the workshops only 44% of the women were “very” interested in national politics compared with 60% of the men, and 66% of the women gave politically intolerant responses to all four questions in the pre-workshop interviews compared with 57% of men. Thus, the differential effects of civic education training on these variables served to equalize to some extent the pre-existing differences between the sexes.

Table V-1. The Effects of NCEP Civic Education by Gender and Age

Changes in:	Gender		Age	
	Women	Men	Youth (18-35)	Older (36+)
Seen Copy of Constitution (-1-1)	.23**	.21**	.20**	.21**
Informed About Contents of Constitution (-2-2)	.19**	.22**	.20**	.21**
Informed About Reform Proposals (-2-2)	.17**	.13**	.18**	.22**
Political Interest (-2-2)	.13**	.07**	.07**	.14**
Political Knowledge (-4-4)	.27**	.26**	.27**	.35**
Internal Efficacy (-3-3)	.23**	.17**	.17**	.26**
Political Participation (-7-7)	.39**	.33**	.48**	.19
Democracy is Best (-1-1)	.02	.01	.01	.01
Political Tolerance (-4-4)	.28**	.19**	.26**	.17**
National Versus Ethnic Identity (-2-2)	.21**	.08*	.12**	.19**
Institutional Trust (-4-4)	-.12*	-.02	-.08	-.05

*p<.10 **p<.05

The effects of civic education were also generally similar for younger and older respondents. On some engagement variables such as interest, knowledge, and efficacy, older Kenyans changed more significantly than did the young, while on political participation, tolerance, and national versus ethnic identity, the opposite pattern emerged. In general, NCEP workshops appeared to be equally effective irrespective of age group.²²

The findings for different educational and income groups (Table V-2) show a consistent pattern, as the workshops had significant effects on the democratic orientations of all groups, but somewhat greater effects on individuals with *lower* levels of education and *lower* levels of household income. The largest effects on political interest were found on individuals with only a primary school education or less, and individuals in the primary and less than secondary education categories showed consistently greater effects on virtually all the orientations were found among the primary education and less than secondary education categories compared to individuals with a secondary school education or more. Similarly, individuals with household incomes of 5000 Ksh or less were more likely than those with higher household incomes to show increases on all of the constitution orientations, and on interest, participation, and national and ethnic identify. Since individuals from lower socio-economic groups registered low levels on many democratic orientations in the pre-workshop survey, civic education served again to equalize to some degree the pre-existing differences. The effects found, however, are neither consistent nor strong enough to base firm policy recommendations.

²² We also examined difference between men and women for different age groups, and found negligible differences in the overall pattern of effects.

Table V-2. The Effects of NCEP Civic Education by Education and Household Income

Changes in:	Education			Income	
	LT Primary	LT Secondary	Secondary or More	LT 5000 Ksh	MT 5000 Ksh
Seen Copy of Constitution (-1-1)	.18**	.23**	.24**	.24**	.19**
Informed About Contents of Constitution (-2-2)	.20**	.18**	.22**	.23**	.17**
Informed About Reform Proposals (-2-2)	.17**	.20**	.21**	.22**	.17**
Political Interest (-2-2)	.19**	.08**	.05*	.12**	.06**
Political Knowledge (-4-4)	.29**	.29**	.21**	.28**	.33**
Internal Efficacy (-3-3)	.22**	.24**	.15**	.21**	.20**
Political Participation (-7-7)	.33**	.56**	.18	.40**	.31**
Democracy is Best (-1-1)	.04	.01	-.01	.03**	-.02
Political Tolerance (-4-4)	.21*	.31**	.15	.20**	.27**
National Versus Ethnic Identity (-2-2)	.23**	.13**	.10*	.18**	.08**
Institutional Trust (-4-4)	-.02	-.11	-.05	-.10*	.03

*p<.10 **p<.05

Table V-3. The Effects of NCEP Civic Education by Religion and Urban/Rural Status

Changes in:	Religion			Urban/Rural	
	Protestant	Catholic	Muslim	Urban	Rural
Seen Copy of Constitution (-1-1)	.22**	.21**	.08	.22**	.23**
Informed About Contents of Constitution (-2-2)	.19**	.26**	-.04	.15**	.22**
Informed About Reform Proposals (-2-2)	.20**	.23**	-.06	.25**	.19**
Political Interest (-2-2)	.11**	.08**	.11	.06**	.10**
Political Knowledge (-4-4)	.31**	.31*	.05	.28**	.30**
Internal Efficacy (-3-3)	.20**	.25**	.28	.23**	.20**
Political Participation (-7-7)	.27**	.48*	1.23**	.38**	.36**
Democracy is Best (-1-1)	.02	-.01	.03	.02	.01
Political Tolerance (-4-4)	.22*	.21**	.34*	.34**	.20**
National Versus Ethnic Identity (-2-2)	.16**	.14**	-.05	.13*	.15**
Institutional Trust (-4-4)	-.07	-.05	.29	.14*	-.11*

*p<.10 **p<.05

Table V-3 presents the findings for individuals with different religious affiliations, and for individuals from urban and rural areas. Virtually no difference was found between the effects registered for the Protestant and the Catholic respondents, and workshop participation was effective in increasing the democratic orientations of both religious groups. There were only approximately 100 Muslim respondents in our sample, so the results for this group must be viewed with caution. The findings suggest that the effects of civic education workshops for Muslim respondents were primarily on political participation, where the effects were over double the size seen for Protestants and Catholics, and on political tolerance, where the effects were one and one half the size as for the other religious groups. To the extent that Muslim respondents tend to receive civic education training that is associated with their religious organizations, the results are consistent with the effects reported for ECEP workshops above. In both cases, civic education that is religiously-related has stronger effects on political engagement and to a lesser extent, political tolerance, while having weaker effects on basic knowledge, competence and constitutional awareness.

The findings on the impact of civic education among urban and rural individuals (Table V-3) are generally significant for both groups, and of roughly equal magnitude. Urban individuals register slightly greater change on tolerance, while rural individuals show larger increases from NCEP exposure on political interest. Interestingly, the effects on institutional trust for the two groups are in the opposite direction, as urban respondents became more trusting of political institutions while rural respondents decreased on trust over time. This pattern is suggestive, in that other less dominant groups in our analyses, such as women and the poor, also showed larger *negative* trends in institutional trust compared with men and more wealthy respondents. To this extent, as civic education develops civic competence and support for democratic values among less dominant groups, it also facilitates a more critical stance about the trustworthiness of Kenyan political institutions.

B. Social Influence and the Secondary Effects of Civic Education

As noted in the introductory section of the chapter, we also are able to explore several aspects of social influence processes related to NCEP civic education. We analyzed whether the effects of civic education were greater for individuals who were also more highly integrated into social groups and secondary associations. We then investigate the extent to which individuals who spoke about their workshop experiences, and who discussed the workshop experiences of others, were more likely to increase in supportive democratic orientations than individuals who engaged in little discussion about NCEP democracy or constitution workshops. To the extent that post-workshop discussions are associated with democratic change, we characterize the results as the “secondary” effects of civic education.

1. The Impact of Social Group Memberships

Table V-4 contains findings on the effects of civic education for individuals with differing levels of associational or group membership, such as youth groups, church groups, women’s groups, cultural organizations, ethnic associations, and the like. On the left side of the table, we show the effects for individuals who belong to zero or one group, two or three groups, and four or more groups. The analyses revealed few differences of any import in the effects of civic education on the socially integrated versus more socially isolated individuals in our sample. There is a slight tendency for efficacy to be greater among *less* socially-integrated individuals, but the results are not generally consistent nor do they carry over to other democratic orientations. The beneficial effects NCEP workshops, then, do not depend on the individual belonging to a large number of groups or associations.

Table V-4. The Effects of NCEP Civic Education By Group Memberships

Changes in:	Overall Group Memberships			Member of Group Conducting or Invited to NCEP Workshop	
	0/1	2/3	3+	No	Yes
Seen Copy of Constitution (-1-1)	.24**	.23**	.21**	.26**	.24**
Informed About Contents of Constitution (-2-2)	.07	.23**	.18**	.24**	.24**
Informed About Reform Proposals (-2-2)	.18**	.25**	.17**	.14**	.26**
Political Interest (-2-2)	.13**	.10**	.07*	.10**	.09**
Political Knowledge (-4-4)	.31**	.23**	.34**	.09	.40**
Internal Efficacy (-3-3)	.41**	.32**	.13**	.15**	.25**
Political Participation (-7-7)	.52**	.26**	.47**	.24**	.51**
Democracy is Best (-1-1)	.04	.01	-.01	.02	.01
Political Tolerance (-4-4)	.27*	.36**	.13	.11	.30**
National Versus Ethnic Identity (-2-2)	.23**	.21**	.07	.02	.19**
Institutional Trust (-4-4)	.08*	.05	-.09	.05	-.03

*p<.10 **p<.05

The right side of table V-4, however, contains more striking results. We asked individuals in our workshop sample whether they were a “member of the group that conducted the workshop or of a group that was invited to the workshop,” and the table compares the effects of workshop exposure for members and non-members of these groups. On six of the democratic orientations, individuals who were members of the CSO that conducted or was invited to the workshop showed more powerful effects than were seen for non-members, and on several dimensions these differences were substantial. Individuals who were members of the civic education groups showed effects on increase in participation that were twice as large as those seen for non-members, and the effects of civic education workshops on critical orientations such as political knowledge, tolerance, and national versus ethnic identity were *only* seen for members of these groups. This is strong evidence that social processes and dynamics within groups can play a powerful role in amplifying and reinforcing the messages of civic education workshops. We conclude that individuals do not necessarily need to be members of several groups in order for workshops to exert influence, but individuals who are members of the specific groups that are involved in civic education training often show greater effects than other individuals. We shall return to this point in the concluding chapter, as it has significant policy implications for the implementation of civic education

2. *The Secondary Effects of Civic Education Exposure*

We tested for the “secondary” effects of civic education, that is, the effects that may result from post-workshop interactions with other individuals, with several questions in our post-test survey instrument. First, we asked individuals who attended workshops whether, after the workshop was over, they had discussed the “issues in the workshop” with a) members of their family, b) friends, c) people where they work, and d) people in groups to which they belong. We then asked them to estimate altogether the number of people they had discussed the workshop issues with, with the response categories being none, one or two people, three to five people, or more than five people. We call this variable *Discussed Own Workshop* in the analyses that follow.

We then asked *all* respondents, those who attended NCEP workshops and those who did not, the following question: “Setting aside any events or workshops that you attended personally, has anyone you know talked to you about events or workshops about democracy and the Constitution that **they** attended this past year?” Respondents who answered yes were then asked to estimate the number of individuals who discussed their workshop experience, with the same response categories as described for the previous variable. We call this variable *Discussed Workshops of Others* in the following analyses.

We estimated the effect of these two *Discussion* variables by including them in a model of change in each democratic orientation, along with variables representing the amount of civic education that the individual received, *Frequency of Exposure* and *Variety of NCEP Activities* from Table IV-1 above. Thus these models provide estimates of the extent to which discussion with others influences changes in each orientation, taking into account the number of NCEP activities that the individual attended. The results are shown in Figure V-5 below. We show only the effects of the two workshop discussion variables for ease of presentation.

Table V-5. The Secondary Effects Of Civic Education

Changes in:	Discussed Own Workshop		Discussed Workshop of Others	
	B	Y-Standardized	B	Y-Standardized
Seen Copy of Constitution (-1-1)	.05**	.09	.05**	.08
Informed About Contents of Constitution (-2-2)	.04**	.06	.05**	.06
Informed About Reform Proposals (-2-2)	.03**	.04	.07**	.10
Political Interest (-2-2)	.02**	.03	.03**	.04
Political Knowledge (-4-4)	.06**	.05	.13*	.11
Internal Efficacy (-3-3)	.04**	.03	.04**	.03
Political Participation (-7-7)	.01	.01	.22**	.10
Democracy is Best (-1-1)	.00	.00	.02**	.04
Political Tolerance (-4-4)	.00	.00	.09**	.06
National Versus Ethnic Identity (-2-2)	.00	.00	.04**	.04
Institutional Trust (-4-4)	.00	.00	-.06**	-.03

*p<.10 **p<.05

The results indicate consistent and substantial impacts of post-workshop discussions on changes in democratic orientations. They support the view that social processes that occur after the individual’s initial exposure to civic education messages can be powerful instruments of democratic change. Discussing one’s own workshop experiences with others was found to have significant effects on all of the constitutional and political engagement orientations, aside from political participation. The size of the effects indicate that individuals who spoke about their own workshop experience to, for example, three to five other individuals, increased on political knowledge by an additional .15 standard deviation, increased on interest and efficacy by about .10 standard deviations, and increased on the constitutional awareness measures between .10 and .20 standard deviations. These are effects over and above the changes brought about by the individual’s direct experience with the workshop itself. Talking to others about the issues that the individual heard about in the workshop thus serves to amplify what the individual initially may have learned.

The effects are even more powerful for the second discussion variable, the number of people who spoke to the respondent about issues from workshops that the *other* individuals attended. As can be seen, this variable is statistically significant in the models predicting change in *every* democratic orientation that was considered, from the constitutional awareness measures, to political engagement and participation, to increases in democratic values. The size of these effects, moreover, is generally the larger of the two post-workshop discussion variables, and is often of substantial magnitude. If respondents speak about democracy or constitution-related workshops with, for example, three to five individuals who attended NCEP workshops, they are predicted to increase on political knowledge by an additional one-third of a standard deviation, by nearly a third of a standard deviation on political participation, and by nearly .20 standard deviations on political tolerance. Again, this is over and above any effect that the respondent may have experienced through *direct* workshop exposure.

We illustrate the importance of post-workshop discussion in graphic form in Figures V-1 to V-3 below. In these graphs, the probability that the individual will exhibit positive change in three of the democratic orientations – awareness of constitutional reform, political knowledge, and political tolerance – is calculated for individuals with different amounts of direct workshop exposure, and different amounts of discussion about the workshop experiences of others. In each figure, there are four lines representing, from bottom to top: 1) individuals who spoke with no others about workshops that the others attended; 2) individuals who spoke to one or two people; 3) individuals who spoke with three to five people; and 4)

individuals who spoke with more than five people. For each of these groups of individuals, we then calculate the chances of increasing on the given orientation if one attended no workshops (i.e. if the individual was in the control group), if one attended one workshop, if one attended three workshops and then if one attended six NCEP workshops.

The figures show two findings of primary importance. First, both direct workshop exposure as well as indirect or secondary post-workshop discussion exert significant influence on the changes in these orientations. More direct exposure (i.e. moving from left to right on the figures) increases the likelihood of change, as does more post-workshop discussion (i.e. moving from bottom to top on the figures). Second, taken together, the two factors lead to much more change than either factor considered separately. For example, in Figure V-1, it can be seen that respondents who attend three workshops and speak with five or more other individuals about their workshop experiences have about a 2 in 3 chance of increasing on political knowledge, compared to a 1 in 3 chance of increasing if the individuals neither attend workshops nor speak about others' workshop experiences. Attending six workshops and speaking with more than five other individuals increases the likelihood of change to nearly 80%. These effects are of substantial magnitude.

Third, and perhaps most important, it can be seen that the effects of post-workshop discussion are substantial even for individuals in the control group, that is, *even for individuals who did not themselves attend any NCEP workshops*. For these individuals (shown in the farthest left section of each table), talking to others about their workshop experiences leads to increases in political knowledge, despite not having attended any workshops of their own. In fact, the chances of increasing knowledge for respondents in the control group who spoke to many other individuals about their workshop experiences is *greater than for many respondents who attended workshops*. For example, individuals in the control group who spoke with five others about their workshop experiences registered about a .55 likelihood of increasing on political knowledge. This figure is larger than that for all individuals who attended only one workshop and spoke with five people or less; it is larger than that for all individuals who attended three workshops and spoke to two people or less, and it is larger than that for individuals who attended six workshops and spoke to no one about their workshop experiences. Thus, individuals may learn substantial amounts about politics through secondary exposure to civic education – even when they themselves do not attend civic education activities. Discussing the activities that others attended can stimulate significant positive change.

In summary, the NCEP has had significant direct effects on individuals who have taken part in the Programme's activities, and it has had significant indirect or secondary effects as well. Individuals who attended workshops and who spoke about the issues with others changed more than did participants who did not also talk about the workshop experiences of themselves and others, and individuals who did not attend workshops often changed by substantial amounts *if* they engaged in discussions about the democracy workshop experiences of others. Secondary effects of civic education do exist, and this study has been the first to demonstrate their scope and power. Moreover, from a policy perspective, these findings indicate that a promising means of generating greater effects of civic education is to encourage participants to engage in more frequent post-workshop discussions of the topics and issues covered in the sessions with others in their social network. We shall return to this notion in the concluding chapter below.

FIGURE V-1
THE EFFECTS OF WORKSHOP FREQUENCY AND DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHERS
ON POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE




FIGURE V-2
THE EFFECTS OF WORKSHOP FREQUENCY AND DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHERS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AWARENESS





FIGURE V-3
THE EFFECTS OF WORKSHOP FREQUENCY AND DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHERS
ON POLITICAL TOLERANCE



VI. RESULTS FROM THE NATIONAL SAMPLE

The results from the preceding chapters have been based primarily on the Pre-Post workshop component of the study, which includes the individuals who were exposed to civic education in the 181 workshops where pre-workshop interviews were conducted, and the individuals who comprised the matched control group from the surrounding communities. Based on the changes between the pre and the post workshop interviews, we were able to identify: a) the kinds of democratic orientations which were most likely to change from exposure to workshops and other NCEP activities; b) the types of civic education training, instruction, frequency of exposure, and topic areas that were most likely to have an impact on democratic change; c) the types of individuals who were most likely to be impacted by workshops and other NCEP activities; and d) the impact of interpersonal discussions and social processes on amplification and reinforcement of the democratic messages to which individuals were exposed. To this extent, we have provided information on how and under what conditions the NCEP workshops, drama presentations, puppet shows and the like changed Kenyans who took part in these activities.

In order to provide a more complete account of the effectiveness of National Civic Education Programme, however, several additional questions must be answered. First, how many individuals throughout Kenya were exposed to the Programme's activities, and which activities were they most likely attend? Second, what kinds of individuals attended NCEP workshop and other activities? Were the participants reasonably representative of the population as a whole, or were workshop and other participants more likely to differ from the average Kenyan citizen? The answers to these questions will provide a sense of the overall "reach" of the program throughout the Kenyan population, which in turn should help donors and the implementing CSOs to determine whether the desired target groups for NCEP civic education were reached.

Third, were the individuals who did attend workshops and other NCEP activities trained under the kinds of conditions that previous chapters have shown are most beneficial? How many of the individuals trained in NCEP activities, for example, attended multiple workshop sessions? How many were trained with multiple participatory methods? And, how many discussed workshop experiences afterwards with several other individuals in their social networks? The answers to these questions can help us assess whether the program fulfilled its potential to affect democratic change. If large numbers of individuals were trained often, with multiple participatory teaching methods, and afterwards they discussed their workshop experiences with others, then much larger effects can be attributed to the program, compared to findings indicating that only a fraction of individuals were trained "correctly." In sum, we wish to assess whether individuals were trained under the most beneficial conditions for stimulating change, and if not, to suggest how future civic education programs can be better structured to bring about more substantial change.

To answer these questions, we rely in this chapter on the National Survey component of the study, which was designed to provide a representative view of the Kenyan population as a whole. As noted earlier in this report, we conducted a national survey, the December 2002 wave comprised 1,260 interviews and the May 2003 wave covered an additional 501 respondents. Details of the sampling design and interview process for the National Sample are presented in Section B of chapter II.

The results of these analyses show that:

- We estimate that NCEP activities reached approximately 16-17% of the overall Kenyan population, though this is somewhat higher than estimates obtained through analysis of the Technical Assistance Team's activities database.

- Participation in NCEP activities was somewhat skewed in terms of the socio-economic status of the participants. We attribute this mainly to the fact that civic education tends to be conducted through existing CSOs, and individuals in lower social strata are less likely to be active within civil society organizations.
- Many individuals who attended NCEP activities were *not* trained with the kind of frequency, or teaching methods most conducive to greater impact. For example, 41% of individuals exposed to any workshops attended only one, with another 29% attending two, yielding a total of 70% of the workshop participants in the “low frequency” category. Similarly, less than half were trained with many participatory teaching methods, and less than half perceived their instructors to be of the higher quality;
- There were likely to have been significant “secondary” effects of the NCEP program throughout the past year. Over 80% of Individuals who were trained in NCEP workshops spoke about their own workshop experiences with at least three other individuals, and over 50% of all respondents in the national survey had at least three people speak to them about the others’ workshop experiences.

A. The Overall Level of NCEP Exposure

We asked individuals in our national sample: whether they had ever been to a meeting or workshop where issues related to democracy, human rights, or the constitution had been discussed in the past year; whether they had attended organized teachings about democracy and the Constitution at their church, mosque or place of worship; whether they had attended theatre and drama presentations; and whether they had attended public lectures and discussions about democracy and the Constitution. Then, respondents were asked to estimate how many of the organized workshops and other events they had attended. These responses are summarized in Table VI-1.

Table VI-1. Overall Exposure to NCEP Activities

Frequency	Workshops	Frequency	Other NCEP Activities
None	84%	None	91%
One	6%	One	5%
Two	5%	Two	2%
Three	3%	More than Two	2%
Four	1%		
Five or More	1%		

Table VI-1 indicates that approximately 16% of the population was exposed to at least one NCEP workshop, and 9% were exposed to other activities such as drama and puppet shows (3%) and other public lectures or events (9%). Because there is considerable overlap in the numbers of individuals who attended these activities, our best estimate of the proportion of Kenyans exposed to *any* NCEP activity is 16-17%. Thus from the survey estimates, it appears that approximately one Kenyan citizen out of six was directly reached by the NCEP throughout the course of the Program.

Of course, we cannot be certain that individual self-reports of their workshop or other civic education exposure is entirely accurate, and thus the estimate is subject to some uncertainty. This is especially the case, given the sample size of 1,761 and its attendant margin of error of approximately 2.3 percentage points. Nevertheless, the available evidence from the TAT’s own NCEP Activities data base provides some verification of our estimate. As part of the Form D that was submitted to the TAT after each activity, the implementing CSOs was required to provide information on the total numbers of individuals who were trained. Based on analysis of the Activities database as of October 28, 2002, the numbers of

individuals trained in the nearly 52,000 NCEP activities was approximately 3,908,000, or approximately 14% of the Kenyan population. Given that some individuals attended more than one activity, the extent of exposure is likely to be somewhat lower than 14%. But it is also the case that more activities were added to the TAT Activities data case since October 28, thus pushing the estimate slightly upwards again. We conclude that the more than 52,000 NCEP activities undertaken most likely reached approximately 15% of the overall population. By any reasonable standards, and compared to nearly all adult civic education programs in developing democracies, the Programme had very sizeable “reach” into the Kenyan population as a whole.²³

B. The Socio-Economic Profile of NCEP Participants: The Question of Representativeness

The large numbers of individuals trained in the NCEP, however, do not necessarily mean that the “reach” of the program extended to all segments of the Kenyan population equally. In our report on the pre-workshop survey findings, it was noted that individuals in our workshop sample were somewhat less likely to come from the lowest education and income strata in Kenyan society. Approximately 62% of the workshop sample reported 5000 Ksh or less in household income, compared with 82% in the 2001 NCEP Baseline Survey, and only 47% of the workshop sample attained a primary school education or less, compared to 61% in the NCEP Baseline Survey. Similar patterns are found in our post-NCEP National Survey, as can be seen in Table VI-2.

As shown in Table-2, the kinds of individuals who attended civic education activities are of somewhat higher socio-economic status than the average person in Kenya. NCEP participants were less likely to be in the lowest income strata, less likely to be in the lower educational strata, and less likely to live in informal dwellings than the average Kenyan. This is not to say that the civic education activities were elite-oriented, as over 60% of NCEP participants did report household incomes of less than 5000 Ksh and over two-thirds did have secondary education or less. Rather, what appears to be the case is that individuals in the *lowest* strata are underrepresented. This conclusion is supported by the findings reported here for type of dwelling: only 12% of NCEP participants reside in dwellings of grass, thatch or mud.

The implications of this finding are by no means straightforward. First, given the fact that much civic education is conducted by CSOs through other CSOs, it is to be expected that participants in civic education activities will tend to be more socially integrated than the average individual. Moreover, since individuals who are members or otherwise active within civil society organizations tend *not* to come from the very lowest socio-economic strata in society, the findings here are not especially surprising. Second, we found earlier that the effects of civic education were especially pronounced among individuals who were members of the community groups that were involved in the NCEP workshops. To the extent that the participants in NCEP workshops were more likely to be group members, the effects of the program overall were *greater* than they would have been had more socially isolated and less advantaged Kenyans been included among the participants. In this way, the socio-economic “skew” of the Programme worked to enhance its overall effects on Kenyan democratic orientations.

²³ The Activities data base also confirms that meetings and workshops constituted the vast majority of activities of the NCEP (86%), with congregational fora (7%) and theatre and puppet shows constituting about 5.4% of all activities.

Table VI-2. Socio-Economic Attributes of NCEP Participants

	National Survey	Pre-Post Workshop Sample	2001 National Baseline Survey
MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME			
LT 5000 Ksh	61%	62%	82%
MT 5000 Ksh	39%	38%	18%
EDUCATION			
Primary or Less	30%	47%	61%
Secondary or Less	39%	43%	29%
High School or More	31%	10%	10%
DWELLING			
Formal	88%	82%	43%
Informal (grass, thatch, mud)	12%	18%	58%
URBAN/RURAL RESIDENCE			
Urban	27%	20%	14%
Rural	73%	80%	86%

Nevertheless, the findings in the previous chapter also indicate that poorer and less educated individuals who did attend NCEP workshops changed in their democratic attitudes, values, and participatory tendencies at least as much as did the better-off respondents. On many dimensions, in fact, individuals in the lower strata who were trained in the NCEP experienced *greater* amounts of change than those in the higher strata. This indicates that increased efforts at targeting poorer and less educated individuals in civic education programs will not lead to a dilution of program impact, provided that a reasonable number of these individuals are also members or otherwise engaged in civil society groups. What appear to be more consequential in producing civic education impact, are the social processes and dynamics that take place within the CSOs themselves, and not the socio-economic level of the participants. To this extent, careful targeting of appropriate groups of less well-off Kenyans could yield substantially more of these types of individuals in future civic education programs, while maintaining the same robust effects as were seen in the NCEP.²⁴

C. The Extent of “Correct” Training of Workshop and Other NCEP Participants

In the Pre-Post analysis, we have shown evidence that civic education impact is maximized under three general conditions: 1) when individuals attend multiple workshops, as one or two exposures often produced little substantive change in the individual’s orientations; 2) when individuals are trained using many participatory teaching methods; and 3) when individuals engage in post-workshop discussions with many other individuals. In that analysis we found less powerful effects associated with the perceived qualities of the workshop leaders, although on political participation and the constitution variables, individuals changed more when their instructors were perceived to be knowledgeable, inspiring, and interesting. We can use the national survey data to assess the extent to which individuals trained in the NCEP workshops and other activities generally met these three conditions.²⁵ The results are shown in Table VI-3.

²⁴ This conclusion is supported by the fact that, in the Pre-Post analysis, the impact of civic education on changes in knowledge and tolerance among poorer individuals who are *not* members of the groups involved in the workshop is nearly three times smaller than the effects seen for wealthier non-group members.

²⁵ The duration of the workshop is also an important factor in the effectiveness of civic education, but we did not ask for this information from respondents in the National Survey.

Table VI-3. Beneficial Training Conditions, Workshop Participants Only

FREQUENCY OF EXPOSURE		DISCUSSED OWN WORKSHOP WITH:	
One	39%	None	5%
Two	29%	1 or 2 People	8%
Three	17%	3 to 5 People	22%
Four	5%	More than 5 People	65%
Five	10%		
PARTICIPATORY TEACHING METHODS		DISCUSSED OTHERS' WORKSHOPS WITH:	
None	13%	None	29%
One	22%	1 or 2 People	19%
Two	22%	3 to 5 People	17%
Three	15%	More than 5 People	35%
Four	13%		
Five	8%		
Six	7%		
PERCEPTIONS OF INSTRUCTOR QUALITY		DISCUSSED OTHERS' WORKSHOPS WITH: (AMONG THOSE WHO DID NOT ATTEND WORKSHOPS):	
Not Highest Quality	55%	None	68%
Highest Quality	45%	1 or 2 People	17%
		3 to 5 People	8%
		More than 5 People	7%

The findings for workshop frequency suggest that most individuals were *not* exposed to a sufficient number of workshops to ensure high levels of impact. Approximately 39% of individuals exposed to any workshops attended only one, with another 29% attending two, yielding a total of 68% of the workshop participants in the “low frequency” category. This is sufficient to produce *some* impact of civic education, but, as was shown in chapter IV, the effects among these groups were often weak in substantive terms. Still, some 32% of workshop participants did attend three or more workshops, and approximately one in ten attended five or more NCEP workshops, thus the record overall is not inadequate. Nevertheless, the potential impact of NCEP workshops was only partially realized because many participants did not experience the intensive exposure to civic education messages necessary to produce greater effects.

As concerns participatory methods and teacher quality, the evidence is also mixed. We asked about six different participatory teaching methods in the national sample, including all of those asked in the Pre-Post survey except for mock trials and judicial proceedings. If we use three or more of the six methods as the dividing line, we can say that the majority of individuals (57%) experienced a relatively low level of participatory methods in their workshop instruction, with one out of eight experiencing no participatory methods and another one in 5 experiencing only one. Again, over 2 in 5 workshop attendees were trained with many active methods, and 54% did believe that their instructors were knowledgeable, interesting, and inspiring, and these are both positive results. But, as with workshop frequency, the findings indicate that there was much slippage between the *potential* effects of the workshops and what they *actually* produced. But, as with workshop frequency, the findings indicate that there was much slippage between the *potential* effects of the workshops and what they *actually* produced.

The results suggest that there was likely to have been significant “secondary” effects of the NCEP program throughout the past year. Individuals who were trained in NCEP workshops were very likely to have spoken to many other individuals about their own experiences; nearly two-thirds spoke to five or

more, and fewer than one in eight participants spoke to only one person or no one. The findings indicate that a large number of workshop participants experienced an additional boost in effects through post-workshop discussions.

The figures for discussing the workshop experiences of others are somewhat less striking. About one-half of all workshop participants had at least three other people talk to them about workshops that the *others* had attended, and, as was seen in the previous chapter, these kinds of discussions often lead to substantial additional impacts, over and above the individual's own workshop experiences. This indicates that a good deal of post-workshop discussion took place during the time period of the NCEP. The sole caveat to this conclusion is that the number of post-workshop discussions appears to have been concentrated mainly among those who attended NCEP workshops. When examining individuals who did not attend any workshops themselves, we found that only 7% were spoken to by five or more workshop participants and only 15% were spoken to by three. This indicates that the actual benefits of NCEP secondary effects was somewhat more limited than they might otherwise have been, as most of the post-workshop discussions took place among those who themselves were already NCEP participants. There were, to be sure, significant amounts of discussion by workshop participants to non-workshop participants, but there was a greater tendency for the secondary effects of civic education to reinforce the primary effects from direct experience. To this extent, greater effects would have been seen had workshop participants discussed democracy and constitution-related issues with individuals outside the network of individuals who already were civic education participants.

VII. INSIGHTS FROM FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

As part of the assessment of NCEP impact, we convened six different focus group discussions with NCEP participants between August and October 2003. Between eight and twelve individuals attended each discussion, which lasted approximately two hours. These semi-structured discussions were led by a trained Research International facilitator, following an outline prepared after the quantitative analyses of the Pre-Post and National Survey components of the study had been completed. The primary goals of the focus groups were: to explore participants' experiences with civic education during the NCEP period; to assess how the civic education training may have affected them in ways that were not adequately captured through the quantitative survey data; and to elicit suggestions for how they believe civic education may best be implemented in the future in order to maximize the effects on participants and thus further the process of democratization in Kenya.

The original plan for the focus group discussions was to carry out five discussions with individuals who had attended NCEP workshops. One discussion was planned for individuals attending CRECO workshops, one for individuals attending GENDER workshops, one for individuals attending ECEP workshops, and two for individuals attending CEDMAC workshops, as the latter consortium was not represented in the Pre-Post component of the study. One CEDMAC focus group was planned for Mombassa and the other for Garissa in North East province, which enabled us to have some information in the study concerning civic education in that large and sparsely populated region of the country. Representatives of both the ECEP and CEDMAC consortia, however, suggested that it would also be fruitful to speak with facilitators who ran workshops that their groups had conducted. We were able to convene an additional workshop for ECEP facilitators, and we included facilitators along with the participants in the Garissa focus group for CEDMAC as well. The six discussions were convened according to the following schedule:

Table VII-1 Schedule and Characteristics of the Focus Groups

Group	Area	Consortia	Type of participants	Date	No. of participants
1	Nairobi	ECEP	Facilitators	13 / 8 / 2003	10
2	Nairobi (Kayole)	ECEP	Individuals	10 / 9 / 2003	12
3	Nairobi	CRECO		13 / 8 / 2003	9
4	Mombassa	CEDMAC	Facilitators/individuals	30 / 9 / 2003	9
5	North Eastern(Garissa)			7 / 10 / 2003	10
6	Nyanza (Oyugis)	GENDER	Individuals	15 / 8 / 2003	11

The individual consortia took responsibility for recruiting individuals to participate in each discussion. Participants from diverse backgrounds and ages were included in the discussions, and, where appropriate, participants from different religious backgrounds and different genders.

A. The Effects of NCEP Workshops

Much of what the focus group participants reported about the effects of the NCEP workshops is consistent with the findings from the quantitative analyses of the pre and post workshop interviews. Participants were in general satisfied with the workshops and believed that they had learned a good deal about constitutional issues and more generally about democracy as a result of their workshop experiences. Individuals reported that their awareness of the constitution, its contents, and the constitutional reform process had increased substantially. The following quotations illustrate this finding:

The constitution we are using right now is the one that was done during independence. It was done by a few people who saw that Kenya needed independence but this one is a people-driven constitution and we hope that it will bring change into our lives as Kenyans since we contributed to it. (Participant, GENDER discussion)

The first constitution did not help us because it undermined women. You know some women are very bright and would have contributed a lot to development but you find that the men had sat on them. So you find that this second constitution will enable us to get a larger female representative in parliament. (Participant, GENDER discussion)

Since I was born it's the only other day I knew the meaning of the constitution. I now understand that learning about the constitution is the right of every Kenyan, I think this knowledge made many Kenyans to vote in the last general elections (Participant, CRECO discussion)

For many participants, this increased awareness of the constitution both reflected and reinforced a newfound confidence in their abilities to take part in the political process. We referred to this orientation as “political efficacy” in the quantitative sections of the report, and the following quotations illustrate how respondents describe their growing political competence:

I remember a few years back I never knew there is something called the constitution, I did not understand what it was. I came to understand what the constitution in depth, I came to understand what we could air on views which could help me and my children, may people did not know all this, people thought that the President had the final word. We forgot that we Kenyans could change this constitution even on President's powers. Let me say that these workshops have really helped me as a citizen to air my views. (Participant, CEDMAC Mombassa discussion)

Through civic education I saw that there was real need for a new constitution and coming up with a few changes. People had the right to air the view on what to change in each section and any section. A good example is we Muslims, we had a section which needed some changes especially the Khadi court which up to now there is still some conflicts as we did not want to be seen as second class citizens. So what Muslims what is just to be heard so during this civic education workshop people aired their views on Khadi courts, it's one of the issues among many issues. This was heard and later on discussed in Bomas of Kenya and put in the Draft, and they pass it. I saw this as a big achievement as a Muslim. (Participant, CEDMAC Mombassa discussion)

So you can use that constitution to take advantage of me because I will be so ignorant in so many other things, but now at least I know that if someone one does something there are powers to deal with him, that is what we call the constitution and that is one thing we understand (Participant, ECEP Kayole discussion)

His constitution has helped us a lot because you find that fathers never wanted to take their girls to school but now when it is put in place they will all go. Widows are mistreated by their husband's relatives who take away their land because they know they don't have the strength to do anything to them or resources to go elsewhere. With the new constitution in place you find widows will be given their rights and will have a voice. I am happy about this. (Participant, GENDER discussion)

The focus group discussions, however, yielded several important insights about the ways that NCEP workshops affected participants that were not demonstrated fully in the quantitative analyses. Perhaps the most important is the sense that participants developed about their *rights* in the new Kenyan political process, and particularly about the ways that the power of the state, the President and the police against the individual are constrained by the rule of law. Given the history of authoritarian rule in Kenya, this newfound appreciation for the limited powers of the state and the inherent rights of individuals is particularly important. Numerous participants claimed that their workshop experience had imparted this sense of individual rights against state power:

Me, I am happy to know that even me as a hawker I have rights. Because sometimes when I see a policeman I think that is the end of my world. Now I have known that is not the end. I have rights in this country and this is one thing that has made me happy. (Participant, CRECO discussion)

Me I am seeing there are a lot of changes. A big one because before you could not talk about the President or even come here and mention the President we would now be arrested but now we have rights. (Participant, ECEP Kayole discussion)

This democracy helps us to know how much we stand for our rights. For example the chiefs can't tell us to do something and we do it while knowing it is against our rights. It taught us that we have our rights as citizens. The woman also has rights this is what we learnt. (Participant, GENDER discussion)

There was a time when the President could order that you are taken to court and the common man like me would not know why someone has been detained. There is the issue of the President being above the law that really hurt us a lot, because some people were killed without knowing what their crimes were. If the President said something it was acted upon immediately. So this new constitution should remove the excess powers of the President such as that of being above the law. (Participant, GENDER discussion)

Previously there was fear of speaking out, we did not have the freedom of speech. I think this where the problem was based, because whenever you spoke, the government would take action and you would face the music. But now we have the freedom and we can now be heard because of the civic education that has been brought. (Participant, CEDMAC Mombassa discussion)

They emphasized more on the importance of education and pastoralism. Also the bill of rights, powers within an individual like the police are not supposed to search where he is not authorized to, he must have a warrant (Participant, CEDMAC Garissa discussion)

Another important workshop effect that is not reflected completely in the survey analyses concerns the participant's increased sense that an individual should vote according to his or her own preferences and not those dictated by the individual's family or ethnic group. To some degree, this is reflected in the survey measures of efficacy and the importance of voting, but the quotations reveal an even deeper sense that individuals learned from the workshops that their vote truly belonged *to them*. As participants in the ECEP Nairobi group and the CEMAC Garissa group claimed:

To me, I know it helped me because I choose my rights, I was not forced. Before it was you had to vote for KANU, now you don't have to vote for KANU. KANU is there but you make a choice of your own. Your right not by force.

Before they are only used to know that you have to vote for KANU and if you don't vote for KANU its like you are asking for war. You are actually spoiling for the chief, but now you know you vote for the person you want. The one promising you the things you want or they way you want the country to progress, because before that, the one that had a lot of support Because one didn't know parties stand for different things and so now you listen for the one that impresses you, and you go to that side.

People used to vote for a person because from his/her own class or was a relative but now where civic education comes in, people become enlightened and they vote for the right person regardless of clanship or being a relative.

You know people think that democracy is when you get what you want when your brother, your sister or your whoever is in the cabinet, what he is doing it tends to be many people tended to think that as Kenyatta was the president from our tribe many of us Kikuyus though that whatever he is doing is good because he is our brother. After this education I found our that people are beginning to understand the interests of the nation other that the interest of the tribal clan and I can recommend that it is important to keep on reaching our people.

In the two CEDMAC focus groups, participants mentioned that the NCEP workshops had increased their sense of inclusion in Kenyan society, and made them more aware of their rights and the rights of Muslims more generally. The following quotations illustrate these increased feelings of ethnic and religious inclusion:

Well personally, what I see has come up is the issue of some people seeing themselves as more important than others. I see there are no first class or second class citizens, there is no one who is marginalized. We are supposed to equal regardless of colour, religion, or what. Even if your complexion is white, you should not be inferior to people who are black. So this is the most important thing, we are all human beings and we all have the same rights.

But we see ourselves as second hand citizens. I do not know its because of our colour or religion, we do not know. So that's why when this new constitution comes out, we will feel as equal human beings.

Through civic education I saw that there was real need for a new constitution and coming up with a few changes. People had the rights to air the views on what to change in each section and any section. A good example is we Muslims, we had a section which needed some changes, especially the Kadhi court, which u to now there are still conflicts as Muslims, we did not want to be seen as second class citizens. What the Muslims want is just to be heard, so during this civic education workshop people aired their views on Kadhi courts, its one of the issues among many issues. We a people of the coast we got lessons from the Imams which was a big score. This was heard and later on discussed in Bomas of Kenya and put in the draft, and they passed it. I saw this as a big achievement as a Muslim.

The constitution states that the distribution of resources should be exercised to everyone, regardless of your race or religion in the country. Now North Eastern province can understand about issues on infrastructure and development.

B. Suggestions for Improving Civic Education

The focus groups also produced a wealth of suggestions from participants regarding how to improve the workshops and civic education more generally in Kenya in the future. Many of the suggestions reinforce the findings from the report thus far. For example, many individuals suggested that there should be longer workshop sessions with active participatory teaching methods:

But you find even to make people understand the basic meaning of the word democracy it takes about a day... (Participant, ECEP Nairobi discussion)

They should take ample time, enough time to actually come up with a good document. Maybe in a day they should teach one or two issues at most. (Participant, CRECO discussion).

Also the issue of the constitution, where they have a lot to talk about and cannot be talked in one day, let them maybe have a subheading. For example if it is about governance or democracy let them tackle it one by one so that they can actually tackle the whole issues exhaustively. Let them have good progress. (Participant, CRECO discussion)

Me I suggest more resources should be put in. Like what you see now aside at times you are told to come in the afternoon, we are taught for about 2 hours. But if you make it lets say on a Saturday, that is why I am talking of resources. On a full day, Saturday, it will require more things, like say drinks and lets say lunch. That way people would relate well and get ample time to ask questions and there be more openings, but in two hours, the time is too short, even if it is introducing the constitution alone that time is very short. (Participant, ECEP Kayole discussion).

So one would like a whole day, then we are suggestion more resources should be out, especially, and make sure it's a whole day workshop even if it has to deal with democracy only, it should be a whole day. (Participant, CRECO discussion).

There was group work and class lecture. Group work would give those people who cannot talk in front of others a chance to talk in their small groups. So group work helps a lot, though there should be a balance. A lecture should start the session and later we have the groups... (Participant, CRECO discussion).

I think it all depends on the topic and groups, like the youth you can prepare a skit which can pass the message. Then the discussion, it all depends on the topic you are covering and the group you are targeting. Passing a message goes deeper if it is accompanied with a song, a poem, depending on the group and the topic they would not understand if you just started lecturing. (Participant, ECEP discussion).

A related theme was that there should be more extensive training of the facilitators to provide better instruction in the workshops and to ensure that participants are more engaged in the workshop process. Participants' evaluation of the facilitators was quite mixed, with a significant amount of criticism directed at facilitators who were not well prepared and who could not communicate to participants in their own languages. Some criticisms about the facilitators' training came from the facilitators themselves, as the following comments from the ECEP Nairobi group make clear:

See what happened there was a bit of rush because I can recall the first time we were at Limuru, those who were trained did not know what to train. You don't just take somebody to

be in the workshop, then the next minute he becomes a facilitator. You must prepare him first. One has to know the best thing to present information.

They (the facilitators) used to fear because they could be asked questions that they are not able to answer. I think the training they got was not enough and also most of them were ignorant about the constitution....Most of them had not even stood in front of a crowd before.

There were many comments about the training of the facilitators and their performance in other focus group discussions as well:

So we also met this teacher who had come to teach us. Most things, we did not understand. If he come to teach constitution he just starts talking and if we ask a question we are wondering whether these teachers were given proper training. (Participant, ECEP Kayole discussion).

Okay, we have some wazees who cannot understand English, but the facilitators use English and this wazee do not understand anything. So when the seminars are over, this guy has not gotten absolutely nothing. Actually its not the wazees mistake....I cannot blame the wazees....They should look for an interpreter. (Participant, CRECO discussion).

The facilitators should be local people, especially from their own village. They should come from around here, someone that we know and who knows us.(Participant, CEDMAC Garissa discussion).

Let's have people who speak both Somali, English, and even Swahili. Should be someone who is known in the village within, good contact and through his he should get good suggestions from the elders. (Participant, CEDMAC Garissa discussion).

Most don't understand English, especially the ones who came during those workshops on democracy. If you ask many people what it meant, no one will tell you what it was all about, it was taught in English. If possible it should be taught in all languages, Kikuyu, Luo, and it should be interpreted in that language. (Participant, ECEP Kayole discussion).

Use as many languages as possible, Even if it means if you go to Kiambu you use Kikuyu, it you go to Luoland, jalu, if you to Masai land you use Kimasai. Because at that time they would be understanding, not just knowing the names and saying democracy. (Participant, ECEP Kayole discussion).

There was a time when I really got angry during a workshop. I was trying to raise a point I had learnt from other workshops but the facilitator could not even listen. She assumed she was someone who cannot make mistakes and that whatever she said was right. (Participant, CRECO discussion).

There were suggestions in many of the focus group discussion regarding organizational issues for groups conducting civic education. Some suggestions focused on the need for more extensive invitations and publicity for the workshops, others on the need for better transportation, and others on the need for more incentives for participants to attend workshops more frequently.

We have a problem here because we have people who would like to attend these workshops but they could not get any information. So I think they should even put it on radio, let them announce about these seminars that it is at this place and all that. If it is issuing out letters,

people will invite their friends along, yet it is something for everyone. That's a mistake these people make. (Participant, CRECO discussion).

The organization of workshops in the rural areas is disorganized and taken lightly as compared to the ones in the urban areas, which are arranged in a very good way. The facilitators are also different. They are good in town, whereas in the villages they are different as most of them cannot facilitate like the ones in town. (Participant, CRECO discussion).

The last time we talked to the people it was at an assistant chief's baraza so the people who attended went and informed others whom later on asked why they hadn't been informed. They said we should invite everyone not only those who received the letters this shows that they were happy with what we taught them and would like us to continue doing so. (Participant, GENDER discussion).

I feel the attendance is low but when people hear there is food to be eaten they come in large numbers. So I feel that is what you can improve on because in the first workshop food and money was given out. This enabled us to buy something small for the children when we got back. So when people hear there is money they will come but when it is food alone and no money some may come and some may not. In this way they get informed and will come back the following day. During the first workshop just a few people got money and those who missed went home very unhappy. I think you should plan well in advance and say the number of people you feel should attend these workshops. The letters should be sent earlier and people should be given a small token. (Participant, GENDER discussion).

Secondly most people here work for 12 hours from morning till evening and when you tell them to attend a workshop they will tell you that they are not going to gain anything and would prefer weeding their shamba instead of attending the workshops and coming home empty handed. They feel it is time wasting. If they got something small they would attend. (Participant, GENDER discussion).

Means of transport from various places to where the workshop is being held and some sort of payment to induce them into liking the workshops should be introduced. People are skipping workshops because of lack of this. There is no proper organization at the grassroots level. (Participant, GENDER discussion).

People were after money if told of workshop somewhere. They will first ask you 'will we be paid?' Even if he/she has not attended he/she want to know and if there is not money then they won't attend. (Participant, ECEP Kayole discussion).

There was much discussion in the sessions regarding the means through which individuals could be encouraged to speak with others in their communities about the issues raised in the workshops. Several participants suggested that materials such as pamphlets and posters would be particularly effective to use to stimulate discussions after the workshops were completed, while others suggested that participants be given some token or button to signify to others that they had attended a workshop, and others suggested that one or two participants be designated to serve as community discussion leaders in the future. In all of the focus groups, the benefits of encouraging post-workshop discussions were recognized by the participants.

You would be having things like books so that like now we are here when we live here and go boast to whatever you can at least show someone, this is what we were taught. With a book or

something like that, even a child could pick the book to read. (Participant, ECEP Kayole discussion).

We should have materials for the workshops, like papers, pens and pamphlets and maybe some pictures. They are learning and discovering new things, which they will later go and share with other people. (Participant, GENDER discussion).

These facilitators should give the people who attend the workshops a symbol of identification so that it can motivate others to come. (Participant, CRECO discussion).

After attended the workshop you would be give a T-shirt, badge, or any symbol and if you happen to walk in the estate people will ask you where you got it. It is at this point therefore that you will tell them that you got from a workshop. That symbol impresses him and you get an opportunity to explain to him and he gets the morale to ask. If you have a pen or badge it will impress him and he will tell you to invite him if you hear of another one. (Participant, CRECO discussion).

I am giving suggestions for improving the workshop. After reaching people in the workshop they should select two or so people to interact with the facilitators so that they can also help them spread the teachings to other people. (Participant, CRECO discussion)

Another suggestion for improvement concerned civic education in the Muslim community, as participants in the CEDMAC discussion recommended that Imams and religious leaders be more closely integrated into the process:

Personally I would urge this organization to educate people on civic education to work hand in hand with the Imams so that they can walk sublocations together, villages as they educate people.

We as Muslims believe there is no more effective way of getting in touch with Muslims like on Fridays, although we visit the mosque almost every day. On Fridays the congregation is big such that the Imam is able to give a certain sermon which is heard by many. So even with civic education, he can give a sermon in the morning, lunch time, prayer time, evening time, sunset time and even at night.

I agree with my friends that the most effective way is through the Imams. There is another way which is the classroom, but you find that people tend to relax, they do not put more emphasis in a classroom as compared to a mosque.

I totally agree that there is no other way that would be effective like teaching in a mosque. You find that the congregation pays attention to what this Imam is saying, simply because they believe that this is a leader who is there are speaks the truth. So whatever he says it sticks in my mind throughout. So what I mean is that the most effective way to teach civic education as Muslims is through the Imams because we believe that he speaks the truth.

Finally, participants in the focus group discussions believed that civic education should be a more widespread aspect of Kenyan political life. Participants suggested that it be offered to children in the formal school system, and that individuals should be encouraged to attend continuously as they reach adulthood.

I feel the children nowadays are very bright and need to be taught about these things. It will therefore be good if this was introduced in schools rather than being a daily activity for workshops only. (Participant, CRECO discussion).

I suggest that civic education should be taught earlier and that it should be continuous. We should not wait to the last minute. (Participant, CEDMAC Garissa discussion).

These things should be taught to the growing up children so that they can be aware what the constitution is about. This is so that they are aware who they are voting for and why instead of waiting until May or June to be called for many workshops on civic education. It should be a continuous process. (Participant, CRECO discussion).

We need to teach civic education on a day to day basis. Not only that, it ought to be in the school curriculum in order for those growing up to know his or her rights and her country is to be governed. (Participant, ECEP Nairobi discussion).

Education is a continuous process, it is not something that has to stop, once you start educating someone he wants it to be on a daily basis. Civic education is not only about constitution alone but other issues that citizens want to be educated about. It could be about economy, positive and negative aspects of the government, all this is civic education. Civic education is something that can be done on a daily basis, not centered on one aspect, but it is a continuous process. People need to know updates about government, about how the economy is faring, people airing their views, even about law. Personally, this is something that should go on an on, maybe after six months, twice a year would be advantageous to us. (Participant, CEDMAC Mombassa discussion).

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE CIVIC EDUCATION

The present study was designed to assess the effectiveness of the Kenyan National Civic Education Programme (NCEP) in promoting democratic values, awareness, and engagement in the constitutional review process among ordinary Kenyan citizens. To accomplish this task, a complex, multi-stage research design has been implemented since late 2001, including a) interviews with 2301 NCEP workshop participants and matched control group individuals, both before the workshops took place in early 2002 and in late 2003 and early 2003 after the Programme was completed; b) interviews concerning exposure to NCEP activities from a representative national sample of 1,761 individuals; and c) focus group discussions with NCEP participants and facilitators from the four participating CSO consortia.

From analysis of the changes between the pre and post workshop interviews with workshop participants and non-participants, we arrived at a series of findings regarding the specific democratic orientations that were most likely to change as a result of exposure to NCEP activities, the kinds of activities that were most effective, the conditions under which NCEP workshops and other activities were most likely to produce change, the types of individuals who were most strongly affected by the training, and the ways that interpersonal processes and group dynamics enhanced the effectiveness of NCEP exposure among the participants. Using the findings from interviews with our national sample, we arrived at estimates of the proportion of Kenyan citizens who were trained in the NCEP, the ways that the program participants reflected the various socio-economic strata within Kenyan society, and the extent to which the participants in the NCEP were trained in ways that were most conducive to beneficial impact.

Our overall assessment of the impact of the Programme is highly positive, with some important qualifications. The findings suggest that NCEP activities were effective in changing many important democratic orientations and behaviors. Coupled with the findings from previous assessments in other countries, there can now be little doubt that civic education can be an important instrument for democratic change. At the same time, the Kenyan results suggest that the effects of civic education are influenced strongly by the amount and the duration of the individual's exposure to workshops and other activities, on the kinds of instructional methods used, and on the degree to which individuals engage in discussions about democracy issues *after* their direct exposure to civic education. Large numbers of individuals were not trained under NCEP in ways that were most conducive to program impact, and to this extent, the Programme's effects were more limited than they could – and perhaps should – have been.

The findings have important implications for the design and implementation of future civic education programs, both in Kenya and other developing democracies. In this chapter we shall first summarize the key results from the study, and then outline several recommendations for the future.

A. Summary of Findings

1. Basic Findings

The strongest effects of NCEP workshop participation were on orientations related to the Kenyan constitution and the ongoing constitutional review process. Individuals trained in NCEP workshops, compared with non-workshop participants, were much more likely to have seen a copy of the Kenyan constitution, to be aware of its contents, and to be familiar with proposals for constitutional reform by the end of the NCEP than at the beginning. Given that the major impetus for the NCEP itself was to contribute to individuals' awareness of the constitutional review process and proposals for reform, these results indicate that the Programme was highly successful in achieving this goal.

Programme activities also had significant impact on what we have called “civic competence,” the individual’s knowledge about politics and belief in their abilities to influence the political process, as well as on political interest and participation. Although these effects were not as large as those seen for the constitutional orientations, they do indicate that workshops and other NCEP activities increased participants’ general knowledge and engagement with the political system, relative to non-participants. The consistency of the effects across virtually all of the engagement and competence orientations we have examined leaves little doubt that the Programme achieved substantial success on changing these dimensions.

At the same time, the Programme had more limited impacts on the individual’s adherence to democratic values, social values that support democratic processes, and support for political institutions. Three important democratic and social values – political tolerance, support for the rule of law, and an increased national versus tribal identity – did show some overall change that was modest in size. For all other values that we examined, there were no statistically significant differences in the changes over time between individuals who were exposed to NCEP workshops and other activities and those who were not. The results are consistent with the findings from previous impact studies, where civic education in countries such as South Africa and the Dominican Republic also had much less success in changing democratic values than civic competence, engagement and political participation.

The findings do *not* indicate that Kenyans decreased in their support for democracy and democratic values during the time period covered by the NCEP. On the contrary, there was substantial pro-democratic change on many of these orientations, such that virtually all Kenyans now believe that democracy is the best form of government and support certain fundamental features of democratic politics, such as a strong opposition and the freedom of political expression. However, these trends were virtually identical for individuals who attended NCEP activities and those who did not.

The analyses also revealed that, among the range of NCEP activities, workshops and organized teachings about democracy and the constitution had the greatest impact on participants. Exposure to theatre, drama presentations and puppet shows, though sometimes important, generally produced less powerful effects on individual attitudes, once the overall level of workshop exposure was taken into account. Further, the national data suggest that most exposure to the NCEP was through workshops and other organized teachings, as approximately 16% of the sample reported that they attended a workshop or organized teaching, compared with about 9% who reported that they attended other activities. These estimates were generally consistent with the findings from the records obtained from the NCEP Technical Assistance Team’s activities database. To this extent, the Programme tended to emphasize the kinds of activities that produced the greater individual-level impacts.

2. *Conditions Producing Greater Civic Education Impact*

We found consistent evidence that workshop conditions, that is the frequency, duration, content and, in some instances, perceived teaching quality, were important determinants of individual change. These conditions, however, were not ‘met’ for significant numbers of NCEP participants; thus, the optimistic conclusions of the previous section are tempered with the conclusion that the *potential* impacts of NCEP civic education were often not fully realized.

First, we found that one or two workshop exposures were usually insufficient for producing meaningful democratic change, while more substantial effects were registered for individuals who attended workshop activities more frequently. In some cases, moreover, individuals who were trained in three or more workshops were the *only* individuals who registered changes on particular democratic orientations.. This finding leads to one of the main conclusions of the study: intensive exposure to NCEP civic education

messages was a necessary pre-requisite for meaningful individual change. And, given the fact that only between one-quarter and one-third of the participants attended three or more NCEP workshops, the overall effects of the Programme were lessened as a result.

Analysis of the Form D information provided by the implementing civil society organizations regarding the duration of the workshops covered in the study strongly supports this general conclusion. Individuals who attended workshops of four hours or less often showed little change in democratic orientations compared with individuals in the control group. When workshops lasted more than four hours, the effects on participants increased significantly, and the strongest effects were registered in workshops that lasted more than one working day, that is more than eight hours. Thus, more intensive amounts of training within a single civic education session are necessary for stimulating individual change. And, as was the case with workshop frequency, the majority (53%) of the workshops we examined *did not* train participants long enough to achieve greater impacts..

We found that the *topics* covered by the workshops significantly influenced the impact of the education received. Workshops that dealt with issues related to constitutionalism and democratization were generally more effective, although governance workshops were also successful in stimulating individual change. Workshops related to nationhood were the least successful, and this topic was covered in the fewest number of NCEP workshops. Workshops that included some discussion of community problems, such as crime or HIV/AIDS, appear to be much more successful than other workshops, and respondents reported that the vast majority of workshops they attended did include these kinds of discussions. To this extent, the topics covered by the majority of NCEP workshops did appear to be conducive to the democratic learning of the participants.

The methods of instruction and the quality of the trainers who led NCEP workshops were also important factors influencing individual change. When workshops were conducted with more participatory teaching methods, such as role-playing exercises, simulations, mock elections, and group problem solving, much larger effects on democratic orientations were registered. In some instances, a threshold effect was found, such that positive changes in attitudes were *only* found when workshops were conducted using many participatory methodologies. However, only about two in five NCEP participants were trained with a variety of these effective teaching methodologies, which again limited the Program's overall effect.

We found that the participants' views on the qualities of the workshop trainers were less important in determining change than the workshop's frequency, duration, and method of instruction. On constitutional awareness and political participation,, individuals who perceived their instructors to be more engaging, knowledgeable and inspiring were more likely to change than individuals with less highly regarded instructors, but on several democratic values the effects showed the opposite pattern.

Finally, we found no significant pattern of effects related to the organizational strategy of the implementing CSO for conducting the workshop. CSOs whose primary entry strategy into the community was through local community-based organizations or women's groups showed substantial impact on many key democratic orientations, but significant effects were also found when entry was made through local elders or opinion leaders. In some instances, notably for political participation, entry through religious gatherings and ceremonies proved effective as well.

3. *Individual Differences in Programme Effects and the Secondary Impact of the NCEP*

We examined whether participation in NCEP activities had greater impact on certain kinds of individuals than others, focusing specifically on a series of important social and demographic characteristics: gender, age, educational attainment, household income, religion, and urban or rural residence. Overall, we found very little difference in the effects of the Programme across these demographic categories. When

differences did emerge, it was usually the case that individuals from less dominant social groups exhibited greater change from NCEP exposure than individuals from more dominant social strata. The Programme appeared to be somewhat more successful in influencing the political efficacy and tolerance of women than of men, and in influencing the interest, efficacy, participation and tolerance of less highly educated and poorer NCEP participants than those who were more well-off. Similarly, religious differences were few, but, based on a relatively small sample of Muslim respondents, it appears that NCEP participation had greater impact on their level of political participation and political tolerance than among Protestant and Catholic respondents. In these ways the findings suggest that the NCEP helped to equalize the pre-existing differences in democratic orientations between many of these groups. The findings also suggest that the broad-based targeting strategy of the NCEP did not hinder its effectiveness; individuals from all social strata were receptive to the Programme messages.

We found strong evidence of the importance of secondary groups and interpersonal social processes in facilitating the impact of NCEP civic education. Individuals who were members of the implementing CSOs or of secondary groups that were invited to NCEP workshops consistently showed more change from the sessions than did non-group members. Further, we found that post-workshop discussions with others were crucial in amplifying and enhancing the impact of the sessions. Individuals who *spoke with others* about their workshop experiences increased significantly more on most democratic orientations than others, and, even more importantly, individuals *to whom other people spoke* about their own workshop experiences showed substantially more change than participants who engaged in few post-workshop discussions. In some cases, respondents who had not attended a workshop changed more as a result of discussions with NCEP participants than did actual participants who did not engage in much discussion afterwards.

This finding suggests that the NCEP had both positive “primary” effects on those who were trained, as well as “secondary” effects from the discussion of workshop topics and issues with NCEP participants. This latter finding, coupled with the fact that large numbers of large numbers of NCEP workshop participants did engage in frequent post-workshop discussions, indicates that secondary effects of the Programme were substantial. The sole qualification to this positive view, however, is that only 15% of the non-workshop respondents discussed NCEP workshops with more than one or two participants, compared with over 50% of the individuals who attended workshops themselves. To some degree, the “secondary effects” of the training served to intensify the Programme’s primary effects, as opposed to reaching individuals outside the immediate social networks of the individual participants. Nevertheless, we take the “secondary effects” of the Program, examined for the first time in this study, to be a very positive result.

B. Recommendations for Future Civic Education

The study’s findings and conclusions have definite implications for how civic education should be structured in the future to maximize individual-level impact. Thus, , we make the following recommendations for the design and implementation of future Kenyan civic education, and, by extension, for programs in other developing democracies.

- 1. Programs should focus on the specific democratic orientations where civic education is both needed and realistically can be expected to achieve significant impact.*

Our findings indicate that Kenyan public opinion has changed profoundly over the past few years, based at least partially on the efforts of the NCEP and other kinds of civic education, as well as from the momentous changes in the overall political environment. For the future of civic education, this means that Kenyans do not need instruction about the advantages of democratic over authoritarian or dictatorial political systems, nor instruction in general democratic principles such as the necessity of political opposition or the rights of free speech. These values are by now nearly universally held in the Kenyan

population. Instead, the findings suggest that civic education is needed to change the more “difficult” values, such as political tolerance, social trust, and support for the rule of law, where individuals must extend democratic liberties and legal rights even to unpopular individuals or groups, and learn to trust and work with others in society to achieve collective political goals. Levels of political knowledge are also somewhat low, and individuals are also relatively disengaged from the political system in terms of actual political participation, as nearly half of all individuals in our study reported participating in zero or one political activity over the past year. These are areas where real changes could have significant impact of the overall health of the democratic system.

At the same time, the study results indicate that not all of these areas can be equally affected by civic education. The evidence suggests that social trust, in particular, is extremely low in Kenyan society but also relatively impervious to change. By contrast, the NCEP was found to have significant impact on tolerance and support for the rule of law, and thus these two values would seem to be promising foci for future civic education programs. Similarly, the NCEP exerted the greatest impact on knowledge and political participation among all of the civic competence and engagement variables. Thus, we recommend that future civic education programs should emphasize those democratic values, beliefs and behaviors that are demonstrably most conducive to change from workshops and other educational activities, taking into account the pre-existing levels of each orientation within Kenyan society.

2. *Programs must be implemented in ways that ensure sustained, multiple exposures to civic education messages.*

The need for repeated exposure to civic education messages cannot be underestimated. As indicated repeatedly throughout the report, multiple workshop exposures, as well as attendance at workshops that lasted more than four hours, are both requisites for significant program impact. This recommendation has several specific implications for program design and implementation.

First, if funds are limited, we recommend strongly that efforts focus on targeting smaller numbers of individuals for more sustained civic education exposures, rather than undertaking a program with a national reach where participants attend only one or two events. The national scope of the NCEP was admirable, but too many of the participants in NCEP activities attended too few events to effect substantial change on many democratic orientations and behaviors. *Efforts must be made to build multiple exposures into future program design.*

Second, efforts must be made to ensure that future workshops are long enough to provide sustained instruction into democracy topics. The number of NCEP workshops that lasted for less than one half a working day was more than 50% in our workshop sample; the comparable figure from the TAT activities database was 56%. These levels of exposure are simply not sufficient to induce significant changes in individual orientations, especially important orientations such as efficacy and tolerance. Again, while the broader brush of the NCEP was an important strategy for reaching as many Kenyans as it did, the strategy carried an equally important price in terms of the extent of its impact.

Third, this recommendation should be applied not only to formal workshops but also to other civic education activities such as dramas, puppet shows, and the like. Our finding that workshops produced larger and more consistent effects than other NCEP activities can almost certainly be attributed to the fact that individuals trained in workshops were more likely to have been exposed to democracy messages in a repeated and relatively more intensive fashion. If other forms of civic education were delivered in more sustained and intensive ways, or combined more rigorously with discussions or other kinds of training, there is reason to expect that these activities can also produce larger effects in the future.

Donors and the implementing CSOs face a number of constraints in structuring civic education programs to facilitate multiple, longer-lasting exposures. Funding, of course, is limited, and prospective participants often cannot sacrifice the time needed for these kinds of instructional activities. Nevertheless, every effort should be made to do as much as possible to overcome these constraints, such as holding them during periods when the demand for agricultural labor is low and holding them at convenient-to-access sites. Inducements to participation in workshops must be provided when possible, transportation must be provided, and workshops must be scheduled at times when participation is most convenient for the participants. Many of these suggestions were echoed in the focus group discussions with NCEP participants. Perhaps most importantly, the workshops themselves should include discussions not only on democracy-related issues, but also on topics of local and community interest such as crime, health, HIV/AIDs, and the like. Such a focus on issues more directly relevant to individuals' daily lives should help ensure participant interest and facilitate multiple workshop exposures.

3. *Civic Education training must make frequent use of active, participatory teaching methods.*

As stressed repeatedly throughout the report, pedagogy in civic education matters. Workshop instruction that made use of role playing, small group problem solving, mock elections, simulations and the like were substantially more effective than lecture-based civic education. This finding echoes previous impact assessments as well as much of the school-based civic education scholarly literature and literature on adult education. But it is also the case that many participatory methods were not used in a large number of the workshops covered by this study. Participatory methods can be more difficult to apply effectively, and require more preparation, training and practice by the instructors themselves. But their use in future civic education is essential, given all that is known about their importance in the learning process.

4. *Training of civic education trainers is of critical importance.*

As just mentioned, conducting civic education workshops using active, participatory teaching methods requires skilled instructors. As such, civic education programs need to include a healthy emphasis on the training of trainers. But the effects of the trainers go beyond their ability to teach democracy-related topics in effective ways. Trainers who are well liked and respected are able to effect greater change among workshop participants, though these changes are not always in a *positive* direction. Under some conditions, it appeared that instructors who were more favorably evaluated by participants led to increased in some more exclusionary values such as political intolerance and feelings of ethnic versus national identity. These were not large effects, but they do caution that the relationship between the workshop instructor and the audience is a complex one that has the potential to impede as well as facilitate democratic change among participants.

5. *Greater efforts should be made to target individuals in lower socio-economic strata, while maintaining the generally group-based focus of Kenyan civic education.*

We found that, despite the best efforts of the implementing CSOs, there was a tendency for individuals with lower levels of household income and education to be underrepresented in NCEP activities. To a large extent, this tendency is the direct result of the group-based emphasis of Kenyan civic education, where most workshops were conducted by one CSO for other organizations that were invited, or that played a prominent role in the workshop's organization. Proportionately fewer lower-strata individuals belong to, or are associated with civil society groups, and thus this "skew" in representation was understandable. And to the extent that civic education has greater impact on members of civil society groups than non-members, this "skew" had a somewhat beneficial effect on the Programme's overall impact.

Nevertheless, future programs may wish to extend the outreach of civic education to include more individuals from the lower socioeconomic strata of Kenyan society. We have shown that these kinds of individuals, when they did attend NCEP activities, changed at least as much as higher status participants, and in many instances showed greater change. Provided that the program targets such individuals through civil society groups with deep outreach, future efforts may be able to include greater numbers of these underrepresented groups while maintaining the same level of robust effects on democratic orientations as were seen in the NCEP.

6. *Programs should emphasize post-workshop discussions of participants, especially with individuals outside of their immediate social networks.*

One of the more intriguing findings of this study was the effect that post-workshop discussions had in amplifying the impact of NCEP activities. If individuals attended workshops *and* discussed the workshop with others, the changes seen in democratic orientations were greater; similarly, if individuals did not attend workshops themselves *but* discussed workshops with individuals who had attended, their levels of democratic change were often larger than those found for some of the NCEP participants. Civic education programs should exploit this possibility to maximize both the reach and the impact of their activities. Participants in civic education programs should be encouraged explicitly to discuss workshop topics with family, friends, colleagues, and neighbors; programs may even develop ways in which these topics can best be broached with different kinds of individuals. And the more that individuals are encouraged to speak to individuals outside of their immediate social networks, the more likely it is that programs will extend their overall reach, and exert secondary impact on individuals who themselves did not directly participate in any training. In these ways, post-workshop discussions should be treated as an integral part of program participation, and CSOs should be encouraged to include specific methods for using such interpersonal processes as means to extend the reach of their activities further into Kenyan society.